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Chapter 1
Taxation and regulation of petroleum companies under asymmetric
information. A discussion of incentive problems and the principles
for applying principal-agent analysis *
1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE THESIS
After the discovery of petroleum reserves on the Norwegian continental shelf the
government had to choose among three basic approaches in administrating these
resources; 1) auctioning drilling rights to private companies, 2) resource extraction
by state-owned companies, or 3) discretionary licensing.! The policy chosen was a
combination of 2) and 3). Drilling rights are given to Norwegian and foreign private
* I would like to thank Kåre P. Hagen, Svein A. Aanes, Geir B. Asheim, Bernt C. Brun, Rune J.
Hagen, Hans O. Husum, Eirik Kristiansen, Diderik Lund, Guttorm Schjelderup, and Øystein Thøgersen
for their helpful comments.
1 In the licensing process, discretion is used in the appointment of operator, the choice of licensees,
the distributions of equity shares among the partners, etc.
1
companies after an application procedure, and the government is a direct participant
through the direct state participation (SDFI) and by the state-owned petroleum
company, Statoil. As foreign petroleum companies had a comparative advantage in
exploration, development and production of oil and gas, an optimal division of labour
implied participation by foreign companies. At the same time the government wanted
to pursue an industrial policy of building up a competitive Norwegian petroleum
industry. As this would require an initial favourable treatment of domestic
companies, auctions were not suited for deciding the licencee structure.? Through
their operating activities the private companies (domestic and foreign) obtain private
information, i.e. information that is not available to the government (the Ministry of
Industry and Energy; MIE). This information asymmetry creates special regulatory
problems.
My research plans are to analyse some of the problems the government faces in
designing and enforcing petroleum taxation and regulation under asymmetric
information. The framework of the analysis is that of principal-agent theory. The
first part of the thesis, chapter 1, discusses principal issues of asymmetric information
in the petroleum industry, and the relevance of applying principal-agent theory. In
the second part, chapters 2, 3 and 4, I construct theoretical models analysing optimal
principles for petroleum taxation and regulation under asymmetric information. The
third part, chapter 5, compares these principles with the current Norwegian system.
By discussing the relevance of incentive theory for the analysis of petroleum taxation,
and by considering the necessary adjustments to be made in the general incentive
theory, I will in this paper build a foundation and give motivation for the subsequent
2 After the transfer of technology and increased competence in Norwegian companies, this is probably
no longer a valid argument against auctions. Another objection to auctions is that the bids will be too
lowas a consequence of imperfect competition (collusion). According to Rowland and Hann [1987],
the exposures to risk, the scale, and the heavy front-end loading of costs, tend to restrict the offshore
industry to an oligopolistic structure. Low bids may also be the consequence of the fact that the
government is not able to commit not to tax the companies heavily after investments have been sunk.
The commitment problem is discussed in section 1.8 below. Optimal auction design under asymmetric
information is treated in section 2.11 and chapter 4.
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analysis. To obtain interesting economic results the theory of mechanism design
makes quite a few assumptions, some of which are not innocuous. In my reading of
this literature I often find the introduction of these assumptions too brief. By
collecting assumptions and principles in a separate paper, I will try to elaborate on
the foundation for principal-agent analysis in the context of petroleum taxation and
regulation.å
1.2 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
From a general point of view, asymmetric information is detrimental to welfare as it
decreases the feasibility set. This is operationalised in principal-agent theory; in
addition to the. participation constraint of models with symmetric information,
asymmetric information necessitates the introduction of incentive constraints. These
constraints make truthtelling a dominant strategy for the agent. With these added
restrictions we cannot reach Pareto-optimum, but must search for a second-best
_!olution. This is known as the Hurwicz conjecture. In the following I will describe
some consequences of asymmetric information for the taxation and regulation of the
petroleum industry.
The government's objective is to extract the rent generated by the scarce petroleum
resources (resource rent)." The most important means for rent extraction are the
licensing conditions and the petroleum tax system. The ideal (Le. non-distorting) tax
base is pure profits, or the multiperiod equivalent; net present value of the cash flow.
Pure profits from an oil or gas field depend partly on characteristics that are particular
3 I will focus on problems related to asymmetric information. For a general survey of economic
aspects of regulation and taxation of the Norwegian petroleum industry, see Lund [1991]. This paper
also gives a good overview of the present Norwegian regulatory regime in this industry. Facts about
the licences and participants on the Norwegial sector, and an outline of the institutional structure in
Norwegian petroleum industry is provided in Ministry of Industry and Energy [1993]. For the recent
tax changes, see Ot.prp. 12, 1991-92.
4 See section 1.4 for a more detailed discussion of the objective function.
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to the field and partly on market conditions in general. With symmetric information
the government can achieve the first best solution, i.e. capture all the economic rent
without distorting the real decisions of the companies. This can be achieved because
the symmetry of information enables MIE to calculate the true economic rent and use
it as the tax base in the income taxation of oil companies.
Through their operating activities, however, the petroleum companies obtain field-
specific information that is not available to the government. The asymmetry of
information is derived from the source of the agency; returns to specialisation.
Examples of such private information are knowledge about the estimated size and
uncertainty of oil reservoirs, and costs of exploration and production. Some costs can
be controlled by auditing, but this is not the case for calculated costs. Due to the
enormous investments in the petroleum industry, the companies' capital costs are very
important. The capital cost is typically a calculated cost that is difficult for MIE to
estimate or verify. 5 Another obstacle to observing true costs in the petroleum
industry, discussed in section 1.11 below, is the possibility for tax arbitrage through
the use of transfer pricing. Due to the asymmetry of information about costs, the
individual companies know more about the economic rent pertaining to a particular
field than the government.
The institutional arrangements in Norwegian petroleum regulation, with a state-
owned oil company, Statoil, and a special regulatory and controlling agency,
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), may to some extent alleviate the problem of
asymmetric information. NPD has the right to participate at partnership meetings in
all licences. The petroleum companies are required to submit technical and economic
5 Lund [1991] points out that the required rate of return in the stock market for an American oil
company is about 5 per cent, whereas the licencees in the Norwegian sector claim they require 10 to
15 per cent rates of return after tax. Lund makes it clear that there may be a justified divergence
between overall and project-specific rate of return requirements. One of the reasons he gives is that
some exploration is unsuccessful; the conditional expected rate of return after successful exploration
must therefore be higher. Lund, however, notes that some of the divergence probably is due to
strategic reporting of capital costs in order to argue for lenient taxation.
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data to NPD. They are also required to submit all their drill tests and seismic data to
the directorate. However, taking into account strategic considerations, the companies
might want to distort their reports of how they interpret these data. By conducting
their own technical surveys, NPD is able to check for some of these distortions,
although not perfectly. Through the process of exploration and production, Statoil
obtains first hand information. As the state-owned company is a large participant in
most of the licences, this information is of direct importance in contributing to
efficient operations in the licences where Statoil is appointed as operator. In addition,
Statoil may also be instrumental for shedding light on licences where it is a
participant but has not been awarded operatorship. From its operations Statoil may
obtain information about the real costs of certain activities, and through the licences it
operates it may gain some information about the true sizes of adjacent reservoirs.
This type of information can be very useful in the regulation of the petroleum
industry. An important assumption for such information to reach the government, is
congruence between the objectives of the government and that of Statoil and NPD. If
Statoil and NPD have agendas of their own, they may (similarly to the private
companies) find it in their own interest to conceal or distort parts of this information.
Despite the efforts of the government, NPD and Statoil to have the information of the
private petroleum companies revealed, they will probably have some private
information left.6 Due to this asymmetry of information, the companies may conceal
their true information by masquerading as a company with different characteristics.
An oil company with low costs and large reservoirs may imitate a company with high
costs and small reservoirs, and must therefore be given an economic compensation
(information rent) to be willing to reveal its information." The fIrm is an information
6 As all information cannot be obtained through control measures, this leaves room for revelation
mechanisms.
7 In the models there will be several companies, each with a certain cost structure. An alternative
interpretation is the existence of one company that may be of different types, each type corresponding
to a different cost structure. The company knows its own type, whereas the government only knows
the distribution of possible types.
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to a natural monopoly whose rents are derived from increasing returns to scale). A
consequence of the government's inability to distinguish (discriminate) between the
different types of companies and types of petroleum fields is therefore that it will not
be able to capture all the rents through taxation.
The high number of applicants for new licences on the Norwegian sector, may be a
signal of the presence of rents. Rents in the Norwegian petroleum sector are indicated
in Ot.prp.nr.12, 1991-92; the petroleum industry has a considerably higher accounting
rate of return on their total investments than the industries on shore. The fact that
this was the case even for the years after the oil crack in 1986, suggests that this
premium is higher than necessary compensation for a possibly higher risk. Apriori it
is not obvious that the petroleum industry in general is more risky than other
industries. Dasgupta et al. [1980] argue that there is little evidence that extractive
industries are riskier (in the relevant sense) than other industries. This seems to be
true also for the present Norwegian petroleum industry. In the beginning there was
much uncertainty with relation to the size and location of recoverable reserves, and
the technical problem of deep-water drilling was not yet solved. This uncertainty has
been drastically reduced after more than two decades of exploration, development
and production.f With the policy of tailoring the tax rates to the petroleum prices, the
government is also bearing much of the risk of price fluctuations. High volatility of
petroleum prices, high front-end investments, long lead times and imperfect loss-
offset, still entail a considerable risk. Some of these risks, however, are similar for
commodity-based industries on shore, e.g. the production of aluminium. Johnsen
[1991] has estimated the systematic risk of the individual departments of Norsk
Hydro, and found that the oil and gas activities had the same beta-value (0.6) as the
metal division of the conglomerate.
8 One might argue this risk should not be compensated anyway, as it is idiosyncratic. This is
discussed in section 1.8.
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One might argue that presence of rents due to asymmetric information is a general
phenomenon that is not especially characteristic of the petroleum industry. But the
fact that this industry is extracting a scarce and exhaustible natural resource makes the
presence of rents more likely than in most other industries. The, imperfect
competition in th~_indus!!)' !s also part o~ the problem. Moreover, the complexity of
deep water operations on the Norwegian sector gives relevance to the assumption of
asymmetric information.
1.3 THE RELEVANCE OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY
The oil and gas deposits in the North Sea are a common resource whose ownership is
shared by all Norwegians. Mill acts as a principal on their behalf in administrating
the resources, and the oil companies are agents that are given the rights to extract the
petroleum resources. In return they compensate the principal through production
royalties and oil related income taxes. The tax system determines the economic
incentives for the agents, and at the general level the problem is to design the
incentive structure in such a way that the agents get incentives for exploiting the oil
and gas reserves in an optimal way from the principal's point of view. This is a
problem of mechanism design. The task is to endogenously decide on the optimal
incentive mechanism. It is clearly a part of normative theory, and it may generate
policy implications.
Incentive theory represents a simplification of a negotiation game; all the bargaining
power rests with one of the parties, the principal, and it supposes that he is able to
commit to a static incentive scheme.? Principal-agent theory can be particularly
9 This simplification is not so restrictive as it may seem at first, as the bargaining power of the agents
is taken care of by the appropriate design of participation constraints (defining the reservation utility)
and incentive constraints.
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relevant in this context as in the relationship between MIE and the oil companies,
MIE is a natural principal; Le. the government can be seen as a Stackelberg leader
which gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the oil companies. The government,
however, might not be able to enter into a binding long term take-it-or-leave-it
contract, as the parliament or new governments may change the tax rules or tax rates.
With this lack of commitment the companies may be less willing to reveal their
private information (ratchet effect).
A common modelling of the process in Principal-agent relations is that the agent
makes an announcement of his type, to which the principal responds with a pre-
determined incentive contract. The revelation principle states that the principal can
restrict his attention to mechanisms that reveal the agents' true types. Type may in this
context refer to costs, efficiency, or the size of petroleum deposits. The present
Norwegian petroleum regulation has features that may be characterised as revelation
mechanisms. As part of the previous licence application procedure, the petroleum
companies offered Statoil a certain ownership schedule (sliding scale). By the
announcement of a specific gliding scale in a certain licence, a company might (to
some extent) implicitly reveal its expected operational efficiency, its costs and its
assessment of the reservoir size of the block. The system (still in effect) of offering a
work programme as part of the licence application, may also have some
characteristics of a revelation mechanism. Without having to commit to certain
exploration activities within a fixed period of time, and with the present system of
negligible licence fees, there would probably be a high number applicants in the
licensing rounds as a licence would represent an option free of cost. The work
programme therefore serves the function of sorting out (separating) the sincere
applicants. Furthermore, by the announcement of what blocks the company offers to
explore, it may reveal what reservoirs it considers to be profitable. In some licensing
rounds, however, in return for equity shares in profitable licences, companies offer to
explore some area of the continental shelf that they do not themselves consider
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profitable. In the 14th licensing round MIE wanted further exploration in the Barents
Sea. Due to previous negative exploration results and due to large transportation
costs in case of discovery of petroleum reservoirs, most companies did not consider
further exploration as a profitable investment. In return for assumed profitable
licences in the North Sea, some companies offered to undertake a certain exploration
programme in the Barents Sea. This may be a revelation mechanism in the sense that
the extent and the expected costs of the offered Barents Sea exploration, may be an
indication of the companies' expected profitability of the blocks in the North Sea.
If the contracts between Mill and the oil companies may be personalised, we are not
restricted to non-discriminatory tax rules. Individualised contracts give room for
more complex tax schedules to be designed, and this gives better opportunities for
utilising contract theory. The scope for contract theory can also be increased by
permitting differential taxation of oil fields (or by applying contract theory one can
check under what conditions it is optimal to differentiate taxes between different oil
companies and fields). An application of general results from incentive theory, would
imply that it is optimal for MIE to tailor the incentive scheme to the information
structure in each separate case. As the extent of private information most likely would
differ in the various licences, this would call for discrimination. Discrimination on
the licence level is difficult as the tax subject in the present petroleum taxation is the
company and not the individual projects. An exception is the field-specific royalty
system, but this is abolished for new licences. Differential taxation also conflicts with
the policy of a uniform petroleum taxation; stated in Ot.prp. 12, 1991-92. The object
of a non-discriminatory tax policy is to obtain an efficient allocation of capital among
existing licences and among investment in existing and new reservoirs. In addition,
Ot.prp. 12, 1991-92 makes it clear that differential taxation may represent an obstacle
to efficient trading of oil between the operators of different oil fields (e.g. to fulfil
delivery obligations) and welfare improving inter-field projects (e.g. injections from
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gas to oil fields). Uniformity has also been a central objective of the recent reforms
of the systems for personal and general corporate taxation.
Despite the stated policy of non-discrimination, the government has a record of
tailoring the tax policy. This has been done in situations where petroleum projects
have been considered to be socially profitable, but where the private petroleum
companies claim it is not profitable for them given the existing taxes and regulations.
These situations have been solved by selective tax reliefs. Examples of this are the
preferential treatments given to supplementary projects on Ekofisk and Snorre. An
indication that this discretionary policy continues is the distinction between old and
new oil fields with relation to royalty (proposed in Ot.prp.nr.12 1991-92).10 The
differential policies on Ekofisk and Snorre were mainly caused by the 1986 oil price
fall. Even if the discrimination was not initiated by systematic differences in
asymmetric information between various petroleum fields, these differences would
most likely systematically affect the extent of tax reliefs in each case needed for the
government to assure development.
In evaluating the present incentive mechanisms in the petroleum industry, it is not
sufficient to see the tax system in isolation. The act~~ inc~n!ive mechanism would
consist of all the conditions and regulations that are relevant for the companies'
decisions. The most important condition, beside the petroleum tax system, is the
distribution of owner interests in the licences. In the present system of discretionary
licensing of exploration and drilling permissions, the licencee structure is an
important differentiation device. There is no official statement that this
differentiation is done according to the distribution of information, but it is reasonable
to assume that information considerations implicitly is one of the factors contributing
to differentiation. A conclusion of this section is that MIE in the present system of
petroleum regulation has necessary means to take account of asymmetric information.
10 The royalty is abolished only for fields whose developments were approved after 1 January 1986.
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There is no official policy, however, of systematically adjusting for asymmetric
information.
1.4 THE GOVERNMENT'S OBJECTIVE
The government is assumed to be benevolent and to have a utilitarian welfare
function, i.e. it seeks to maximise the total (unweighted) domestic surplus generated
from the petroleum sector.'! This surplus is comprised of benefits accruing to three
parties; domestic consumers of petroleum products, petroleum companies, and the
public in general. The benefits for the public can be represented by the government's
petroleum revenue, R. This revenue is the total government take in the petroleum
industry, i.e. it is the sum of petroleum taxes, royalties, licence fees, etc. People
benefit from this revenue through public services, transfers, and possibly through
reduction of tax rates in the non-petroleum sector.
The possible direct benefit to the consumers is an increase in the consumer surplus of
petroleum products resulting from domestic petroleum production. As oil and gas are
commodities that are traded internationally, an increase in consumer surplus must be
the result of a reduction of world prices due to Norwegian petroleum production. I
will make the simplifying assumption that Norway is a price taker in the petroleum
markets, thereby abstracting from consumer surplus considerarions.l-
The government's objective function contains weights for the producer surplus, II,
and government revenue, R. It is worth noting that the incentive problems in
11 The social welfare function will here be taken as exogenously given. The literature on social
choice endogenises the social welfare function. I will not go into this theory as my focus is on
incentive problems in the petroleum industry, and not on the relationship between the regulatory
agency and the electorate. .
12 This assumption might be more plausible for the oil market than for the gas market, as the gas
market is more segmented due to higher transport costs.
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screening models where the producers have private information about their types, rest
on the assumption that government revenue has higher weight than producer surplus.
The incentive problem ceases to exist if IIis given at least as high weight as R. This
is the result of Loeb and Magat [1979]; when a transfer between the principal and the
agent can be done free of cost, the first best optimum can be achieved. It is
implemented by designing the transfer so that the objective function of the agent
equals the social surplus, giving him incentives to internalise all social effects.P This
result is easily applied to our context: If IIis given at least as high weight as R,
social welfare, W, is maximised when II is maximised. The government should
therefore set royalties and taxes to zero. The producers will consequently use all their
private information to maximise II.
The incentive problem arises when R is given the higher weight. Mill would now
like to extract II, but this is difficult due to the companies' strategic use of private
information. There are two approaches in the incentive literature to justify that R
should be given the higher weight in the welfare function. Baron and Myerson
[1982], adjusted to this model, would give
( 1.1) W= R+aII,
with a < 1.14 The rationale they provide for this weighting is that it is derived from
the regulator's interest to serve the interests of the citizens in their jurisdiction. They
further assume that all the consumers reside in the jurisdiction, but not all the owners
of the firm. The regulator will accordingly give preference to consumer interests. As
the jurisdiction to the government regulating the petroleum industry is comprised of
the whole electorate, this approach does not seem relevant for my purpose.
13 This is an application of the Groves mechanism to regulation.
14 This is the approach chosen in Gaudet, Lasserre and Long [1991], in their analysis of optimal
resource royalties.
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In the trade-off between government revenue and rent to the petroleum companies, I
will instead use the assumption made in Laffont and Tirole [1986]. In a partial model
of regulating a monopolist under asymmetric information, they make use of the
general equilibrium shadow cost of public funds, 1+ A , and take it as exogenously
given. As there generally is a considerable excess burden from raising government
revenue through taxation, the marginal value of funds in the public sector is higher
than in the corporate sector (the shadow cost of public funds is higher than one). The
resulting welfare function is
(1.2) W=(1+A)R+ll
As in Laffont and Tirole [1986], I have taken the general equilibrium shadow cost of
public funds, 1+ A , as exogenously given in my partial analysis. This is reasonable
in Laffont and Tirole's model for regulation of a monopolist. Due to the large
revenues, this is more questionable in the petroleum sector. For simplicity, however,
I will stick to this assumption.
It is worth noting that the objective of rent extraction is a result of efficiency
considerations and not of distributional preferences. This is evident as the argument
above is based on a utilitarian welfare function, Le. consumer and producer surplus
have been given equal weights. Taking into account the government's distributional
preferences over foreign and domestic income, the objective of rent extraction is
reinforced. The fact that much of the petroleum production is carried out by
companies owned by foreigners makes the objective of rent extraction even more
important, as foreign income does not count in domestic welfare considerations. In
the context of foreign investment in a developing country, Little and Mirrlees [1974]
make a distinction between net of tax profits remitted abroad and funds that are
ploughed back domestically. The remitted profits are given welfare weight zero,
whereas retained profits might be given some weight, since
13
"...such further investment yields benefits or costs for the host country, as did
the original investment; moreover this further investment would not have taken place
without the original investment."
This argument seems to rest on the implicit assumption that the foreign investor is
financially constrained; new investments must be financed through retained earnings
in the host country. I do not find this plausible in the case of multinational petroleum
companies, having ample access to the international capital market. Investments will
in this case not be determined by present accounting profits, but rather future net of
tax cash flow. This expected cash flow must be sufficient for the foreign companies
to be willing to invest. In the setting of incentive theory, however, this cash flow is
not part of the principal's objective function, but rather a constraint on his
optimisation problem. IS The welfare weight of foreign income will therefore be set
equal to zero. As there usually are several companies participating in a petroleum
licence, forming a partnership, the regulator's welfare function will look like
(1.3) W = (1+ A)R+ (1- Il)ll,
where Il is the foreign companies' share in the licence.
The approach of distributional considerations in Baron and Myerson [1982] and the
approach of a cost of public funds in Laffont and Tirole [1986], have been shown to
generate similar qualitative results. This is because rent extraction is a government
objective under both approaches. The objective function in the case of foreign
participation on the continental shelf, given by equation (1.3), takes into account both
distributional considerations and cost of public funds. The objective of rent
extraction is therefore reinforced.
15 This is called the participation constraint, or the individual rationality constraint.
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It is worth noting that the objective of rent extraction is of special relevance for the
petroleum industry. As petroleum is a scarce and exhaustible fossil fuel, much of the
income in the petroleum industry is reallya resource rent. According toe MIE [1993],
in 1992 the calculated Norwegian petroleum rent was 40 billion NOK. As pointed
out in Dasgupta et al. [1980], the taxation of such rents is non-distortionary, if
appropriately arranged. Minimisation of the dead weight loss associated with the tax
system as a whole may imply that extractive industries should be taxed more heavily
than other industries. This is done in the current Norwegian system of petroleum
taxation; in addition to the ordinary corporate tax of 28 per cent, a special tax of 50
per cent is levied on petroleum net income.
1.5 STRATEGICBEHAVIOUR
The rent to the petroleum companies may be derived from strategic use of private
information about the size of oil and gas reservoirs and the costs of exploration,
development and production. Examples of such strategic behaviour are to understate
the reservoir size and overstate the costs to obtain higher profits.
In accordance with traditional incentive theory, I assume that the petroleum
companies (the agents) are rational and that their objective is to maximise profits.
These assumptions imply strategic behaviour. This is not to say that the companies
commit crime or fraud. In measuring costs, and even more in estimating the size of a
reservoir, there is not always an unquestionable truth to be found. To calculate these
measures one has to choose which data to use and which measurement methods to
apply. The companies may act strategically by not reporting their best estimate, but
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rather using a selective presentation of data and choice of methods in order to obtain
highest possible profits.!>
1.6 ADVERSE SELECTION MODELS
Adverse selection is a special type of hidden information, in which the agent obtains
private information before entering into a contract with the principal. The contract is
designed by the principal.
The inability to capture all the rents through taxation, due to hidden information,
makes it optimal for the government to strike a balance between efficiency in
resource extraction and efficiency in general taxation (i.e., a second best solution).
This trade-off between efficient exploration and production on the one hand and
capturing the excess returns on the other hand, can be illustrated by noting that in
general it is possible to achieve the former at the expense of the latter. In other
words, it is possible to design a tax system in which all petroleum companies make
use of all their private information in their real decisions. To achieve this efficiency,
however, the resulting government revenue may be low, as the companies must be
paid off to reveal their information. Due to the objective of rent extraction, this tax
system is probably not optimal for the government. At the point of efficiency,
marginal changes in real decisions will have no first order welfare effects (the
envelope theorem). However, changes in the real decisions of the petroleum
companies with high costs and small reservoirs, may make them less favourable to
mimic by efficient companies with large reservoirs. The latter type of company will
-
16 This is also a common phenomenon in the relationship between petroleum companies operating
different licences on the same reservoir. After the initiative from one or several of the parties,
according to unitisation agreements the split of the petroleum production from the reservoir may be
subject to renegotiation. The main subjects in these renegotiations are the decisions about which data
and methods to apply.
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therefore require less rent to be willing to reveal their information, i.e. their incentive
constraints are relaxed. The reduction in information rent is captured by the
government. Increased government revenue leads to a welfare increase of the first
order, as it is now possible to reduce distortive taxation in the non-petroleum sector.
Consequently, the second best solution to petroleum taxation with informational
constraints may imply some distortions of real decisions in the industry. The optimal
trade-off is to distort the real petroleum decisions to the point where the deadweight
loss from these distortions equals the reduction in deadweight loss in the non-
petroleum industry made possible by the increase in petroleum taxation. Or put
differently, the optimal solution trades off between efficiency losses generated by the
departure from the symmetric-information (efficient) real decisions and financial and
distributional gains associated with increased rent extraction from the petroleum
industry. This is a typical second-best result in taxation theory; it is optimal to
spread the deadweight loss over several markets.
In regulation of the petroleum industry there are numerous problems related to
asymmetric information. I will in the subsequent analyses of adverse selection
narrow the scope to two bargaining situations that seem particularly relevant for the
question of raising revenue; 1) asymmetric information about the petroleum industry
in general (the geological structures and the costs and efficiency of the private
companies) and, and 2) asymmetric information of a particular field. The first
problem is relevant for designing and revising the general petroleum taxation and
regulation. The revisions of the Norwegian petroleum tax system often come after
changes in the oil price (measured in domestic currency), with tax increase after price
increases and tax relief after a fall in price. The basic issue in designing and revising
the general petroleum taxation is to figure out under what conditions private
petroleum companies are willing to participate on the Norwegian sector. An
illustration of this is the revisions following the price fall in 1986. The government
wanted the Troll field to be developed, as this was considered socially profitable.
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However, the operator of the licence, Shell, said that current conditions made field
development unprofitable. This initiated negotiations between MIE and the private
companies about revisions of the general tax system. l?
The main problem for MIE in such negotiations is that it does not know the
companies' basis for decisions. Due to the asymmetry of information the principal
does not know the companies' evaluations of costs and petroleum deposits. When a
company is threatening not to participate in exploration and production under the
existing regulation and taxation, the principal may not be able to discern whether this
is true or whether it is an empty threat used for bargaining purposes. The problem of
MIE is that it does not know the real reservation points of the companies, i.e. the
supply price of private petroleum investment is uncertain. In the language of the
incentive theory; the Ministry does not know the private companies' types. However,
it is often assumed that the government has a prior distribution over the possible
types. If the social value of a project is considered so high that it should be
implemented no matter what type the company is, it is a main result from the
incentive theory that the company can gain a considerable rent if it happens to be of a
"good type" (i.e. if it has low costs and the reservoir is large). Ex post this seems to
be descriptive of the Troll field. Under certain circumstances it may be optimal for
the regulator to follow a strategy of awarding production licences only to companies
that announce reservoir sizes and efficiency parameters over a certain cutoff level.
This mechanism will reduce the rent of efficient producers with large reservoirs, as
they can no longer mimic the least efficient type, but only the cutoff type. In deciding
on the cutoff levels, MIE has to trade off this gain against the loss of the field not
being developed if the agent is of an unfavourable type. The cutoff strategy is most
likely to be optimal for marginal fields, as in this case the loss from the field to
remain undeveloped is relatively small. The recent decision (after the 14th licensing
round) of not awarding participation in any new licences to Esso and Shell, due to the
l? The results of these negotiations were to abolish royalty and to introduce a production
compensation ("negative royalty") on new fields.
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fact that these companies required too high net compensation, may be an indication of
a more active policy from the government, in which participation is made contingent
on the announced type being in a certain range.tf
The second problem of asymmetric information to which I will bring attention, is
special adjustments in the incentive structure for fields that are already in operation.
As these typically are adjustments to particular fields, they will not represent
revisions of the general petroleum taxation but rather exemptions from it (thus
undermining stated principles of uniform petroleum taxation). An example of this
practice is tax reliefs connected to the injection project on the Ekofisk field. The
regulator's ability to capture the rent on such supplementary projects will depend on
how private information changes over time. Exemplified by the injection, this is a
supplementary project on a field that has been in production for some time. It is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the operator has gained much knowledge of this
particular tract. On the other hand, the regulatory agency is also likely to have gained
much information, by means of tax reports, public disclosures 19, company reports to
NPD, and by NPD participation in the license committee.
Negotiations over favourable treatment for supplementary projects on licences
already in production are recurrent. A usual starting point is that the partners on a
licence point to a supplementary project that they claim is unprofitable for the
licencees with existing regulations and taxation, but that would prove to be beneficial
for the society. These marginal projects can be socially profitable as they benefit
from the sunk investments in platforms and transportation systems. Reasons for
deviations between social and private profits are often found in non-neutral features
of the tax system. As a favourable treatment to secure realisation of such marginal
projects, the companies seldom ask for reduction in tax rates but rather focus on
18 Esso and Shell were not willing to participate in further exploration activity in the Barents Sea.
This can be considered as a higher net compensation demand on the blocks in the North Sea. cf. the
discussion of existing revelation mechanisms in section 1.3.
19 E.g. to the stock market
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higher equity shares in the tract (often asking MIE not to exercise Statoil's option of a
gliding scale).
An apriori result about these renegotiations of incentive contracts, is that Mill could
gain (capture more rent) by keeping its strategies a secret. ff the regulator gives the
impression, directly or implicitly, that a certain project is to be implemented - no
matter the exact costs or the reservoir size - it gives away a lot of negotiation power.
Effectively it reveals that it has no reservation point with relation to the agent's type.
By making the implementation contingent on the company's type being in a certain
range, the regulator could capture more of the rent. If the project actually was
socially profitable for all types, this reduction in rent must be traded off with the
welfare loss from not implementing the project if the agent happens to be of a bad
type.
The regulatory agency is instructed to serve many goals. This makes it hard to keep
the regulating strategy a secret and creates difficulties for using mechanisms that are
contingent on the company's type being in a certain range. Apart from capturing the
resource rent, the regulator is also supposed to achieve employment and
macroeconomic objectives. More specifically, the petroleum industry is given the
task of securing a stable employment in the engineering and the construction industry.
Hence in periods of idle capacity in the mechanic industry, the government is eager to
develop new petroleum fields. As explained, this increases the bargaining power of
the companies and gives them higher rent. This illustrates that introducing additional
objectives in petroleum regulation may reduce the regulatory agency's ability to
extract rent.
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1.7 DYNAMICS
Some important aspects of petroleum regulation cannot be analysed in static models.
Dynamics are important in this industry as it exploration is time consuming, and as it
takes several years to develop a field which thereafter may produce in thirty years.
The theory of mechanism design recommends regulating the private companies by
means of incentive mechanisms. A crucial feature of dynamic models is that
incentive mechanisms may be responsive to new information. As time goes by
uncertainty resolves itself, and the regulator may gain information about the agent's
type. Ex post it is efficient to make use of this information; if the information is
perfect the regulator may set an efficient production level without leaving rent to the
firm. Anticipating this, however, the agent will not reveal his type in the first place
(the ratchet effect). It is, therefore, a result from dynamic incentive theory that it is ex
ante efficient for the regulator to commit not to make use of new information that is
revealed over time; i.e. it is optimal to stick to a fixed static scheme instead of acting
opportunistically in each period (a fixed rule is better than discretion). A crucial
assumption for this result is that the regulator is able to credibly commit to a long-
term policy.
Norway clearly applies a discretionary regulation of the petroleum industry, as the
licensing process (especially the distribution of equity shares in licences) and the tax
system is responsive to changes over time in prices, technology and estimates of
recoverable reserves.s" This opportunism can be seen as the result of the regulator's
inability to commit to a multiperiod mechanism. Problems with credible commitment
are common for most principal-agent relationships, as ex post deviation from a
20 An example of the tax system being responsive to price changes is the introduction of a special tax
on petroleum net income (25 per cent) in 1975, in response to increased petroleum prices. After a new
price increase this tax rate was adjusted to 35 per cent, and then reduced to 30 per cent in 1981 after a
price fall. Similarly the royalty on gross petroleum income was abolished in 1986, but only for new
licences.
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committed policy often is profitable. The problem is severe in the case of regulation
of petroleum companies; two additional characteristics of petroleum regulation make
credible commitments especially hard to achieve in the relationship between
petroleum companies and the government: 1) Irreversible investments, and 2)
institutional restrictions.
A large fraction of the costs in the petroleum industry is made up of capital
investments. Important among these are platforms designed and constructed to drill
on a specific field on the deep water of the Norwegian continental shelf. Due to this
specialisation, which is most profound for concrete gravity platforms, the investments
have a low alternative value (the investments are specific to the relationship with
MIE). This irreversibility implies a low elasticity ex post, i.e. once the investments
are made (sunk) the money generated can be taxed without creating any static excess
burden (only income effects). As the government's welfare maximisation implies
raising a given revenue at lowest possible dead-weight loss, it is difficult to credibly
commit not to tax the petroleum sector heavily after large investments have been
done.U Due to the considerable size of the petroleum income such a confiscatory
policy would be especially tempting in this industry. Institutional characteristics
make this problem even worse as the principal is the present government, and as the
present administration is restricted in making commitments concerning the politics of
future administrations. Another aspect of the commitment problem is the fact that
MIE is restricted to incomplete contracting. Full commitment would require
complete long term state-contingent contracts. As it is impossible today to foresee all
future contingencies with relation to costs, technology, proven reserves and petroleum
prices, the contracts between the regulator and the petroleum industry will necessarily
have to be incomplete.
21 The problem with the commitment game is that it is not subgame perfect.
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Norwegian authorities have chosen a policy of gradual extraction of petroleum
reserves, and it is mostly the same companies that apply in each licensing round. The
licensing process may therefore be approximated as a repeated game. Given the
impediments to commitment, it may seem difficult to build reputation for sticking to a
certain rule in petroleum regulation. As commitments are not likely to be credible,
the companies will expect MIE to act opportunistically in each period. Given these
expectations, opportunism would also be the best action for the principal. This
equilibrium will be characterised by suboptimal investments. MIE will therefore
have a strong incentive to establish a credible commitment for a non-confiscatory tax
policy. In principle, this can be achieved by establishing a reputation for sticking to a
non-confiscatory tax rule, or by creating institutional arrangements that punish the
government in case of deviations from such a rule. Reputation or institutional
arrangements may substitute for long-term contingent contracts, and to some extent
mitigate the underinvestment effect.
An institutional arrangement suggested for committing governments is to use the
constitution. The idea is that this will commit the government as changing the
constitution would be time-consuming and would require a qualified majority in the
parliament. Due to the long horizon in petroleum production (exploration may take
several years, development up to five years, and the production phase may last for
more than thirty years), the fact that it takes up to four years to amend the constitution
does not help much. The need for a qualified majority in parliament may also not be
an effective restriction due to the temptation of higher short-term revenue. Most
likely MIE would therefore have to use reputation effects to build commitment.
As Norway has an open economy and is an integrated member of the international
community, the Norwegian government is not likely to nationalise foreign
investments in the Norwegian petroleum sector, because this would cause serious
diplomatic problems and may provoke economic retaliations. As there is a strong
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political suppon for a mixed economy, the government is also not likely to nationalise
private domestic investments on the continental shelf. Although MIE is generally
believed not to choose the drastic means of nationalisation, and therefore has more
credibility than politically unstable and less internationally integrated countries, it will
still have to build reputation for not choosing less dramatic means like heavy ex post
taxation of irreversible investments.
In analysing the dynamic taxation problem, I will consider two categories of games:
Games of complete and incomplete information with respect to the government's
type. The government is per assumption free to reoptimise in each period, Le.
commitment is ruled out. To stan with complete information games; the petroleum
companies are assumed to know equation (1.3), i.e. they know that the government's
objective is rent extraction. In a finite horizon model (T periods), we will inevitably
get suboptimal investments. The government's strategy in period T cannot affect the
future. Period T is therefore a one-shot game, and MIE will play the dominant
strategy of heavy ex post taxation. The petroleum companies, having complete
information, will figure out the government's period T strategy. Consequently, the
equilibrium of period T-l cannot affect the future. MIE will again choose its
dominant strategy, and by backward induction the equilibrium is characterised by
heavy taxation and suboptimal investments in each period.
In an infinite horizon model, however, the underinvestment problem may be
alleviated by appropriate trigger strategies. Strictly speaking, the game between MIE
and the private petroleum companies does not have an infinite horizon as petroleum is
an exhaustible resource. Nevertheless, the infinite horizon can be justified by a
random termination date. In the process of exploration and production, new
recoverable reservoirs are discovered and the estimated size of existing reservoirs is
increased. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the players always expect the
game to extend one more period with a high probability.
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A sequentially rational equilibrium without underinvestment can possibly be
characterised by the following expectations: The companies expect a reasonable
taxation if this has been observed in the past. If the government defects from this
pattern, heavy taxation is expected for the n subsequent periods. The government
may not want to choose the dominant one-period policy of heavy taxation, as the gain
in that period may not be sufficient to compensate for the underinvestment in the
following periods.
Another model solving the undert!!\,~_s_t_IJ1~_!1.!__proble_æ,is a finite horizon model in
which MIE can be of two types; soft or tough (incomplete information of type may
be a reasonable assumption for newly elected governments). The soft type would like
to leave the companies with a reasonable rate of return in each period, whereas the
tough type's preferences are given by clear cut rent extraction. In the last period there
is no use of building a reputation, hence the tough type will tax the companies
heavily. In the early part of its incumbency, however, the tough type may have an
incentive to masquerade as being soft. This is achieved by imposing a reasonable tax
policy, thereby building a reputation for softness. Heavy taxation would give high
revenue, and consequently an immediate efficiency gain as the taxation of the non-
petroleum sector can be reduced. This short term gain, however, must be traded
against long term costs of losing the reputation for reasonable taxation, as revelation
of a tough type would cause suboptimal investments. If the government has a high
reputation when it enters office, and if it can be assumed to be a patient player, it is
likely to be willing to incur short-term costs to build this reputation. We get a pooling
equilibrium in which both types play the reasonable strategy in the first periods.
Hence reputation can substitute for commitment in sustaining an equilibrium with
private investments.
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Common for the models of complete and incomplete information is that they depend
on the government to be a patient player in order to solve the underinvestment
problem. A government is perhaps patient within its incumbency period. The length
of that period, however, is uncertain. Due to long lead times and long production
periods on the continental shelf, the incumbency periods of Norwegian governments
are under all cricumstances likely to be small compared to the planning horizon in
petroleum investment projects.
The large private investments made and the high number of applications for new
licences on the Norwegian continental shelf, combined with high revenue from the
industry, indicate that the Norwegian government has succeeded in establishing a
credible commitment for a reasonable tax policy. The policy has been to tailor the
taxes and licence requirements to the existing economic conditions in the industry.
The purpose of this implicit contract has been to attract new investments, and the
policy has therefore taken into account the development in costs, technology, proven
extractable (recoverable) reserves and petroleum prices.
As the prices of oil and gas have been the most volatile of these figures, there has
typically been a change in taxation and regulation following price increases (tax
increases in 1975 and 1980) and price reductions (tax relief in 1986). In each of these
tax revisions, however, consideration has also been given to changes in costs,
technology, and proven reserves.
Lund [1991] argues that the main reason for the need to tailor the tax system is that it
is not neutral. In the case of neutrality the tax base is equal to the rent, and will
consequently not distort development and operating decisions. A non-neutral system
leads to distortions, and these distortions become more serious when prices fall. An
important feature of the petroleum tax system in this respect is imperfect loss-offset.
Losses can be carried forward, but are not compensated for inflation and opportunity
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costs of capital. Due to the long lead times, this is a particular problem in the
petroleum industry. If the company is unsuccessful in generating profits, an initial
loss will never be deducted.
The tailoring may look like a policy-rule that effectively commits the government.
This is not so as this policy is subject to discretion, and hence does not represent a
complete conditional conrract.V The policy of tailoring resembles the "fair
mechanism" characterised in Baron [1989]: "The fairness condition prohibits the
regulator from offering a policy in the second period that would yield non-negative
profits to a firm with the type revealed in the first period." This mechanism lies in
between full commitment and pure opportunism. In Baron's model the private
company can choose to withdraw from the relationship in each period, and the
principal is not able to commit to future policies. The parties enter into a voluntary
arrangement in which the firm exchanges its right to withdraw from the relationship
for restrictions on the opportunism of the regulator. Due to the huge irreversible
investments on the Norwegian continental shelf, the private petroleum companies do
.
not have the option of withdrawing. Instead the companies may deny participation in
new licences. The government therefore has an incentive to restrict its opportunism.
The "fair mechanism" is a possibility in situations where full commitment in the form
of complete contingent contracting is not possible. It is important to note that it does
not completely solve the commitment problem, as it requires that the principal is able
to credibly commit to leave non-negative profits to the companies after revelation of
their types (or analogously: After irreversible investments). Baron justifies this by
assuming that the "fair mechanism" is written as a legal contract between the parties,
and that procedural requirements and legal precedents restrict the government's ability
to alter it ex post. This may be of relevance in our context as procedural requirements
in Norwegian law protect firms from arbitrary and capricious actions by the regulator.
22 The latter would have to prescribe the exact percentage change in the tax parameters that were to
follow a certain percentage change in petroleum prices, costs, proven reserves, ete.
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However, much of the regulation of the petroleum industry is not in the form of
explicit legal contracts, but rather an implicit contract between MIE and the industry.
Of relevance to the question of commitment, is the controversial issue of asymmetric
treatment of old and new fields with relation to royalty. As pointed out by Lund
[1991], in the tax reform of 1986-87, following a price fall of petroleum, a negative
instead of a positive royalty was introduced. However, this was only applied to
licences with a development plan approved after January 1986. This represents an
asymmetry, as tax increases in 1975 and 1980, following a rise in petroleum prices,
were made effective for all fields. This ratchet effect can be seen as an opportunistic
policy: High taxes on irrevocable investments. This is clearly harmful for the
credibility of the government' s tax rule. The problem is that the tax changes are
made on an ad hoc basis. If progressivity is an important objective for the
government, it would be better to construct a clearly defined and stable progressive
tax system.T' Lund [1991] concludes that this asymmetric policy will reduce the
petroleum companies' interest in new licences. To keep the investment levels, the
government would have to lower its revenue. It would be possible to maintain a
higher tax level if the government avoided the reputation for asymmetric treatment of
gains and losses.
An argument in favour of asymmetric tax treatment of price increases and decreases
is that the extraordinary price increases represent windfall gains. Such gains are
totally unexpected and can therefore be taxed without creating any distortions.
However, Rowland and Hann [1987] argue that the windfall nature of additional
profits is questionable in a North Sea context, as company plans will consider various
oil price trends. Hence sharp increases in petroleum prices are unlikely to be totally
unforeseen. Imposing extra taxes on these profits will therefore act as a tax on
incentives and thereby deter development plans.
23 The uplift proposed in Ot. prp.nr 12 represents a progressive element in the petroleum taxation.
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The principle of uniform taxation of all fields, old or new, stated in Ot. prp.nr 12,
1991-92, can be seen as an attempt to build reputation for non-discrimination. Such a
commitment, if assumed credible by the companies, could increase government
revenue. In spite of this statement of uniformity, MIE upholds the discrimination
between fields whose developments were approved before or after 1 January 1986
(royalty is abolished only for the latter). However, no new asymmetries were
proposed.
Much of the analysis above concerns situations of symmetric information, as the oil
and gas prices probably are observable for both the principal and the agent. The
principles of commitment, however, are similar for factors that are subject to
asymmetric information. To get sufficient incentives to reveal a good type (large
reservoir and low costs) in the first period, a company must be given a considerable
first period compensation (rent) as an opportunistic government is expected to use
this information to eliminate all rent in the next period. The first period rent can be
reduced if the government is able to commit not to take advantage of the information
revealed in the first period.e'
The inability to commit imposes restrictions on means of regulation. For example,
the inability to commit has been used as an argument against the use of auctions in
petroleum regulation; an oil company is not willing to offer much front-end payment
for a petroleum licence as the government cannot commit not to tax the company hard
once the production starts (political risk).
24 This is shown in Laffont and Tirole [1993], chapters 1 and 9. A broader treatment of credibility
problems in economic policy is given in Persson and Tabellini [1990].
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1.8 RISK
As a prerequisite for the discussion of moral hazard models in section 1.9, I need
evaluations of the relevant risk in petroleum projects for private companies and for
the government. I also need to know whether the degree of risk aversion is different
for the two parties.
Bøhren and Ekern [1987] argue that, from the government's standing point, the
relevant risk for investment projects in the petroleum industry is the macroeconomic
(systematic) risk. The macroeconomic risk is defined as the covariance between the
project's payoff and the payoff of a reference portfolio. The relevant reference
portfolio from the government's perspective is the national wealth, including the
Norwegian international diversification of risk through investments and financial
operations abroad.25 According to Bøhren and Ekern, macroeconomic risk in the
petroleum industry is income risk, i.e. risk related to fluctuations in petroleum prices
and the exchange rate of the US dollar. Microeconomic (idiosyncratic) risk, i.e. risk
related to production and costs, is not relevant as it is diversified in the country's total
portfolio of petroleum projects.
Due to the absence of a complete set of contingent markets (incomplete markets), all
of the income risk cannot be eliminated by the use of hedging strategies. Some of the
exposure to exchange rate fluctuations, however, can be eliminated by long term
funding in dollar. Some of the price risk might be diversified by investing in the
stock markets of countries that are net importers of oi1.26 The Norwegian
25 The authors make an exception for especially large petroleum project; in this case the project's
variance will have a direct effect on the variance of the national wealth. For small projects the
variance term is negligible, only the covariance term counts.
26 According to Obstfeld [1993], the correlation coefficient between the change in the log real price of
oil and the change in the log of world real per capita consumption, for the period 1973-1988, is -0.6.
This indicates an opportunity for international diversification of petroleum income risk by investing
abroad.
30
government, however, does not seem to pursue a strategy for diversification of the
petroleum income risk. On the contrary, the exposure to risky petroleum income is
increased by a relatively high pace in the development of the North Sea, and by
building up a large domestic petroleum industry. In the analysis of the government's
risk aversion in petroleum projects, I will have to choose the relevant reference
portfolio; is it the present national wealth or is it an internationally diversified
portfolio? By choosing the present portfolio, with a relatively high exposure to
petroleum income risk, one would require a significant risk premium for petroleum
investments. I will argue, based on conventional portfolio theory for investments
under uncertainty, that diversifiable risk should be taken care of by international
diversification possibilities. The choice of real investments on the continental shelf
should not be affected by such risk, only undiversifiable risk should be taken into
account.
From the perspective of a petroleum company, Bøhren and Ekern [1987] states that
the relevant risk for a petroleum project may consist of both project specific risk and
the project's covariance with the company's portfolio. However, the authors argue
that if the company has a portfolio of 10-15 imperfectly correlated projects of about
the same size, most of the idiosyncratic risk (risk with relation to production and
costs) will be diversified. From the shareholders' point ofview, this risk is irrelevant
even if the company has a smaller portfolio of projects, as the shareholders can
diversify on their own behalf. By letting the petroleum component of their portfolios
consist of several companies, possibly on different continental shelves, most of the
idiosyncratic risk should disappear. The shareholders would prefer companies that
stick to areas where they have most competence, preferring to diversify their own
portfolios rather than purchasing shares in diversified companies. They will therefore
object to the wide-spread vertical integration in the petroleum industry, if this process
cannot be justified by vertical synergy and reduced probability of bankruptcy. To
some extent, this integration process may be explained by agency problems. The
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wealth of a company manager (the agent) is likely to depend on the company's profits.
As the manager probably has imperfect means for diversification of his human
capital, and is assumed to be risk averse, he will have a preference for projects with
low idiosyncratic risk. Bøhren and Ekern [1987] point out that due to the same
agency problems for the project managers, the companies may diversify not only at
the company level but also at the project level. That is, project managers may take
irrelevant (idiosyncratic) risk into account. This, however, will only pose a real
problem if both of the following two conditions are fulfilled: 1) If the project
manager tries to eliminate idiosyncratic risk through the choice of certain technical
solutions, it cannot be detected by the company managers, and 2) the agency problem
cannot be counteracted by appropriate design of the incentive mechanism for the
project manager. An example of a detectable strategy for reduction of idiosyncratic
risk is the use of outdated but safer production technology. On the other hand,
asymmetric information about the geology in a certain licence, may give the project
manager some leeway in choosing technological solutions that reduce idiosyncratic
risk.
The corporate systematic risk is given by the covariance between the rate of return on
the company stocks and the rate of return on the market portfolio. As for the
government, this will be an income risk that cannot be fully diversified due to
incomplete markets. Some of the exchange rate risk can be eliminated by long term
funding in US dollars. The price risk is difficult to hedge, as listed oil futures have a
maximum maturity date of one year. Due to high specific investments in pipelines,
gas is mostly sold on long term contracts. Price uncertainty still exists, however, as in
these contracts the price of gas often is indexed to the oil price.
With the perspective of optimal risk sharing, one would also like to compare the
relevant risk for foreign versus domestic private petroleum companies. If petroleum
companies were only owned by citizens of the country where they have their head
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office, and if the market portfolios in various countries differed in their correlation
with petroleum income, companies of different nationalities could have different
systematic risk. According to Johnsen [1990], this is not very likely due to increasing
financial integration in general and the multinational nature of most petroleum
companies in particular. An increasing financial integration with petroleum
companies being traded in many countries (e.g. Norsk Hydro is quoted on the stock
exchanges in London and New York), and with high correlation between the various
stock exchanges, petroleum companies of different nationalities are likely to have
about the same systematic risk.
Summing up, in the absence of agency problems, the relevant risk for the companies
and the government is systematic risk, given by the project's covariance with a
reference portfolio. This may give different measures of risk as the two parties do not
have the same reference portfolios; the market portfolio versus national wealth. On
an apriori basis it is hard to judge the relative size of these two risk measures. Based
on analyses on data from the stock market and the national accounts, Johnsen [1991]
argues that the Norwegian national wealth probably is less exposed to petroleum
income risk than is the Oslo Stock Exchange. The systematic risk, therefore, will be
higher for private companies than for the government. In addition, if company or
project managers, due to agency problems, take irrelevant (idiosyncratic) risk into
account, there is another reason to believe that the companies assign a higher amount
of risk to a given petroleum project than the government. Having discussed the
relevant risk measures for the principal and the agents, I now turn to the comparison
of the two parties' risk aversion for a given amount of risk.
In a generalised version of the model in Sandmo [1972], Lund [1993] shows that
uncertainty should be taken into account in cost-benefit evaluation of projects. He
argues that in petroleum projects one can base the analysis on a representative
individual (as the revenues are collected by the government), and that covariance
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between the project rate of return and the rate of return on the national wealth is the
relevant risk measure. Referring to Bøhren and Ekern [1987], he agrees that price and
currency fluctuations are the factors generating macroeconomic risk. As a way of
implementing this macroeconomic risk measure, Johnsen [1991] suggests using stock
exchange data for the private Norwegian petroleum company, Saga. Lund [1989,
1993] argues that Norwegian citizens in their implicit claims on the government's
petroleum revenues already have a considerable component of petroleum in their
portfolios.I? As short-sale is prohibited on the Norwegian stock exchange,
Norwegians have imperfect means of diversification of their petroleum wealth.
Consequently, only Norwegians with especially high wealth and low risk aversion
will choose to own stocks in Saga (clientele effect). In aggregating the risk
preferences, the expected return on stocks in Saga will therefore represent a lower
bound on the social discount rate in petroleum projects.28 Johnsen [1991] agrees
with the statement that Norwegians have imperfect means of diversification of their
petroleum wealth. He points out that Norwegians in the short run can diversify oil
wealth by use of options in petroleum companies. But in the long run this is not
possible due to the prohibition of short sales and by the inexistence of stocks with a
negative correlation with petroleum incomes. The representative Norwegian will
therefore be locked in with a too high petroleum component in their portfolios, thus
violating a central assumption for CAPM.29
27 In the government's Long- Tenn Programme for 1994-1997, the petroleum wealth is estimated at
550 billion 1993-NOK, or about 130.000 NOK per citizen. There is considerable uncertainty in these
calculations. Moreover, it will overestimate the claim on government revenue, as the government, due
to asymmetric information, is not able to extract all of this wealth. Nevertheless, the estimate indicates
a substantial petroleum component in the individuals' portfolios.
28 One might argue that this is a result of an inefficient regulation (prohibition of short-sales), and that
the resulting corner solutions (imperfect diversification of risk) therefore should not be taken into
account in calculating the social discount rate.
29 Nevertheless, Johnsen, stressing the lack of implementable alternatives, finds CAPM useful for
calculating the social discount rate for petroleum projects. This is because of the availability of
relevant data from the stock market, and because the lock-in effect is counteracted by the observation
that the systematic petroleum risk is higher in the stock market than in the national wealth.
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An implication of the argument in Lund [1989, 1993] is that the government, for a
given relevant risk in a petroleum project, will have a higher degree of risk aversion
than a private petroleum company. However, as concluded above, the companies
might assign a higher amount of risk to a given petroleum project than the
government. The overall comparison of risk calculations in project evaluation of the
two parties is therefore inconclusive.
1.9 MORAL HAZARD
Ceteris paribus the tax system will determine the number and types of operative
companies and oil/gas fields. The optimal tax system should then attract the most
efficient companies and induce all socially profitable fields to be exploited in an
optimal way. In addition, efficiency would call for the resource extraction to be
carried out in a cost-minimising way. The government may here face additional
information costs, as it may only be able to monitor the companies' efforts to reduce
costs in an imperfect way. If the government neither directly can monitor the actions
of the agents, nor is able to deduce these actions from observable outcomes (as the
outcomes are the joint product of an action that only the agent knows and of
uncertainty), it faces the problem of moral hazard.
Imperfect monitoring (hidden action) plays an important role in incentive theory
models. Laffont and Tirole [1993] assume the following function for total costs, C:
(l.4) C=f3-e
They assume that the principal is able to observe total costs, but due to asymmetric
information he cannot observe (separate) the two cost components; efficiency (the
agen t's type, f3, an adverse selection parameter) and effort (e, a moral hazard
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parameter). These assumptions see.mreasonable for the relationship between MIE
and the petroleum companies. The presence of asymmetric information with relation
to a company's type was pointed out in section 1.6, and in this section I will argue for
the presence of hidden actions in the petroleum industry. Although the model of
Laffont and Tirole contains both an adverse selection parameter and a moral hazard
parameter, it is basically a model of adverse selection (screening). The reason is that
the focus of the model is not the trade-off between incentives and risk sharing, as in
pure moral hazard models, but rather an analysis of information rent accruing to the
agent following asymmetric information about his type, as in screening models.
Laffont and Tirole [1993] can be viewed as an extension the model of Baron and
Myerson [1982]. Baron and Myerson construct an adverse selection model in which
there is asymmetric information with respect to costs. Laffont and Tirole, however,
assume costs are observable. Still, the principal can not directly infer the agent's type,
as the costs are a linear function of two separate variables (f3 and e), and it is assumed
that the principal can observe neither of these.
There is a large literature focusing directly on the problem of moral hazard. A well-
known paper in this tradition is Grossman and Hart [1983]. The paper analyses the
problem of an owner of a firm (principal) who delegates the running of the firm to a
manager (agent). The authors assume a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent.
This assumption can be explained by a difference in the two parties' possibilities for
diversification of risk; the owners of the firm can diversify their financial portfolios
whereas the manager cannot diversify his wealth due to an incomplete market for
human capital. Under symmetric information (Le. in the absence of moral hazard) an
optimal risk sharing between the principal and the agent is given by equality of the
two parties' marginal rates of substitution of income between the different states of
nature. With a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent, it implies complete
insurance for the agent. As the agent's income in this case is independent of effort, it
is problematic if the principal cannot observe or deduce the effort (moral hazard). To
36
induce the agent to exert effort, his income must be made dependent on the only
observable variable; the output. As the output is stochastic, the agent no longer
receives complete insurance, i.e. we deviate from the Pareto-optimal sharing of risk.
Grossman and Hart [1983] show that with the presence of moral hazard, the second
best solution is given by a trade-off between risk sharing and incentives.
In my opinion it is reasonable to believe that there are important moral hazard
problems in the relationship between MIE and the petroleum companies. To justify
this I will have to argue for: a) The existence of hidden actions in the petroleum
industry, and b) outcomes being the joint product of actions that only the agent knows
and of uncertainty. To start with b), the outcomes I have in mind are output (tons of
oil equivalents; toe) and costs (for a given output). In this context I will assume that
the information about output and costs is symmetric.å? As asserted in a), however,
there is asymmetric information when it comes to effort; MIE has imperfect means
for observing the company's effort to increase output and to reduce costs.
Furthermore, due to uncertainty with relation to technology and the geologic
structure, it is reasonable to consider output and costs in the petroleum industry as
being stochastic. If MIE observes high costs and low production, it will therefore not
know whether this is due to a low effort of the firm or due to technological problems
or an adverse geological structure. As the sizes of petroleum reservoirs are hard to
estimate before the point of drilling, and as there still are unsolved technological
problems, the problem of discerning the effort seems particularly relevant to this
industry. Having discussed point b), I will now provide more detailed arguments in
favour of point a); the presence of hidden actions.
MIE has imperfect observability of the companies' efforts contributing to the
production volume, i.e. exploration and production efforts. It is possible to observe
the amount of seismic data collected, the number of exploration (appraisal and
30 This may be an unreasonable assumption for calculated costs, cf. section 1.2.
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wildcat) and production wells drilled, etc}l But the government cannot perfectly
monitor the amount of internal resources the companies allocate in the exploration
and production processes. An example of these internal resources is the number and
the competence of the personnel (geologists, geophysicists and reservoir engineers)
allocated to interpret seismic data and results from exploration wells. Further
examples of imperfect observability are the amount of gas injected into an oil field to
increase extraction, and the amount of management resources allocated to a certain
exploration or production process. Another observability problem is that a
multinational petroleum company may choose technical solutions for a Norwegian
petroleum field as part of the company's research process. Such technical
experiments may be beneficial for the company's activities on other continental
shelves, but may be detrimental to the production of the Norwegian experimental well
(suboptimal technology). The present petroleum taxation, where costs can be
deducted at an effective marginal tax rate of 78 per cent, makes it profitable for
multinational companies to perform such experiments in Norway.V If such
experiments can lead to increased revenue in the company's petroleum activities in
countries with a lower marginal tax rate, the company would also like to do more
experiments than in a no-tax world.
MIE cannot perfectly monitor the companies' efforts to reduce costs. This is
especially relevant for the development stage. In this stage the companies make large
investments in pipelines and platforms for production and accommodation. These
investment goods are not standard commodities with established costs. On the
contrary, these are complex goods whose costs will depend on the operator's effort in
design, management and procurement. The specific nature of these investment goods
31 The companies are required to report this information to NPD.
32 For costs that can be deducted in the same year as they accrue, the effective marginal tax rate is
equal to the statutory marginal tax rate, i.e. 78 per cent. This presupposes that the company is in a tax-
paying position. For costs that have to be depreciated over a number of years, investments, the
effective marginal tax rate have to be determined by calculations. With the assumption of a company
with positive profits that has a nominal before-tax opportunity cost of capital of 11.11 per cent,
Stensland et al. calculate an effective tax rate of 77.2 per cent on investment costs.
38
makes it hard for MIE to deduce this effort by looking at the costs of comparable
projects. Lund[1991] points out that the high marginal tax rates lead to incentives for
transferring the training of new personnel to the Norwegian petroleum sector, while
the resulting benefits will occur in other sectors with lower marginal tax rates. Again,
costs may be high as a result of hidden actions.
With asymmetric information with respect to the companies' efforts to increase
production and to reduce costs, and with production and costs being stochastic, the
second best optimum is given by a trade-off between risk-sharing and incentives.
This follows from a direct application of models for moral hazard, cf. the above
discussion of Grossman and Hart [1983]. From the discussion in section 1.8,
however, the total risk in petroleum projects is the sum of risk related to production
and costs (idiosyncratic risk) and income risk (systematic risk). It is important to note
that the problem of moral hazard is only attached to the former of these risks. For the
companies, assumed to be price takers, the income risk (i.e. price and exchange rate
risk) is exogenous. It is therefore not affected by the companies' effort. Furthermore,
petroleum prices and the exchange rate of US dollar can be observed in the markets,
and the income risk is therefore subject to symmetric information.P As the one type
of risk is subject to symmetric information, and information of the other type of risk
is asymmetric, the risk sharing should be taken care of by two separate contracts.P
The sharing of the income risk should be arranged by a contract contingent on
petroleum prices and the US dollar exchange rate. Due to symmetric information, the
optimal sharing of income risk between MIE and the petroleum companies is given
by equality of the two parties' marginal rates of substitution of income between the
different states of nature. In section 1.8, I argued that both parties should be averse
to the systematic risk. The problem of sharing income risk is therefore likely to have
33 The gas prices agreed on in long term supply contracts are not directly observable, but the
companies are required to submit this information to MIE.
34 I am thankful to Frøystein Gjesdal for this idea.
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an interior solution. Furthermore, in the section on risk I also argued that the
systematic risk is higher for private companies than for the government, but that the
government, for a given relevant risk in a petroleum project, will have a higher
degree of risk aversion than a private petroleum company. Consequently, the overall
comparison of the two parties' attitudes to systematic risk is inconclusive, and the
exact optimum of income risk sharing cannot be decided on an apriori basis.
The sharing of the risk related to idiosyncratic risk should be arranged by a contract
contingent on costs and production. As argued in section 1.8, in absence of agency
problems in the companies, both parties will be neutral towards idiosyncratic risk.
We will therefore not get the usual trade-off between incentives and risk sharing; the
contract should be designed to achieve the single objective of providing optimal
incentives for the agent. The solution to this problem is provided by the residual
claimant principle; the agent should be made residual claimant for all increases in
production and for all of its cost savings. This solution implies a contract in which
the company carries all the idiosyncratic risk, and can be implemented by ex ante
contracting on a fixed quantity of production and a certain cost. If the company (due
to agency problems) takes idiosyncratic risk into account in its decision making, the
objectives of incentives and risk sharing go in different directions (from the
perspective of optimal risk-sharing the company should receive a fixed payoff,
whereas to provide optimal incentives the company should be made residual
claimant), and we get an interior solution. On the basis of the discussion in section
1.8, however, I will argue that companies are not very likely to take into account
idiosyncratic risk. At the level of company managers most of this risk is diversified
by the composition of the companies' portfolios of petroleum projects. At the level of
project managers, the problem of aversion to irrelevant risk can be counteracted by
the probability of detection and by appropriate design of incentive mechanisms.
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The present Norwegian policy
The problem of inobservability is that it may result in a level of companyeffort that is
suboptimal from the government's point of view. MIE tries to counteract the problem
of suboptimal effort by use of direct regulation, but is restricted to regulate observable
efforts, e.g. by establishing a detailed exploration work programme as part of the
licensing conditions. To induce the company to exert the optimal level of
unobservable effort, the government must provide it with an appropriate incentive
structure. The most important incentive feature in the present regulatory policy is to
give the companies equity shares in the licences in which they operate. This
mechanism will give correct incentives if 1) the operator and the other partners are
refunded their true costs in their internal accounting (cash calls), and 2) the petroleum
tax system is neutral.å> With the present regulation, however, the operator is in some
instances refunded more than true costs, and the other partners are not refunded the
costs they incur in their monitoring of the operator. Moreover, from the theory of
corporate taxation, we know that it is difficult to implement a neutral profits tax.
It is important to note that the risk measure and risk attitude proposed for the
government in section 1.8, are based on normative considerations. As I will focus on
normative theory, the current risk attitudes and risk sharing on the Norwegian sector
will be compared with these normative analyses. The practice of the Norwegian
government is clearly not in line with the theoretical recommendations. The official
policy for risk evaluations in public investments, stated in NOU 1983:25, resembles
risk neutrality in recommending that the social rate of discount is not to be adjusted
for risk. Risk is only to be accounted for by use of sensitivity analysis. The present
35 Dasgupta et.al. [1980] show that a constant tax rate levied on a company's true profits, is neutral
with respect to the company's choice of extraction path. The corporation income tax, however, may
distort the decisions on exploration. As shown in Heaps and Helliwell [1985], the exploration decision
will be undistorted is the company (assumed in a tax-paying position) is allowed immediate expensing
of exploration costs.
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practice in evaluations of petroleum projects, however, is better described as risk
seeking behaviour. This is due to a high direct state participation in the petroleum
industry, and is also a result of the procedures chosen for regulation of the private
petroleum companies.
In the beginning of the development of the petroleum sector, the private foreign
companies bore a large part of the risk on the Norwegian continental shelf. This was
the result of a relatively low marginal tax, use of a gliding scale, and regulation
establishing that the foreign companies were to carry Statoil's exploration costs. The
experience from several decades of exploration, development and production, has
significantly reduced the idiosyncratic risk in Norwegian petroleum activities.
Simultaneously, there has been a change in policy; risk bearing has been shifted from
the companies to the state: Bearing and the gliding scale have been abolished, and in
the present Norwegian petroleum taxation system with high marginal taxes on net
income (78 per cent), much risk is borne by the government. The policy of tailoring
the tax level to the economic conditions entails an additional shifting of risk from the
companies to the government. There is also a high risk attached to the direct state
participation (SDFl) in the petroleum industry (Statoil and the State's Direct Financial
Interest takes up 80 per cent of the licences, and according to MIE [1993] SDFI is
likely to account for approximately 45 per cent of all investments offshore in 1993).
Adding the fact that SDFI and the offshore activities of Statoil are self-insured, and
observing that the Norwegian government is not attempting any diversification of
petroleum risk through investments and financial operations abroad, one might argue
that this reveals a pattern of risk-seeking. In a total evaluation of the risk sharing
between the government and the petroleum companies, however, one must take into
account the risk borne by the companies due to high front-load investments and
imperfect loss-offset.
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From the analysis of optimal risk sharing, I concluded that the companies should bear
all the idiosyncratic risk. When the diversifiable risk was reduced on the continental
shelf, it is in line with the theoretical recommendations that the government were to
bear a larger fraction of the total risk. Though hard to quantify, it seems that too
much risk-bearing now has been shifted to the government. There is no theoretical
justification for the government to carry most of the undiversifiable price risk, and
contrary to normative theory the government is also carrying much of the
idiosyncratic risk.
The problem of low cost consciousness is of special relevance in the present tax
regime due to the high marginal tax rates, as the partnership in this case is residual
claimant only for a small fraction (22 per cent) of its cost savings. Seen from the
perspective of the operator, this fraction is even smaller. Letting t be the marginal
tax rate and the a the operator's equity share, the operator is residual claimant for the
fraction a(l- t). With a marginal tax rate of 78 per cent and an equity share of 20 per
cent36, the fraction is only 4.4 per cent. Clearly, this system may cause low cost
consciousness and excessive testing of new technology.
An alternative means of extracting rent from the petroleum sector, in which more of
the risk is borne by the private companies, is to introduce a system of front-end
payments. This could be a pure auctioning system, or could be implemented in the
framework of the present system of discretionary licensing (by use of licence fees).
36 Often the equity share is considerably lower.
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1.10 INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION
Most applications of principal-agent analysis in regulation theory analyse the
situation of a principal regulating one agent or several homogeneous agents. The case .
of one agent will in the terms of industrial organisation be a monopoly. The case of
several heterogeneous agents, oligopoly (collusion), is not yet settled in the theory of
mechanism design. Hart and Holmstrom [1987] explain that the traditional contract
theory approach, in which the agent's reservation utility is taken as exogenously
given, has a methodological advantage relative to models of imperfect competition.
Analytically contract theory is an optimisation problem, whereas in imperfect
competition it is an equilibrium problem. Methods for optimisation are substantially
more advanced than methods for solving equilibrium problems. In the subsequent
analyses I will therefore make the simplifying assumption that the regulatory agency
faces a monopoly. As there are many companies that participate on the Norwegian
continental shelf, this assumption can only be justified if the companies form a stable
cartel in negotiations with MIE. In the context of the screening models sketched out
in section 1.6, the partnership must form a cartel in negotiations with the government
in a particular licence, and the petroleum companies must form a cartel in the
negotiations over general offshore regulation and taxation.
To start with the negotiations over the general economic conditions on the Norwegian
continental shelf, the operators often act as a cartel through their interest organisation;
the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF). In some instances the operators have
a common interest in their negotiations with the government, and the cartel will be
stable. This will be the case for regulations and taxes that affect the companies in the
same way. Due to different portfolios (large versus marginal fields, old versus new
licences) and differences in ownership (private or state-owned, foreign or domestic),
the companies may also have conflicting interests. In such situations, the cartel
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assumption cannot be justified. A recent example of such disagreement is the
negotiations following the proposed tax changes in Ot.prp. 12, 1991-92. The group of
operators were in this instance split into factions. A possible strategy for MIE to
increase its negotiating power is to increase the potential conflict of interest between
the companies (divide and rule).37 Such discrimination does in fact exist, cf. the
discussion of tax discrimination between old and new fields.38 Another example is
the principle of "revenue neutrality" for tax reforms, Le. maintaining the same
revenue as in a reference case. This is achieved by changing two or more parameters
simultaneously, implying more tax for some companies and less for others.
The choice of modelling the petroleum companies as a cartel raises the question of
how to treat state-owned companies; are they to be considered as part of the principal
or as a member of the cartel (agent)? Are the objective functions of the state-owned
companies aligned with that of the government, or do they have an agenda of their
own? Norsk Hydro is 51% state owned, but clearly acts as a private company.
Consequently it will be analysed as belonging to the agent group. Statoil mostly acts
on a commercial basis. In many respects it can therefore be considered equal to the
other companies; i.e. as a member of the cartel (Statoil is in fact a member of DLF).
It may seem unnatural that Statoil is part of a cartel negotiating with MIE, as the
Minister of Industry and Energy is head of the board in Statoil. This gives the
impression that the government is negotiating with itself. Most of the decision taking
in Statoil, however, is delegated to a management group that is instructed to act on a
commercial basis. Statoil is responsible for operational and financial administration
of SDFI. It was established as a means of keeping part of the petroleum cash flow
outside Statoil. It has been asserted, however, that this is mainly a book-keeping
device, and not an effective economic regulation. In the question of industrial
organisation I will therefore consider SDFI as an integrated part of Statoil.
37 I am thankful to Gunnar Stensland for this idea.
38 As pointed out in section 1.8, this is probably not an optimal means of discrimination, as ad hoctax
changes may have adverse dynamic effects.
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I will proceed with a discussion of the cartel assumption in negotiations between the
government and the partners of a particular licence. Licences are awarded to groups
of companies, partnerships. If a partnership is to be analysed as a cartel, it must be
justified that the licencees have common interests. The operator may have conflicting
interests with the other partners, as it has an incentive to charge too high costs on the
licence. The other partners are therefore monitoring the cost consciousness of the
operator; this is one of the intentions of awarding licences to partnerships. A conflict
between the partners may also arise from the fact that they have different portfolios of
petroleum deposits (if one or several of the partners participate in adjacent licences)
and different investments in infrastructure (e.g. competing transport and refining
facilities). However, the licencees normally have a common interest in securing a
highest possible information rent. In negotiations with the government they can
therefore be considered to form a cartel. This presupposes that Statoil acts on a
commercial basis. In some special situations of vital economic or political
importance, however, Statoil may be instructed to vote in accordance with a decision
reached by the Minister of Industry and Energy. In such cases Statoil has veto power
in the partnership. In these rare cases Statoil acts at the direct orders of the principal,
but mostly Statoil acts on a commercial basis. As it mostly is the operator that
obtains private information, I will assume that it has an implicit understanding with
the other partners to use this information strategically (tacit collusion).
1.11 TRANSFER PRICING AND TAX ARBITRAGE
A special monitoring problem pertaining to multinational petroleum companies, due
to imperfect international harmonisation of the national tax systems, is the problem of
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international tax arbitrage through the use of tax-minimising transfer pricing, e.g.
borrowing at a high interest rate or purchasing expensive insurance from an affiliated
company located in a tax haven. An incentive for transfer pricing exists when the
effective tax rates, taking into account procedures for credit of taxes paid to foreign
governments, vary between countries. As pointed out in Horst [1971], a
distinguishing feature of multinational corporations is that the interfirm transactions
are not valued in an open market. Instead, within the limits established by the
monitoring opportunities and efforts of the national tax authorities, these firms choose
an optimal transfer price. Such monitoring problems are also relevant for the
Norwegian companies as they have economic activities both onshore and offshore.
Due to the large difference in marginal tax rates, 28 versus 78 per cent, this gives
possibilities of tax arbitrage; the companies would like to transfer petroleum income
to the mainland and transfer costs from the mainland to the sea. This can be achieved
by appropriate choice of internal pricing. As the offshore activities of Norwegian
petroleum companies are not organised as separate companies, the monitoring
problem of domestic companies may be more difficult than those of the foreign
companies (most of the foreign companies are organised as separate Norwegian
limited companies). However, the profits of the domestic companies have a positive
weight in the government's objective function. As the weight of foreign profits is
zero, the monitoring problem of the foreign companies may nevertheless be more
important.
The problem of transfer pricing has been solved for oil revenues, by establishing
norm prices to secure arm's length prices. The norm price is set by the Petroleum
Price Board, and according to MIE [1993] the norm price shall correspond to the
value that petroleum could have been traded at between independent parties in a free
market. For other revenues and costs, the authorities try to restrict the use of strategic
internal pricing by detailed audits of the companies' accounts.
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By strategic use of internal pricing companies can masquerade their true costs, thus
gaining private information. The traditional government response is to mitigate this
problem of asymmetric information by control measures and norm prices.
Monitoring of reported costs and revenues is a generic problem for profits taxation.
Due to the international nature of the petroleum industry, and the high degree of
vertical integration, the problems of international tax arbitrage are bound to be more
pervasive in this industry. Furthermore, many of the inputs in the offshore industry
are not standard commodities with an established market price, making it hard to
monitor costs or impose norm prices.t? Taking into account the limitations on control
measures in the petroleum industry, and the monitoring costs, it may be fruitful to
consider the approach suggested by regulation theory: Revelation of true costs is
obtained by offering the companies incentive contracts.
Most likely, optimal regulatory policy will involve a mixture of monitoring and
incentive mechanisms. The design of incentive contracts, however, may affect the
extent of the ex post monitoring problems. The principal-agent models generate
qualitative solutions to a regulatory problem under asymmetric information. Often
there are various ways of implementing this solution. For reasons of simplicity, I will
assume that the monitoring problems can be taken into account in the implementation
phase, i.e., I assume that the monitoring problem can be separated from the qualitative
decisions on mechanism design.
The present system for petroleum taxation, a profits tax with a very high effective
marginal tax rate, provides strong incentives for transfer pricing. Instead of
mitigating the monitoring problems, the present regime is making it worse. To
counteract the incentives for transfer pricing, one needs lower marginal tax rates. To
39 Examples are tailor made parts or modules to production platforms, and specialised consulting
services.
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keep up the revenue, the change in tax rates would have to be combined with the
introduction of some type of fixed payments from the companies.
Another example of tax arbitrage that is prevalent in the US oil industry is design of
cost-sharing arrangements in order to minimise tax payments. A typical arrangement,
described by Scholes and Wolfson [1992], is the "functional allocation": Limited
partners (passive investors with a high marginal tax rate) pay for 100 per cent of
drilling costs that are immediately deductible, and general partners (active investors
with a lower marginal tax rate) pay for completion costs that must be capitalised.
Scholes and Wolfson argue that this arrangement creates an incentive problem; as the
general partner bears 100 per cent of the completion costs but gets only a fraction of
the resulting benefits, the general partner may complete fewer wells than is optimal
from the society's point of view.
This incentive problem is a result of pure tax arbitrage, it is not a result of information
asymmetries. The problem does not appear in the present Norwegian licensing
system. After abolition of carried interest, a partner has the same share of costs and
revenues.
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Chapter 2
Taxation and regulation of petroleum companies under
asymmetric information. A static adverse selection model."
2.1 AN ADVERSE SELECTION MODEL OF PETROLEUM REGULATION
I will in this chapter focus on adverse selection problems in the petroleum industry. Due to
the presence of calculated costs and the possibility of affecting reported costs by means of
transfer pricing, the petroleum companies are likely to have private information about their
costs.! Exploration and extraction costs depend on a company's efficiency level and the
quality of the reservoir (the geological structure). Those are factors known to the company,
but only imperfectly observable by the government. A low cost company may conceal its
information by imitating a high cost company, and must therefore be given an economic
compensation (information rent) to be induced to reveal its information.
* I would like to thank Kåre P. Hagen, G.B. Asheim, Hans O. Husum, Eirik Kristiansen, Diderik Lund, Ulf
Pedersen, Leif K. Sandal, Guttorm Schjelderup, Stein I. Steinshamn, and Gunnar Stensland for their helpful
comments.
l See section 1.2 on asymmetric information and section 1.110n transfer pricing.
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The specific regulatory problem to be analysed is the design of optimal incentive contracts
for a partnership after a production license has been awarded by discretionary licensing.? The
partners are assumed to form a cartel in negotiations with the government. 3 The negotiating
parties, the partnership and the Ministry of Industry and Energy (Mill), are assumed risk
neutral. The production license covers a petroleum deposit with a resource base of a
deterministic size, K.4 The resource base is the total amount of petroleum that is present in
the reservoir. This definition of the petroleum stock is independent of economics and
technology, and can therefore be taken as exogenously given. Furthermore, I assume there is
symmetric information with relation to K. This assumption may not be realistic, cf. the
discussion in section 1.2. The main point of this analysis, however, is asymmetric
information about costs; and since asymmetric information in two dimensions will generate
technical difficulties, I make the simplifying assumption of symmetric information with
relation to K. As to the quality of the reservoir, however, there might be asymmetric
information.
This article is inspired by an article on regulation of the mining industry by Gaudet, Lasserre
and Long [1991]. The structure of their two-period model is similar to that of Baron and
Myerson [1982] and Baron [1989], with an added resource constraint. The changes I make
in the model of Gaudet et al. [1991] are: a) The introduction of a general cost function
C(q, (J), b) The elimination of one constraint, and c) Some minor changes in the
government's objective function. By developing comparative statics, characterising the
optimal cutoff rate, analysing the effect of market power, and discussing alternative
implementation mechanisms; I also make a number of extensions to the model of Gaudet et
al. [1991].
2 Auctioning of production rights is treated in section 1.11.
3 Cf. the discussion of industrial organisation in section 1.10.
4 Petroleum is formed by geological processes that take millions of years. For decision purposes we can
therefore view these resources as having a fixed stock of reserves. At the time of contracting, however, the
reservoir size will be uncertain. To keep the model simple, I will treat K as a deterministic parameter.
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The purpose of this chapter is to make the model of Gaudet, Lasserre and Long [1991] more
accessible to the profession of economists in general and to provide economic intuition. The
model will also be adjusted for technical and economic differences between the mining and
the petroleum industry. Gaudet et al. assume a quadratic cost function. By introducing a
general cost function, I examine whether their results can be generalised. Elaborating on the
static version, I also provide information about the dynamic model. Finally, through
simplifications of the static model, I hope to provide a basis for generalising the dynamic
model of Gaudet, Lasserre and Long [1991] to allow for the private information parameters to
be correlated over time.
2.2 STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC MODEL
The focus of attention in this chapter is on models in a timeless world, or equivalently,
models in which the focus of attention is on a single period. Such models may generate
useful insights by themselves, and they also serve as building blocks for dynamic models.
Since the dynamic models tend to be complex, some aspects of regulation can still only be
satisfactorily treated in static models. In interpreting static models, however, one should be
aware that in ignoring the time dimension, these models abstract from important aspects of
regulation. Expanding the model to more than one period adds well-known complexities of
renegotiation and lack of credible commitment. In the present model of petroleum regulation,
which contains a resource constraint, a static model will also abstract from considerations of
an optimal exploration path. The focus will be on the extent rather than the rate of extraction.
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2.3 ASSUMPTIONS
I introduce a general function for total costs (capital and operating costs), C(q,0), where q is
the quantity of petroleum extracted, and where O is a cost parameter. The cost parameter is
determined either by the quality of the reservoir or the companies' internal efficiency, and is
private knowledge for the petroleum companies. The support O E [fl,8] and the distribution
of types, F(O), however, is common knowledge. For the costs and the distribution, I make
the following assumptions:
Al: JC(q,O) > O Monotonicity
JO
A2: J
2C(q,0) > O Single crossing property
JOJq
A3: J
2C(q,0) > O ConvexityJq2
A4: J
3C(q,0) > O and J
3C(q,0) > O
JOJq2 - J02Jq -
A5: _E_( F(O»)" O Monotone hazard rate
dO f(O)
The motivation for these assumptions is as follows. Assumption Al reduces the set of
participation constraints to a single constraint. Assumption A2 is a sufficient condition for
the local and global second order conditions for incentive compatibility. Sufficient
conditions for the regulator's optimisation problem are secured by assumptions A3 and A4,
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whereas assumptions A2, A3, A4, and AS are sufficient conditions to fulfil the monotonicity
constraint.
The economic explanation of assumption Al is that total costs, for a given q, are increasing
with B, i.e., the average cost is increasing inB. The parameterB can therefore be interpreted
as an efficiency parameter. The types are distributed on an interval [fl, 8], where fl is the
most and 8 is the least efficient. The marginal costs are also assumed to be increasing with
the partnership type, as is clear from A2. The term single crossing property is derived from
the observation that assumption A2 is a sufficient condition for the isoprofit curves of two
different types to intersect only once.> Convex costs, assumption A3, are common in
petroleum extraction. When production increases, the reservoir pressure is reduced. The
producers are dependent on a certain level of reservoir pressure to pump up oil and gas. The
reservoir pressure must therefore be maintained, e.g., by pumping water or associated gas into
the reservoir. These measures are costly. The injections needed to compensate for the loss of
reservoir pressure from one unit of petroleum production, are increasing with the extraction
level. Hence, total extraction costs are convex. Assumption A4 contains third derivatives,
and has no clear economic interpretation. Sufficient conditions for the principal's
optimisation program will involve restrictions on third-derivatives, since the principal under
asymmetric information optimises his utility function subject to the agent's optimisation
problem (the first-order approach). Assumption AS, monotone hazard rate, is satisfied by
many standard distributions, e.g., uniform, normal, logistic, chi-squared, exponential, and
Laplace. An interpretation, given in Laffont and Tirole [1993], section 1.4, is decreasing
returns in technological improvements. Let 8 be the basic technology, and let 8- B stand
for the number of improvements. Assumption AS says that the conditional probability that
there are more improvements, given that there have already been 8- B improvements,
d(f(B) / F(B» / ae. is decreasing.
5 This is verified below in the text explaining figure 2.2.
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2.4 THE SYMMETRIC INFORMATION CASE·
In the case of symmetric information, the government knows the cost parameter 8. I will use
the objective function discussed in section 1.4:
(1.3) W = (1+A)R + (1- Jl)l1.
W is the benevolent government's welfare function, and R is the net total government take
from the petroleum industry," Whereas Gaudet, Lasserre and Long [1991] base the motive for
rent extraction on the government having distributional preferences in favour of the
consumers, I use the approach of Laffont and Tirole [1993]: The government has a utilitarian
objective function, but still has an objective of rent extraction as the shadow cost of public
funds, 1+A , is greater than one. I introduce an additional motive for rent extraction; foreign
owner share in the license, u . There will be no consumer surplus generated from domestic
petroleum production, as i assume that Norway is a price taker in the petroleum market. The
rent of the licensees, II, is given by
(2.1) II = pq(8) - C(q(8), 8) - R.
By solving equation (2.1) with respect to R, and inserting it in equation (1.3), the
government's objective function becomes
(2.2) W = (1+A )(pq( 8) - C(q( 8),8)) - (A +u )II.
6 Gaudet, Lasserre and Long [1991] use the term royalty for R. In the literature on petroleum taxation this term
is used for payments of a certain percentage of the value of the resources extracted (see e.g., Dasgupta and Heal
[1979], chapter 12). As rent extraction can be implemented by a variety of instruments (license fees, income
tax, royalties etc.), l will instead use the general term net total government take.
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The welfare generated from the petroleum sector consists of two terms. The first term,
(1+ A )(pq( 8) - C(q( 8),8», is the welfare we would get if the government were to keep all
the revenue. The second term is a correction term taking into account the loss to society
caused by the petroleum companies keeping parts of the rent. The loss caused by imperfect
rent extraction is equal to the partnership's rent, II, multiplied by the difference between the
welfare weights for income accruing to the partnership and the government,
(1- J1.) - (1+A) = -(A + J1.). The welfare function clearly illustrates the government's motive
for rent extraction; one unit of income transferred from the companies to the government
will, ceteris paribus, increase the welfare by A + J1..
The regulatory problem under symmetric information is given by
(2.3) Max[(l + ,1.)(pq(8) - C(q(8), 8» - (A+ J1.)I1].
q(8),R
subject to
(2.4) Il = pq(8) - C(q(8), 8) - R(8) ~ O
(2.5) q( 8) sK,
where (2.4) is the participation constraint, and (2.5) is the resource constraint. Owing to the
fact that negative production is possible in the petroleum industry, we do not need a non-
negativity constraint on q.7 This represents a simplification of the mining industry model of
Gaudet, Lasserre and Long [1991]. Under symmetric information, R will be set such that the
7 Negative production can be achieved by pumping petroleum back into the reservoir. This is often done with
associated gas in order to maintain the reservoir pressure, and in some occasions gas is pumped into another
reservoir for temporary storage (gas banking). We do not observe petroleum companies having a negative net
production over long periods. This is because it is obviously not an optimal extraction strategy. Note that non-
negative production is not the result of a technical constraint, but is a consequence of the objective function.
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participation constraint will be binding for all types in optimum. By inserting fl = O in the
objective function, I get the Lagrangian
(2.6) L = (1+ Å )(pq(O) - C(q(O), O» + r(O)(K - q(O»,
where reO) is the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint. The necessary Kuhn-
Tucker conditions are given by
(2.7) ~=(l+Å)( - dC(q(O),O»_ (0)=0
aq(O) p aq(O) r
(2.8) reO) ~ O, K - q(O) ~ O, r(O)(K - q(O» = o.
The second-order condition is satisfied by assumption A3. It is worth noting that the first-
order condition implies
(2.9)
aC(q,O) r
p- aq =1+Å'
which simply states a binding resource constraint (r(O) >O) implies a positive marginal
resource rent in optimum.
To solve, I make a conjecture about the structure of the solution, and thereafter seek an
extraction schedule with this structure satisfying the conditions. My conjecture is that it will
be optimal to empty the reservoir if the partnership is of a low-cost type. For less efficient
producer types, it will, due to convex production costs, be optimal to leave parts of the
reservoir unextracted.
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Proposition 2.1
There exists a 8* such that
q(8)=K, dq(8) =0 for !l s (Js 8*
(2.10)
d8 '
q((J)<K, dq((J) < O for 8* s 8 ~O
d8 '
I have assumed that 8* E [!l, O]. This is satisfied for reasonable values of petroleum price,
net cost of public funds, and the foreign equity share; see comparative statics analyses in
section 2.7.
In solving the problem, I start by finding an expression for the interior solution of the
extraction level q(8). When q(8)<K, (2.8) implies r(8)=0. Then from (2.7),
(2.11) G == r(8) = (1+ A)(p - dC(q(8), 8» = O 8* s 8 sO.
dq(8) ,
Since we from assumption A3 have that
(2.12)
equation (2.11) implicitly defines extraction level q as a function of the licensees' type 8, for
the types (J* ~ 8 ~ O. Hence, from implicit derivation, I get
(2.13)
d2C(q( 8), (J)
dq = _ G 8 = _ dq( 8)d8 O
d8 G
q
d2C(q((J),8) < ,
dq((J)2
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where the sign is determined by assumptions A2 and A3.
I continue with a characterisation of 0*. From the case of a non-binding resource constraint,
equation (2.11), I get the following expression in 0* for the limiting case q --+ K-:
(2.14) (1+ A)( _ dC(q( 0*),0*» = o.
p dq(O*)
When q(O)=K, we have from (2.7)
(2.15) y(O) = (1 + A)( - dC(K,O»;::: O O 5: 05: 0*.P dq(O) ,
Non-negativity of y(O) is required by (2.8). Making use of the fact that in optimum we have
bunching (i.e., pooling; dq( O) / dO = O) for fl. 5: 05: 0*, I get
(2.16) dy(O) = (1 + A)( d
2
C(q(0), O» < O O 5: O 5: 0*,
dO dq(O)dO'
where the sign is determined by assumption A2. This sign has a clear economic
interpretation: y( 0), which is the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint, expresses
the marginal value of petroleum in optimum. When O is increasing, the partnership's
efficiency diminishes. Consequently, the marginal value of petroleum is reduced, i.e., y( O)
is decreasing in O. From (2.15), I therefore get a second equation for determining 0* by
noting that non-negativity is assured, provided
(2.17) (1 + A)( - dC(K,O*» ~ O.
p dq(O*)
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Hence, the set of constraints in equation (2.15) has been reduced to the single constraint
(2.17). The critical type is determined by equations (2.14) and (2.17), and together they yield
the condition
(2.18)
The critical type (t is implicitly defined by equation (2.18).
The economic interpretation of this section is straight forward: For the most efficient
producer types it is optimal to empty the reservoir. Due to constant marginal income, p, and
convex extraction costs, less efficient producer groups should extract only a fraction of the
petroleum deposits, and this percentage is lower the less efficient the partnership is. From
condition (2.18), it is clear that the critical type ft, is the partnership whose efficiency
parameter implies that price is equal to marginal extraction costs for q = K. For the more
efficient producer groups it is optimal to empty the reservoir, since price exceeds marginal
extraction costs for all q ~ K. For producer groups that are less efficient, optimal extraction
level is determined by price equal to marginal extraction costs. For these types there will be
some petroleum left in the reservoir, as p < de(K, 8) / dq(8) .
These results are hardly surprising. The problem has been solved formally for the purpose of
comparison with the asymmetric information case.
2.5 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
The partnership is assumed to know their own type, 8, whereas the regulator only knows the
distribution, given by the probability density function f(B), 8 e [~,8]. In this case, the
regulator will recognise that if he tried to implement the first best solution, the companies
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would have incentives to overstate their costs to obtain higher profits. The analysis to follow
is facilitated by the revelation principle, which states that the principal can restrict his
attention to the class of mechanisms in response to which the firms report their types
truthfully. The regulatory agency, i.e., the Ministry of Industry and Energy (MIE), offers
the self-selection mechanism M={(q(B),R(B),Be[!l,O]}, i.e., a menu of type-revealing
contracts in q( B) and R( B) that the partnership can choose among.
Let 1I(9, B) be the profit of a partnership of type B when it reports type ii. The regulatory
problem is now given by
(2.19)
'6
Max J[(1 +A)(pq(B) - C(q(B),B»- (A + Jl)lI(B)]dF(B)
q(9),R(9)
!!.
subject to
(2.20) lI(B) == lI(B,B);;::: O, 'VB e [fl,O]
(2.21) 1I( B) ;;:::1I( 9,B), 'V 9,Be [fl, O]
(2.22)
From the symmetric information case, we recognise the participation and the resource
constraints; conditions (2.20) and (2.22), respectively,. Asymmetric information generates
an additional set of constraints; incentive constraints, given by equation (2.21). As is clear
from this equation, for the class of incentive compatible mechanisms it is a dominant
strategy for the partnership to reveal their true type.
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The only action of the firms in the model is to select one of the contracts offered byMIE. In
real life petroleum companies would also make decisions about their effort levels, and these
decisions will affect the costs and the extraction level. As I argued in section 1.9, MIE
cannot perfectly monitor these efforts. Since the focus of this chapter is adverse selection,
and not moral hazard, the effort decision is not explicitly modelled. If I nevertheless were to
include moral hazard in the model, it would create complexity without new economic
insights. Analogous to section B2.1.1 in Laffont and Tirole [1993], an effort variable, e, can
be included in the model by making costs a declining function of the effort level,
C(q(8),8,e), and by adding a function for di sutilit Y of effort, If/(e). Since the regulatory
agency is not able to observe costs or effort, it has no direct controlover the cost-reducing
and production-enhancing efforts. The contract offered to the partnership must instead be
made contingent on the observable extraction level, and the effort decision is delegated to the
~
partnership. The partnership's decision problem is now given by Max II(8,8) =
8.il
~ ~ ~
pq(8) - C(q(8),8,e) - R(8) - If/(e). The effort decision is determined by
- dC(q(8),8,e) / de = If/(e), yielding a function e*(q). With the cost of added complexity,
we are now back where we started; substituting for the optimal effort in the cost function
gives us a cost function that exhibits only adverse selection:
c == C(q(8), 8,e* (q)) + If/(e* (q)).
In solving the original program, equations (2.19) to (2.22), I will begin by characterising the
class of mechanisms that satisfy the incentive constraints (implementable allocations). This
characterisation is facilitated by the differentiability of the policies R( 8) and q( 8). Proof of
differentiability is provided in appendix 2.1.
Proposition 2.28
An allocation {R(8),q(8)} satisfies the incentive constraints if and only if
8 This is an analogous application of the approach in Fudenberg and Tirole [1991], chapter 7. l also benefit
from the presentation of this approach in Schmidt [1992].
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(2.23) dq(O) _ dC(q(O),O) dq(O) _ dR(O) _ O VO E [_0,0]P dO dq dO dO - ,
(2.24) d~~) ~ O, VOE [fl,8] Monotonicity
I will start with the necessary conditions, i.e., I will show that the incentive constraints,
equation (2.21), imply the constraints (2.23) and (2.24). The partnership's profit
maximisation problem is given by
(2.25) Max II (8, O) = pq( 8) - C(q( 8), O) - R( 8)
9
First- and second-order conditions are
(2.26) dll(8,O) _ dq(8) _ dC(q(8),O) dq(8) _ dR(8) _ O
d8 - p d8 dq( 8) d8 d8-
(2.27) d2ll~8,O) = dq258) _ d2C(q\8),O)(dq(~»)2 _ dC(q(~),O) d2q58) _ dR258) s o
d02 P d02 dq( 0)2 ae dq( O) d02 d02
For truth telling to be optimal, the first- and second-order conditions have to be satisfied at
A A
O= O. Substituting O for O in (2.26) gives (2.23). Equation (2.23) must hold for all values
of O E [fl, O]. Differentiating this identity yields
(2.28)
dq2(O) _ d2C(q(O),O) (dq(O»)2 _ d2C(q(O),O) dq(O)
P d02 dq( 0)2 dO dOdq( O) dO
dC(q(O),O) d2q(O) _ dR2(O) = O
dq( O) d02 d02
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By substituting 9 for 9 in (2.27), and inserting this expression into (2.28), we can rewrite the
second-order condition as
(2.29) _ d
2C(q(9),B) dq(B) ~ O.
dq(B)dB dB
BY assumption A2, the single crossing property, d2C( q(B),B) I dq(B)dB ~ O, we get
dq(B) I dB sO. Thus (2.29) implies (2.24).
I have shown the necessary conditions, i.e., that the local first- and second-order conditions
for incentive compatibility are satisfied. To prove that any allocation {R(9),q(B)} that
satisfies the constraints (2.23) and (2.24) is implementable, I also need to derive the sufficient
conditions. I must prove that the global second-order condition for maximisation is satisfied.
A
Suppose that truth telling is not optimal for type B, i.e., there exists a B such that
n(B,B) > n(B,B). Then
(2.30)
6 -
tt;0,9) - tt;B,B)= f dn;:, B)de
6
= f6 ( dq~) _ dC(q( ~), B) dq~) _ dR~e)te> O
6 P se dq(B) d9 se r
Suppose B> B. We get the contradiction
(2.31)
n(o B) _ ttce B)= f6( dq(~) _ ac(q(~), B) dq<!) _ dR~e)te
, , 6 P se dq(B) se se r
s f6 ( dq~) _ dC(q( ~), e) dq<!) _ dR~e)te = o
6 P dB dq(B) dB dB r '
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The inequality in equation (2.31) is explained by noting that lJ ~ O, and by applying equation
(2.24), dq( O) I dO sO,VOE [!l, 8], and assumption A2, ;PC(q, O) / oOoq > O. The second
A
equality in (2.31) follows from (2.26). Similarly, suppose that O < O. We now get
(2.32)
II(O O)-II(O O)=_f
6
( dq<!) _ oC(q(~),O) dq<!) _ dR~lJ)tlJ
, , il P ae oq(O) dO ae r
s _f6( dq(~) _ oC(q(~),lJ) dq0) _ dR<!) tlJ= O,
B P ae oq( O) ae se r
again a contradiction. Therefore it is optimal to announce O= O, and {R( O),q( O)} is
incentive compatible.
•
Using proposition 2.2, the regulatory problem can now be reformulated as
(2.19)
"8
Max f[(1 + A)(pq(O) - C(q(O), O)) - (A + Jl)II(O)]dF(O)
q(6),R(6)
fl
subject to
(2.20) II( O) ~ O, VOE [!l,8]
(2.23) dq( O) OC(q( O),O) dq( O) dR( O) _ O OE [_0,8]P-;W-- oq dO ----;w-- ,
(2.24) dq(O) sO
dO
(2.5) «s«.
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Let nco) == n(o,o) = pq(O) - C(q(O),O) - R(O).· From the envelope theorem, i.e., by using
the first order condition for incentive compatibility (equation (2.23», we get
(2.33)
attce, (Jn(O) (JC(q(O), O)-....;_~ = = -_...:...:...:........:....:~
dO (JO (JO
We see that the rent, due to assumption AI, is decreasing in O, i.e., to be willing to reveal
their true type, efficient partnerships must be rewarded with a higher rent than inefficient
partnerships. The economic interpretation is that instead of revealing its true efficiency O
and produce accordingly, the partnership may choose to camouflage as a less efficient
producer group O+ dO, where dO is small and positive. Mimicking the less efficient
producer group is done by selecting the combination of production level and net taxes
intended for this type; {q( O+dO), R( O+dO)}. From the monotonicity constraint, this
implies a lower level of extraction, i.e., installation of a smaller capacity (smaller or fewer
platforms) or a less extensive use of extraction enhancing techniques in the production phase
(e.g., injections). An interpretation of the rent function, therefore, is that in order to get
incentive compatibility, the partnership group, when they reveal their true type, must be paid
up front the rent difference they would get if they instead were to mimic a less efficient type.
For a type O this rent difference is equal to its cost advantage relative to the less efficient type
O+ dO. For a type O, therefore, the total information rent is equal to a cumulation of cost
differences, given by equation (2.35) below.
Integrating both sides of equation (2.33), yields
(2.33')
;1 - ;1 --I dn~O) dO = -I (JC(q(~),O) dO,
9 dO 9 (JO
or
69
(2.34)
li --
II( 8) = II(li) + I iJC(q(~), 8) dO.
8 d8
By assumption Al, C(q,8) is increasing in 8. If the participation constraint, equation
(2.20), is satisfied for type 8 =O , it is therefore satisfied for all 8 E [fl, O]. Since MIE wants
to extract rent, the participation constraint will be binding for type 8 =O. Hence, the set of
participation constraints in equation (2.20) is reduced to the single constraint II(O) =O. By
combining the first order condition for incentive compatibility, equation (2.21), and the
participation constraint, equation (2.20), we get
(2.35)
8 --
II(8) = I dC(q(~), 8) de.
8 d8
Since II (8) = pq( 8) - C( q( 8),8) - R( 8), we get
li --
(2.36) R(8) = pq(8) - C(q(8), 8) - I dC(~~),8) de,
8
I have shown that the class of mechanisms satisfying the incentive and the participation
constraints, is composed of those policies in which the quantity of extraction is non-
increasing in type, and where the fixed government charge R( 8) satisfies (2.36).
As R( 8) now is determined, the regulatory problem can be rewritten as
9
(2.37) MaxI[(1 + A)(pq( 8) - C(q(8), 8)) - (A + J.l)II(8)]dF(8)
q(8)
~
subject to
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(2.38) n(9)=0,
(2.39) dn(B) dC(q(B),B)=
dB dB
(2.22) dq(B) <OdB - ,
(2.5) a s «,
Equation (2.38) is the participation constraint (transversality condition). Equations (2.39) and
(2.22) are the first- and second-order conditions for incentive compatibility. Equation (2.5) is
the resource constraint. I will ignore (2.22) at first, and later, in appendix 2.3, show that the
solution to the less constrained problem satisfies this condition. I will here show the
necessary conditions for optimum, the sufficient conditions are given in appendix 2.2. I will
use a control theoretic approach to solve the regulatory problem, and choose n(B) as a state
variable and q( B) as a control variable.? The Hamiltonian is written as
(2.40) H = [(1+ A)(pq(B) - C(q(B), B» - (A + /l)n(B)]f(B) -1J(B) dC(~~),B),
where f(B) is the probability density function and 1J(B) is the costate variable associated
with constraint (2.39). The regulator's problem is equivalent to maximising the Hamiltonian,
subject to the resource constraint.l'' The Lagrangian for this problem is
9 An alternative derivation of the optimal production schedule q* (O). without using optimal control theory. is
given in section 2.8.
10 I am following the approach in Kamien and Schwartz [1981], section 10.
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(2.41) L = [(1+ A )(pq(O) - C(q(O),O» - (A + J.l)n(O)]f(O)
-11(0) ac(~~),O) + r(O)(K -q(O»,
where r(O) is the multiplier for the resource constraint.
The necessary Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a constrained maximum with respect to q( O) are
given by
(2.42) .s..= (1 + A)( - aC(q(O),O»f(O) - (O) a2C(q(0),0) - (O) = O
aq( O) p aq( O) 11 aOaq( O) r ,
(2.43) r(0):2:0, K-q(0):2:0, r(O)(K-q(O»=O.
By applying Pontryagin's maximum principle on this non-linear programming problem, I
obtain the additional condition
(2.44) d11(O)= _ aH = (A + J.l)f(O).
dO an
I integrate on both sides of equation (2.44)
(J - (JJ d11~O)de = f (A + J.l)f(e)de,
~ dO ~
and by applying the transversality condition 11(f!.)=O (since the boundary of n(O) is
unconstrained for all O '# "8), I get
(2.45) 11(0)= (A + J.l)F(O).
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Substituting from (2.45) into (2.42) and rearranging, yields
(2.46) ac(q(O),O) ..1.+ J.l F(O) d
2C(q(0),0) y(O)
P - dq(O) = 1+ A /(0) dq(O)dO + (1+ ..1.)/(0) .
To understand the second-best optimum in (2.46), it is useful to start with interpretation of
the case where the resource constraint is non-binding (y( O) = O). MIE faces a trade-off
between maximising total production value (pq(O) - C(q(O), O» and minimising the
8 --
petroleum companies' information rent II( O)= I dC(~~), 8) dØ. Consider any type 8> fl..
6
IfMIE reduces q( 8) over the interval [8,8 + d8] by a small amount åq, the expected total
value-weighted production value is reduced by
(2.47) (1+ ..1.)(d[pq(8) - C(q(8),8)] t1q(8)]/(8)d8.
dq(8)
However, the value-weighted rent of type 8 + d8 is reduced by
(2.48) (A + )_d_(dC(q(8),0»)t1 (8)d8.u dq( 8) d8 q
The weight, A +u, is the value of transferring one unit of income from the companies to the
government. The rent is reduced for all types 8 E [fl., 8 + d8], having probability F( 0+ d8),
so the expected reduction in value-weighted information rent is
(2.49) (A + J.l) dC
2
(q(8),8) t1q(8)d8F(8 + d8).
dq(O)dO
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At the optimum, the marginal reduction in value-weighted production value is equal to the
marginal reduction in value-weighted information rent, i.e.,
(2.50)
(1+A)( a[pq(O) - C(q(O), O)] Llq(O)Jf(O)dO
aq(O)
= (A + Jl) aC
2
(q(0), O) L1q(O)dOF(O+ dO)
aq(O)aO
By taking the limit, i.e., letting L1q(O) and dO approach zero, we see that this equation is
equivalent to (2.46), provided a non-binding resource constraint.
To solve for q( 0), I first make a conjecture about the structure of the solution, and thereafter
seek a path that has this structure and satisfies the conditions. The conjecture will be based
on economic intuition. By comparing equation (2.46) with the solution to the symmetric
information case, equation (2.9), we see that asymmetric information generates a new term in
h d b . Th A +.u F(O) a
2C(q(0),0) . h . ltesecon est optimum. e new term, ----:'I ' IS t e margma
1+ A f( O) uq( O)aO
information cost, and it creates an additional wedge between price and marginal production
costs, for all types O> fl.. This will, for a non-binding resource constraint, give lower
production for all types but the most efficient. The economic explanation for this distortion
in q( O) is that it makes it less favourable for efficient companies to mimic inefficient
companies. This is clear from the expression of the partnership's rent:
(2.35)
ii --
II(O) = I aC(q(~),O) dO.
B ao
As explained above, equation (2.35) satisfies the first-order condition for incentive
compatibility. From assumption A2 (the single crossing property), the rent is increasing in
q(O) :
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(2.51)
B 2 _ _
dII(8) = f J C(q_(8),_8)dØ> O.
dq(8) 6 Jq(8)J8
Type 8 can masquerade as type 8+d8 by producing q(8+d8) at cost C(q(8+d8),8).
By inserting in the profit function (2.1), we see that relative to type 8 + d8 this strategy
yields a rent equal to II(8)-II(8+d8) =C(q(8+d8),8+d8)-C(q(8+d8),8). As the
incentive constraint is binding, Le. type 8 is indifferent between announcing 8 and 8 + d8,
the same rent difference will appear when the partnership announces its true type (a
separating equilibrium).
To interpret equation (2.51), note that the single crossing property implies that the marginal
extraction costs are increasing in 8. Hence, a producer of type 8 has lower marginal costs
than type 8 + d8. The relative cost advantage of type 8, C(q( 8 + d8), 8 + d8)
- C(q( 8 + d8), 8), i.e., the rent difference, is therefore increasing in q, as illustrated in figure
~------------~----~----------------~~q
2.1 below.
C
C(q(8+d8), 8+d8)
a, ql K
Figure 2.1: Illustration of relative cost advantage (rent difference), C(q( O+ dO), O + dO) - C(q( O + dO), O)
(the vertical distance between the two cost curves), as an increasing function of the extraction level q.
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By reducing the extraction level, partnership 9 +d9 is now less favourable to mimic by a
partnership 9. The latter type of company will therefore require less rent to be willing to
reveal their information, i.e., their incentive constraints are relaxed. The consequent
reduction in information rent is captured by the government. The optimal trade-off is to
distort the real petroleum decisions to the point where the marginal deadweight loss from
these distortions (the left hand side of equation (2.50» equals the marginal reduction in
deadweight loss in other sectors of the economy, made possible by the increase in
government take from the petroleum sector (the right hand side)."!
If the resource constraint is non-binding for all 9, we have y(9)=0. The regulatory
solution is in this case analogous to that of Baron and Myerson [1982]; compared to the
model with symmetric information, the quantity is reduced for all types 9> fl.. To provide
additional economic intuition for this result, it is useful to start with the optimal regulatory
solution under symmetric information and a non-binding resource constraint. From equation
(2.9) we know that this first-best interior solution is characterised by price equal to marginal
production cost. At this starting point we introduce asymmetric information. At the initial
point of efficiency, marginal changes in real decisions will have no first order welfare effects
(the envelope theorem). However, changes in the real decisions of the petroleum companies
(reduction in q( 9) for 9 > fl.) will relax the incentive constraints. The consequent increase in
government revenue leads to a welfare increase of the first order, since it is now possible to
reduce distortive taxation in the non-petroleum sector. Hence, the second best solution to
petroleum taxation with informational constraints will imply some distortions of real
decisions for all types 9 > fl..
The interior solution to the regulatory problem can be illustrated in the extraction-revenue
space, for the case of two possible partnership types, fl. and 8, where "8 > fl.. I start by
characterising the companies' isoprofit curves:
11 This optimal trade-off is more thoroughly discussed in section 1.6.
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(2.52) il(9) = pq(9) - C(q(9),9) - R(9) = ilt,
for a given profit level ilt. The slope of the isoprofit curve is dR / dq(9) =
p - aC(q(9), 9) / aq(9) ~ 0, and the curvature is given by d2R / dq(9)2
= -a2C(q( 9),9) / aq( 9)2, which is negative due the convexity assumption A3. The isoprofit
curves, therefore, are concave and upward-sloping. The profits are increasing when we move
south-east in the diagram: For a given extraction level, rents are increasing with a reduction
in net taxes, and for a given level of net taxes, rents are increasing in the extraction level as
the price exceeds marginal extraction costs. The isoprofit curves intersect only once. A
sufficient condition for single crossing is that the isoprofit curve for type fl. is steeper than the
curve for type 8, for all q. This is satisfied, since d2R / d9dq(9)1
q(9)=ql
= -a2C(q(9),9) / a9aq(9) < 0, for all qlc'due to the single crossing property assumption A2.
R
__ r--- II(!!.) = o
J.---- II(f!.) = IIll > o
q
Figure 2.2: Illustration of optimal regulatory mechanism in the case of two types, !!. and '8.
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Figure 2.2 is analogous to figure 1.2 in Laffont and Tirole [1993]. The first-best solution of
the regulatory problem, which is possible in the case of symmetric information, is given by
{(q ,B.FB),(qFB,RFB)}. The optimal quantities qF and qFB have been marked off in the_FB _ B
diagram. The corresponding net total government take, B.FB and RFB, can be read off the R-
axis. With this allocation price equals marginal extraction costs for both types, and they are
left with no rent. When we introduce asymmetric information, this solution is no longer
feasible, since it is not incentive compatible for the efficient producer to select qF . Instead
-B
he will mimic the inefficient producer by choosing qFB' and thereby gain a positive
information rent lIk2• The regulator can reduce the rent of type fl. by reducing the extraction
level for type 8, i.e., by moving leftwards along the indifference curve II(8)=O. This
implies a loss of production efficiency, however, since price is now higher than marginal
extraction cost if the producer is of type 8. The regulator is therefore not likely to reduce q
until all the rent of the efficient type has been eliminated. The second best solution, trading
off production efficiency and rent extraction, will be somewhere in between, like point a and
b in figure 2.2. We get the same economic conclusions as in the continuum type case: The
efficient type's extraction level is efficient (no distortion at the top), and he obtains a positive
economic rent. The inefficient type is left with no rent, and the extraction level is lower than
the efficient level.
If the resource constraint is binding for some types (r(8) >O for some 8), we get bunching
(partial pooling) at q( 8) =K.. For an interval of the most efficient producer groups, the
optimal contract is to extract all the petroleum resources in the reservoir. The economic
intuition is as follows. With the symmetric information starting point, we already have a
wedge between price and marginal production costs:
(2.9) dC(q,8) rp- =--.
dq l+A
Applying the envelope theorem, we now see that a distortion (reduction) in q( 8) will
produce a first-order welfare loss (equal to the wedge). This is different from the case with
78
no binding resource constraints; in that case price is equal to marginal cost if there is
symmetric information. A marginal reduction in q(Ø) will therefore have no first-order
welfare effects, and to reduce rent, q( Ø) will therefore be reduced for all Ø > fl.. With a
binding resource constraint, however, in determining whether to reduce q( Ø), the first-order
loss in production efficiency must be traded off against the marginal reduction in the
information costs. The arguments for distortions in q( Ø) have therefore been weakened. My
conjecture is that we, as in the symmetric information case, get bunching for the most
efficient types. Compared with the symmetric information case, the extraction levels for the
less efficient types will be distorted (reduced), and the critical type for which the resource
constraint is binding, Ø*, is lower.
Proposition 2.3
There exists a Ø* such that
(2.53)
q(Ø) = K, d~~) = O, for fl. s Ø s Ø*
q(Ø) < K dq( Ø) < O for Ø* < Ø < 7f
'dØ' - - ,
Parallel to the solution procedure applied in section 2.4 of the symmetric information case, I
start by finding an expression for the interior solution of the extraction level q( Ø) . When
q( Ø) <K, (2.43) implies y( Ø) =O. Then from (2.46),
(2.54)
y( Ø) = (p - JC(q( Ø), Ø»(1 + Il )f( Ø) - (Il + Il )F( Ø) J2C(q( Ø), Ø) = O Ø* ~ Ø s fl.
Jq( Ø) Jq( Ø)JØ '
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Equation (2.54) implicitly defines extraction level q as a function of the licensees' type O.
The extraction level is decreasing in the efficiency parameter, i.e., the partnership extracts
more petroleum from the reservoir if it is efficient than if it is inefficient, see appendix 2.3.
I continue with a characterisation of O·. From the case of a non-binding resource constraint,
equation (2.54), I get the following expression in O· for the limiting case q -7 K-:
(2.55)
When q( O)=K, we have from (2.46)
(2.56) y(O) = (p - de(K, 0»(1 +A)/(O) - (A + J.l)F(O/Ye(K,O) ~ O fl. '5: O '5: O·.
dq(O) dq(O)dO '
Non-negativity of y( O) is required by (2.43). In appendix 2.4, I show that under assumption
A(2.16), y( O) is decreasing in O for fl. '5: O '5: O·. This has a clear economic interpretation:
y( 0), the Lagrange multiplier for the resource constraint, expresses the social marginal value
of petroleum in optimum. When O is increasing, the partnership's efficiency diminishes.
Consequently, the social marginal value of petroleum is reduced, i.e., y(O) is decreasing in
O. From (2.56), therefore, I get a second equation for determining 0·, by noting that non-
negativity is assured, provided
(2.57)
Hence, the set of constraints in equation (2.56) has been reduced to the single constraint
(2.57). The critical type is implicitly determined by equations (2.55) and (2.57), and together
they yield the condition
(2.58) ( _ de(K, 0*»(1 + A.)/(O*) _ (A + )F(O·) d
2
e(K, 0*) = O
p dq(8) J.l dq(0)d8'
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or
(2.58')
iJC(K,(}*) A +,Lt F«(}*) d2C(K,(}*)
p - dq(O) = 1+ A 1(0*) dq(O)dO .
This is to be compared with the symmetric information case, condition (2.18). Since the
marginal extraction cost is increasing in O by assumption A2, evidently the critical type is
reduced when we introduce asymmetric information. The economic rationale is that the
reduction in 0* implies a reduction in extraction levels for the types O E [0:, 0;), where O;
and 8: are the critical types under symmetric and asymmetric information, respectively.
These reductions in q( O) are optimal since they enhance rent extraction. In determining how
much to reduce 8*, MIE must trade off the marginal reduction in information costs (the right
hand side of (2.58'» against the production inefficiency (the left hand side).
To obtain explicit solutions for q(8) and 0*, one has to specify the cost structure C(q,8) and
the distribution of types F( 8).
2.6 QUADRATIC COST FUNCTION
In their model of optimal resource royalties, Gaudet, Lasserre and Long [1991] use a cost
function with the specific form
(2.59) bC(q,O)= Oq+-l, s e«.
2
I will in this section show that the model of Gaudet et al. [1991] is obtained as an application
of the general model developed in this chapter. It will be made clear that the choice of a
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quadratic cost function is convenient, since it in this special case is possible to find an explicit
solution for quantity as a function of the partnership's type.
As a start I will have to check whether the cost function (2.59) satisfies assumptions AI-A4
in section 2.3. It is easy to verify that Al and A2 are satisfied. A3 is also satisfied, by the
restriction b ~ O. Since the third-derivatives of a quadratic cost function are zero, A4 is
trivially satisfied.
Proposition 2.4
For a quadratic cost function, there exists a fr such that
q(O)=K, dq(O) =0
dO '
for fl. s O s O·
(2.60)
(O)=.!.[ _O_).,+JlF(O)]
q bPI +)., f(O) ,
dq(O) < O
dO '
This solution of q, as a function of the distribution of types, is analogous to equation (38) in
Gaudet et al. [1991]. To solve for this special case, I insert for a quadratic cost function in
the solution of the general model. I start by solving for the interior solution for extraction
level q. Inserting for a quadratic cost function in equation (2.54), yields
(2.61) y(O) = (p - 0- bq)(1 + ).,)f(O) - ()., + Jl)F(O) = O,
Solving with respect to q, gives
(2.62) =.!.[ -0- ).,+Jl F(O)]5:K O· ~O~(j,q bPI +)., f(O) ,
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I continue with a characterisation of 0*. Parallel to the approach in the case of a general cost
function, I make use of the fact that r(O) is decreasing in O for fl.::;; O::;;0* .12 This is
satisfied by assumption A(2.17) in appendix 2.4. I insert for the quadratic cost function in
equation (2.58):
(2.63) .!.[ _O*_A+J.lF(O*)]=K.
bPI + A f(O*)
The critical type 0* is implicitly determined by equation (2.63), and this is analogous to
equation (36) in Gaudet et al. [1991].
To obtain an explicit solution, I proceed by assuming a uniform distribution of types. The
hazard rate is now equal to13
(2.64) F(O) = (0- O) / (O - O) = O_ O.
f (O) 1/ (O - fl.) -
Hence, the optimal extraction level (interior solution) and the critical type are given by
(2.65) (O) =.!.[ - 1+ 2A + J.l0+ A + J.lO]q b P I+A l+A - ,
(2.66) 0* = (l+A)(p-bK)+(A+J.l)8.
1+ 2A +u
To illustrate the effect of introducing a binding resource constraint, I draw the optimal
quantity as a function of type.
*12 This assumption, not mentioned in Gaudet et al. [1991], is necessary to characterise ø .
13 The uniform distribution satisfies the monotone hazard rate assumption AS, as fø (~i:~)= 1.
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qFigure 2.3: Optimal production schedule for manufacturing and petroleum extraction, under assumptions of
quadratic cost function and uniform distribution of types.
In figure 2.3 optimal quantity is drawn with a bold line for the case with a binding resource
constraint (the petroleum sector) and with a thin line for cases of absence of binding resource
constraints (e.g., the manufacturing sector). The two lines coincide for the inefficient types
B* ~ B ~ "li, whereas the line for manufacturing quantity lies above the petroleum line for the
more efficient types fl. ~ B < B*. The optimal regulatory solution in the case with a binding
resource constraint implies bunching (partial pooling) for an interval of efficient types.
Compared with a situation without a binding resource constraint (a fully separating
equilibrium), the quantity is lower for those types.
For the case of quadratic cost function, figure 2.4 below illustrates the optimal extraction path
for symmetric and asymmetric information about costs. The optimal extraction level under
symmetric information, B" = (p - bK), is obtained by inserting for a quadratic cost function
in equation (2.11). Similarly, by inserting for a quadratic cost function in equation (2.18), I
obtain the critical type with symmetric information; B; = (p - bK).
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qFigure 2.4: Optimal production schedule with symmetric (thin line) and asymmetric information (bold line),
under assumptions of quadratic cost function and uniform distribution of types.
We see that the two curves coincide for the types 8 ~ 8:, whereas, for the less efficient
types, the optimal production schedule for asymmetric information is below the schedule for
symmetric information.
2.7 COMPARATIVE STATICS
I will try to keep the analyses at the highest possible level of generality, and will therefore
return to the original model with a general cost function and a general distribution of types.
Since in this model it is not possible to find an explicit solution for q( 8), I will instead
characterise the solution by comparative statics analysis. These analyses will also be of help
in providing more intuition for the economic results.
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I will start by determining the relations between the critical type fl and the parameters
p, A and u..
Corollary 2.1
The critical type is increasing in the petroleum price, and decreasing in the net cost of public
funds and the foreign equity share.
These comparative statics results can be shown by implicit derivation of (2.58'). Equation
(2.58') defines fl as an implicit function of p, A and ,u:
(2.67) G _ _ aC(K,(}*) _ A +,u F(f}*) a
2C(K,fl)
- p aq(f)*) 1+ A j(fl) aq(fl)af)* ,
as we from the assumptions A2, A4, and A5, have that
Hence, corollary 2.1 is verified by the following derivations:
(2.69)
86
(2.70)
1+ 2A +Jl F«(}*) a2C(K,£}*)
so: = _ GÅ = _ (1+A)2 f«(l) aq«(l)a(}* < O
dA GEt a2C(K,£}*) + A +Jl.!!:_(F(e·»)a2C(K,e·) + A +Jl F(e*) a3C(K,e·)
aq«(}*)ae· 1+ A de· f«(}*) aq(e·)ae· 1+A f«(:}*) aq«(}*)a(l2
(2.71)
ae: G_= __Jl =
au GB'
1 F«(l) a2C(K,e·)
i+If((1) aq((r )ae· < O
a2C(K,e·) A+Jl d (F(e·»)a2C(K,e*) A+Jl F(e*) a3C(K,e·)
aq(e·)a(r + 1+A d(r f(fr) aq((l)a(l + 1+ A far) aq«(l)a(r2
The economic interpretation is that a higher petroleum price, ceteris paribus, increases the
marginal value of petroleum. It will therefore be optimal to empty the reservoir also for
producer groups with lower efficiency. An increase in the net cost of public funds and the
foreign equity share, on the other hand, will increase the value of transferring funds from
private petroleum companies to the state; A + u, Ceteris paribus, this will call for increased
rent extraction. More rent is extracted by reducing the interval of types for which the
resource constraint is binding, fl. s e s fl, i.e., by reducing (l.
For a very high petroleum price and very low levels of the net cost of public funds and the
foreign equity share, we may have e·;;::: (j, i.e., it will be optimal to empty the reservoir
irrespective of the efficiency of the petroleum companies (pooling). Conversely, for low
petroleum prices and a high value of transferring funds from private petroleum companies to
the state, it may be optimal to leave petroleum in the reservoir for all producer types.
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Corollary 2.2
For a non-binding resource constraint the optimal extraction level is increasing in the product
price and decreasing in the foreign equity share and the net cost of public funds.
These results of how the optimal extraction level q( 8) depends on the parameters
p, J.L and A.. when the resource constraint is non-binding (y(8) = O), can be verified by
comparative statics analysis. Equation (2.46) defines q(8) as an implicit function of
p, J.L and A.. :
(2.72) G = _ aC(q(8),8) _ A.. + J.L F(8) a
2C(q(8),8) = O
P aq(8) l+ A.. /(8) aq(8)a8 '
since we from assumptions A3 and A4 have that
(2.73) G = _ a
2C(q( 8),8) _ A.. + J.L F( 8) a3C(q( 8),8) *O
q aq(8f 1+A.. /(8) aq(8)2a8 '
Hence, the relationship between optimal extraction level q( 8) and the product price p is
derived by implicit derivation in equation (2.46):
(2.74)
The positive sign is due to assumptions A3 and A4. The economic interpretation is that an
increase in product price implies, ceteris paribus, an increase in the expected ex post
extraction inefficiency for a given distortion (reduction) of q( 8). Hence, the balance
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between rent extraction and ex post efficiency is tilted, and the optimal extraction level is
increased.
To establish the relationship between the production level q( B) and the foreign equity share
J.l, I proceed in the same manner:
(2.75)
1 F(B) d2C(q(B),B)
dq(B) = _ GJl = _ 1+ A, f(B) dq(B)dB <O
dJ.l G d2C(q(B),B) A,+J.l F(B) d3C(q(B),B)
q +
dq( B)2 1+ A, f( B) dq( B)2dB
The sign is determined by assumptions A2, A3 and A4. The economic intuition of the result
is that an increase of foreign ownership decreases the welfare weight to the partnership profit,
1- u, since income accruing to foreign investors is not seen as contributing to the welfare in
Norway. As a consequence, the welfare gain from transferring one unit of income from the
partnership to the government, A,+ u, is increasing in the foreign equity share. The motive
for rent extraction is reinforced, and, ceteris paribus, the extraction level should therefore be
reduced as this is a means for rent extraction.
The effect on optimal extraction level of a change in the net cost of public funds is given by
(2.76)
1-J.l F(B)d2C(q(B),B)
dq(B) = _ GÅ = _ (1 + A,)2 f(B) dq(B)dB < O
dA, G d2C(q(B),B) A,+ J.l F(B) d3C(q(B),B) .
q + ------...;..;:_;.,--_
dq(B)2 1+ A, f(B) dq(B)2 dB
Again the sign is determined by assumptions A2, A3 and A4. The economic rationale is
similar as for the change in the foreign equity share: The welfare gain from transferring one
unit of income from the partnership to the government, A,+ u, is increasing in the net cost of
public funds. The motive for rent extraction is reinforced, and, ceteris paribus, the extraction
level should therefore be reduced as this is a means for rent extraction. An increase of
A,reflects an increase of tax-induced distortions in other sectors of the economy. Optimal
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taxation in the petroleum sector implies balancing the deadweight loss of petroleum taxes
against deadweight losses elsewhere in the economy. When the latter are increasing, ceteris
paribus, second best taxation optimum calls for higher taxes (more distortions) in the
petroleum sector. Reduction in the level of petroleum production introduces an ex post
extraction inefficiency. Hence, by reducing the production level we get a higher expected ex
post deadweight loss in the petroleum sector.
Corollary 2.3
Compared with a situation without a resource constraint, the partnership gets a lower
information rent if it is of type fl.::;; 8 < 8*. For the other types the rent is equal.
The economic rationale for the reduction of rent is that the resource constraint is binding for
the types fl.::;; 8 ::;;8*. The optimal regulatory solution in the case with a binding resource
constraint implies bunching. Compared with a situation without a binding resource constraint
(a fully separating equilibrium, see the thin line in figure 2.3), the extraction level is lower for
those types. From (2.35) we get that
(2.77)
jj 2 --
dII(8) = I d C(q_<8)~8)dO >O,
dq( 8) 8 dq( 8)d8
i.e., a lower quantity implies lower rent. The expression in (2.77) is positive due to the single
crossing property (assumption A2). Due to bunching (partial pooling), the types that are
more efficient than 8* are not able to obtain higher quantity and rent through self selection.
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In interpretation of figure 2.3, I used manufacturing as an example of an industry with
absence of binding resource constraints. For this example an economic implication of
corollary 2.3, ceteris paribus, is that efficient producers in the manufacturing industry enjoy
higher rents than efficient petroleum companies. Since the information rent of the producer is
derived from private information, it is important to note that this comparison presupposes the
same degree of private information in the two industries. As I argue in section 1.2,
however, in Norway the presence of asymmetric information is more likelyoffshore than
onshore.
2.8 OPTIMAL CUTOFF TYPE
I will now discuss the principal's strategy option of denying extraction rights if the reported
cost parameter is above some critical level (Jc' a cutoff level. I make use of the approaches
in Baron [1989] and Laffont and Tirole [1993], section 1.4.5. Let r«(J)=1 indicate that the
partnership is allowed to produce and let r«(J)=O indicate denial of extraction rights.
Proposition 2.5
The partnership will be awarded a production right if (J S; (Jc' i.e.,
(2.78)
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To start with symmetric information, it was made clear in section 2.4 that the government in
this case was able to capture all the economic rent, i.e., II =O. The welfare function in
equation (2.2) is now equal to
(2.79) W = (l + A )(pq(8) - C(q(8), 8».
It will be optimal for MIE to deny extraction, i.e., to set q(8) = 0, for 8 E (8c'O], where 8c is
implicitly given by
(2.80) W(8J = (l + A )(pq(8e> - C(q(8c)' 8e» = O.
This is self-explanatory; MIE denies extraction rights for types that would generate a
negative net production value. We have not gained any new insights, however, since this
result is already contained in the participation constraints (2.4).
By introducing asymmetric information, the ex ante optimal contract may imply denial of
extraction for some interval of types even though it is ex post efficient for them to produce.
The rationale for this ex post inefficiency is the same as for the distortion of production
levels: It reduces the rent of the more efficient types. This is clear from the expression of the
partnership's rent:
(2.35)
The incentive compatible rent difference between two types 8 and 8 + d8 is equal to relative
cost advantage of type 8, C(q( 8 + d8), 8 + d8) - C(q( 8 + d8), 8). For a type 8 , therefore,
the total information rent is equal to cumulative cost differences given by equation (2.35).
By introducing a cutoff rate 8c <8, the least efficient company gets more efficient. Hence,
the cumulative cost advantage for a type 8, i.e., the profit, is reduced.
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In determining 0c' I assume that there is an interior solution to the cutoff rate problem, in
which the resource constraint is non-binding. To solve, I make use of the fact that the rent
function (2.35) combines the participation and the incentive constraints. Inserting for this
rent in the objective function (2.37), the expected welfare is given by:
(2.81)
"6 "6 --
EW = J [(1+ A,)(pq(O) - C(q(O), O» - (A, +.u)J ac(q(~),O) dØ]dF(O).
~ 6 dO
By integrating by parts in the last term, (2.81) can be rewritten as
(2.82) EW = f9 [(1+ A,)(pq(O) - C(q(O), O» - (A, +.u) dC(~O), O) F(O)]dF(O).
~ O 1(0)
An implicit expression for the optimal production schedule l(O), is found by pointwise
differentiation of the expected welfare, equation (2.82), with respect to q( O) :
(2.83) dC(q( O), O) A,+.u F( O) dZC(q( O), O)
p - dq(O) = 1+ A, 1(0) dq(O)dO .
We see that (2.83) is the same as equation (2.46), for y(O) =O. Since I have not used the
optimal control theory approach of section 2.5, this represents an alternative derivation of the
optimal production schedule, q.(O). The production levels are distorted in order to extract
more rent from the partnership.
A
By making extraction contingent on the reported O belonging to a certain interval, the
government has an additional means for rent extraction. This is,clear from the rent function,
given by equation (2.35). With a cutoff rate 0c' the rent of a partnership of type O is given
by
(2.84)
6 --n;O) = f dC(q(~), O) dØ.
6 dO
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The change in rent with respect to a change in cutoff rate is
(2.85) dll(O) = aC(q(oJ,OJ > o.
dOc aoc
The rent is increasing in the cutoff rate, due to the monotonicity assumption A 1. It is,
therefore, clear that MIE can reduce the information rent by denying production for some of
the least efficient producer groups, i.e., by reducing the support of the distribution function
F(O) from [!l,8] to [!l,OC]. By denial of production rights for reports 8 E (Oc,8], Mill
strengthens its negotiating power (by reducing the partnership's strategy space, given by the
support for 8 ), and is hereby able to capture more of the rent if O E [!l, 0c]. If O E (Oc'8],
however, this strategy may give a welfare loss if extraction for those types would give
positive welfare ex post.
The partnership now faces a contract involving a positive production schedule q* (O) for the
types OE [!l, Oc] and zero production for the types OE (Oc'8]. The right-hand tail of the
distribution of types, i.e., the types to the right of OC'is cut off. Note that the hazard rate is
invariant to an upward truncation of the distribution: For
Os 0c,[!(O) / F(OJ] / [F(O) / F(OJ] = !(O) / F(O). The optimal production schedule at
0< Oc is therefore still given by (2.46), i.e., it is independent of the truncation point OC' The
economic intuition of this result is clear from the interpretation of (2.46): q(O) is distorted
from the symmetric information level until the gain from a marginal increase in rent
extraction (the right hand side) is equal to the marginal reduction in production value (the left
hand side). These are local effects that are not affected by an upward truncation of the
probability distribution.
Hence, the expected social welfare is given by
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(2.86) EW(OC>= BJ'[(1+ Å)(pq·(O) - C(q·CO), O» _ (Å + j.l) aC(q; (0), O) F(O)]dFCO).~ O f(O)
The optimal cutoff rate is found by maximising (2.86) with respect to Oc (i.e., with respect to
the upper integral limit):
(2.87)
An interpretation of this condition is that in choosing the truncation point Oc' MIE will trade
off the net value of keeping type 0c (the left hand side) against the cost of extra rent to the
more efficient types (the right hand side). Compared with the case of symmetric information,
equation (2.80), we see that asymmetric information generates the additional right hand side
of equation (2.87). To extract more rent, the government is willing to accept some ex post
inefficiency in production.
Corollary 2.4
The cutoff rate is non-increasing in the foreign equity share and the net cost of public funds,
and it is non-decreasing in the petroleum price.
These results of how the optimal cutoff rate Oc depends on the parameters u,Å and p, can be
verified by comparative statics analysis. To start with the cutoff rate's dependence on the
foreign equity share in the license, let O~ and O! denote the optimal cutoff rates for the owner
shares j.l0 and j.l' , respectively. By applying revealed preference, we have
(2.88) EW(O~ ,j.l0) ~ EW(O;,j.l°),
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(2.89)
Adding up (2.88) and (2.89) gives
(2.90) EW (O~,J.l o) - EW (O~,J.l1 ) - EW (O;,J.l o) + EW (O;, J.ll ) ;;::O,
or
(2.91)
From (2.86) I get
(2.92)
where the sign is determined by assumption AI. Since the intregrand in equation (2.91) is
negative, the integration limits, O and u , must be non-positively related for the double
integral to be non-negative. Hence, equation (2.91) implies the following:
J.ll > J.l0 => O; ~ O~, i.e., the cutoff rate is non-increasing in the foreign equity share. Put
differently, higher foreign participation in a license leads to lower probability for production
rights to be granted; F( 0c) is non-increasing in J.l . The economic intuition of the result is
parallel to the comparative statics analysis of optimal extraction level: The welfare gain from
transferring one unit of income from the partnership to the government, Il+ u, is increasing
in the foreign equity share. The motive for rent extraction is reinforced, and, ceteris paribus,
the cutoff rate should therefore be reduced since this is a means for rent extraction.
To establish the functional relationship between the cutoff rate 0c and the net cost of public
funds Il, I proceed in the same manner as above. From (2.86) I get
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(2.93) d
2
EW =f(O)( ·(0 )'-C( ·(0) 0»- dC(q·(OJ,OJ F(O)
dAdO c pq c qc' c dO c
c
=_1-j.J. dC(q·(OJ,O) F(O )<0
1+ A dO c'
where the second equality is obtained by using (2.87). Hence, we have that the cutoff rate is
non-increasing in the net cost of public funds. The economic rationale is similar as for the
change in the foreign equity share: The welfare gain from transferring one unit of income
from the partnership to the government, A +u, is increasing in the net cost of public funds.
The motive for rent extraction is reinforced, and the cutoff rate should therefore be reduced
since this is a means for rent extraction. An increase of A reflects an increase of tax-induced
distortions in other sectors of the economy. Optimal taxation in the petroleum sector implies
balancing the deadweight loss of petroleum taxes against deadweight losses elsewhere in the
economy. When the latter are increasing, ceteris paribus, second best taxation optimum calls
for higher taxes (more distortions) in the petroleum sector. Introducing a cutoff rate
introduces an ex post extraction inefficiency, since the field is not developed if OE (Oc''O].
Hence, by reducing the cutoff rate we get a higher expected ex post deadweight loss.
From (2.86) we get
(2.94) d
2EW •
iJpdO
c
=f(OJ(l+A)q (OJ>O.
The sign is positive since q.(OJ, determined by (2.46), is assumed to be positive.
Consequently, the cutoff rate is non-decreasing in the petroleum price. The economic
interpretation is that an increase in product price implies, ceteris paribus, an increase in the
expected ex post extraction inefficiency for a given cutoff rate. Hence, the balance between
rent extraction and ex post efficiency is tilted, and the optimal cutoff rate is increased. If p
is sufficiently large, the reservoir is developed for all types, i.e., Oc= 'O .
97
2.9 MARKET POWER
In the preceding analysis I have made the simplifying assumption that Norway is a price taker
in the petroleum market. With the increasing pace of extraction in the North Sea, thisis at
present probably not a reasonable assumption. Norway probably has market power both in
the oil and the gas market. According to BP Statistical Review of World Energy, in 1992 the
Norwegian shares of total world production of oil and natural gas are 3.4 and 1.4 per cent,
respectively. Gas and oil have different market characteristics, mainly due to different
means of transportation. Whereas the oil market is global, the gas market is segmented into
regional markets due to higher transport costs. Norwegian petroleum companies export oil to
the world market, whereas the gas sales are restricted to the European market. Norwegian
share of European gas production is 3 per cent. Since there are only a small number of
companies supplying gas to Europe, and since Norway is perceived as a more reliable
supplier than its main competitor, Russia, Norway probably has more market power for gas
than for oil.
It is important to note that the principal (MIE) and the agent (the partnership) in the
regulatory model of this chapter, may have different degrees of market power. Since there
are several gas fields on stream in the Norwegian sector, and since the partnerships vary
among the licenses, the total Norwegian gas sales (qN) are higher than the sales of a
particular partnership (qp). Hence, Norway has higher market power and a lower marginal
revenue than that of a particular partnership:
(2.95) dp dpP+-qN <p+-qp.
dq dq
In addition to the problem of achieving truthful cost reporting, MIE will in this situation face
a problem of pricing. In calculating the marginal revenue, a partnership will not take into
account that selling one additional gas unit will reduce the incomes of the other Norwegian
98
partnerships (a pecuniary external effect). Consequently, from a domestic welfare
perspective, total Norwegian gas sales may bee too high and the price too low. To exploit the
Norwegian market power, it may therefore be optimal to restrict competition among
Norwegian partnerships selling gas to Europe. Since 1986 such cartelisation has been in
effect, all negotiations on sales of Norwegian gas are taken care of by the Gas Negotiating
Committee (GFU).
To avoid the problems related to pricing issues, I have in this chapter made the assumption
that Norway is a price taker in the petroleum market. I will now try to indicate the effects of
relaxing this assumption. I will focus on gas, since the presence of Norwegian market power
for petroleum is most relevant in this market.
Proposition 2.6
Introducing a downward-sloping demand curve does not affect the qualitative conclusions as
to asymmetric information.
Up to now I have assumed that the welfare generated from a petroleum license can be
expressed as a weighted sum of the partnership's profit and the net total government take;
with the objective function
(1.3) W = (1+A)R + (1- ,u)ll.
If Norway faces a downward sloping demand curve for gas, our decisions on gas extraction
and marketing will affect the European gas price. Hereby will also the Norwegian consumer
surplus of gas be affected. The change in domestic consumer surplus caused by Norwegian
gas supply is thus a third welfare effect, and should be included in the welfare function (1.3).
Introducing this new effect, ceteris paribus, will call for a higher gas quantity q for all types
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O, but will not change the qualitative results of the analysis above. Due to our hydroelectric
power, the domestic consumption of natural gas is small, and practically all the production
volume is exported. Hence, the change in consumer surplus of natural gas is probably
negligible compared with the effects on revenue and production inefficiency. Since
inclusion of consumer surplus considerations in the model will also cause technical
complexities, it will be abstracted from in the analysis to follow.
To illustrate that the presence of market power does not change the qualitative conclusions of
the analysis, I will make a stylised model of a partnership facing a downward sloping demand
curve. To abstract from problems of pecuniary external effects, I will assume that there is
only one gas license on the Norwegian continental shelf. Alternatively, there are several gas
licenses, but they are all awarded to the same partnership group. In order to avoid
complexities of strategic interaction among petroleum producers, I will furthermore assume
that the partnership is a monopolist on the European market. In the following I will examine
whether the results of sections 2.4 and 2.5 are modified under these altered assumptions.
To start with symmetric information, the only change in the model of section 2.4 is that the
partnership no longer considers the product price to be a parameter p, but rather a function
p(q), where dp(q) / dq < O. Analogous to equation (2.6), the regulatory problem now
generates the Lagrangian
(2.96) L = (1+ A )(p(q)q - C(q, O))+ reK - q),
and the first-order condition iS14
(2.97) p(1+_I_)_ dC(q,O) =_r_,
c(q) dq l+A
14 Sufficient conditions for the second-order condition to be satisfied, are assumption A3 and
d2p(q) I dl s 0, i.e., a convex cost function and a concave inverse demand function, respectively.
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where e(q) is the elasticity of demand, given by
(2.98) e(q) = dq(p) _l!_ < O.
dp q(p)
Comparing with condition (2.7), we see that the only difference is the replacement of the
price p with the marginal revenue p(l + 1/ e). Since the cost function is assumed convex
(assumption A3), comparison of (2.7) and (2.97) shows that, with the resource constraint
non-binding, the quantity extracted is lower when the partnership faces a downward-sloping
demand curve. This is due to traditional monopolist behaviour; increasing the profit by
limiting the supply.
Turning to the case of asymmetric information; repeating the procedure of section 2.5 will
make clear that the regulatory problem now will generate the Lagrangianl>
(2.99) L = [(1+ A )(p(q(B»q(B) - C(q(B),B» - (A +Jl)II(B)]f(B)
-1](B) dC(~~),B) + y(B)(K -q(B».
The second-best optimum is given by16
(2.100) (1+.!.) _ dC(q( B), B) = A + Jl F( B) d
2C(q( B), B) + y( B)
p e dq(B) 1+ A f(B) dq(B)dB (1+ A)f(B)'
and is identical to condition (2.46), except that the price p is replaced with the marginal
revenue p(1 + 1/ e). For a non-binding resource constraint, the quantity extracted is thereby
15 The reason why the Lagrangians in (2.41) and (2.99) are almost identical, is that equation (2.34) still applies.
This can be verified by noting that in this case we have II(O) = p(q(O»q(O) - C(q(O),O) - R(O). Condition
(2.35) for the price taker case, that encompasses the incentive and the participation constraints, therefore
generalises to this context.
16 The sufficient conditions for optimum are the ones listed in appendix 2.2, with the addition of
d2p(q) I dq2 s O (concave inverse demand function).
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lower when the partnership faces a downward-sloping demand curve. This is similar to the
case with symmetric information.
With the same reasoning it is also clear that the critical type (the type for which the resource
constraint is exactly binding, fl) is lower when the partnership faces a downward-sloping
instead of a horizontal demand curve. This result is valid for both symmetric and asymmetric
information, and can be shown by replacing the price p with the marginal revenue
p(l + 1/ £)p in equations (2.18) and (2.58'), respectively. The economic interpretation is
straight forward; as the marginal revenue is reduced, it takes a more efficient producer group
to make the resource constraint binding.
Introducing a negative-sloped demand curve, therefore, has the same effect in the symmetric
and the asymmetric case: It reduces the critical type 8*, and for a non-binding resource
constraint, it reduces the optimal extraction level for all types. However, the marginal
information cost, Å + ~ F(8) a2f(q(~,8) ,is unaffected. The qualitative conclusions with
1+/1, f(8) q(8) 8
respect to asymmetric information are therefore unaffected by the change in slope of the
demand curve. The economic explanation is that the model is based on private information
about the cost parameter 8, whereas there is assumed to be symmetric information about the
demand function.
2.10 IMPLEMENTATION
In developing an optimal contract for petroleum regulation, I have used the revelation
approach, i.e., the Ministry of Industry and Energy is assumed to offer the petroleum
companies a revelation mechanism M = {(q( 8), R( 8),8 E [!l, 'O]}. Since the optimal
mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility, the partnership will report their true cost
parameter 8, in response to which they will be instructed to extract
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(2.101)
q( 8) = K, if fl s 8 s 8*
q(B) < K, given by (2.46), if 8* $: B $: B,
and to pay the net taxes
(2.102) R(8) = pq(8) - C(q(8),8) - ll(B).
Comparing this contract with present systems for petroleum taxation is difficult, since direct
revelation mechanisms are rarely used. Under certain conditions, however, the optimal
contract can be given an alternative implementation that is similar to present petroleum tax
schemes; net taxes as a function of the production level. This is termed the delegation
approach, since the level of extraction is left for the partnership to decide.
The following is an analogous application of the approach in Laffont and Tirole [1993],
section 1.4. As shown in appendix 2.3, q( B) is strictly decreasing for the types 8* $: B $: '8,
and can thus, for this interval of types, be inverted; 8(q). I substitute for this function in
(2.36):
(2.103) T(q) == R(8(q» = pq - C(q(8),8(q» - ll(8(q».
The optimal net tax T (q) for the types B* $: 8 $: '8, is now a function of the extraction level. I
examine the properties of this function:
(2.104)
dT(q) dC(q(8),8(q» dC(q(8),8(q» d8(q) dll(8(q» d8(q)--=p- - --_;__~
dq dq d8(q) dq d8(q) dq
dC(q(B),8(q»
=p- dq
The second equality in equation (2.104) is obtained by using condition (2.39). Since price
exceeds marginal extraction costs for all types B > fl, the net tax function is upward-sloping.
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The optimal allocation solving the regulatory problem can thus be implemented by offering a
menu of tax-production bundles, forming an increasing net tax function T(q):
T
Figure 2.5: Implementation by a net tax function.
The partnership types (J> (J* choose the tax-production bundle where their isoprofit curves
are tangent to the net tax schedule (self selection), whereas the types (J:::;; (J* bunch at the
boundary point q = K ,i.e., q( (J)IØE[ft.Ø·J = K.
Ihave established that the net tax function is increasing in the extraction level. Without more
information it is not possible to be more exact about the functional form. As shown in
appendix 2.5, T(q) is likely to be a strictly concave function either if the cost function
exhibits a strong degree of convexity or if the marginal extraction costs do not differ much
among different producer types. As was made clear in the discussion of assumption A3 in
section 2.3, it is reasonable to expect convex costs in petroleum extraction, due to reservoir
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pressure considerations. As I argued in sections 1.2 and 1.11, however, there is a severe
problem of asymmetric information in petroleum regulation and taxation. This is formalised
in assumption A l (total costs increase with the producer type) and assumption A2 (the
marginal extraction costs increases with the producer type). If the major part of the private
information is related to fixed costs, the marginal extraction costs will not differ much among
different producer types, and T(q) is a strictly concave function. If there is much asymmetry
with relation to the marginal extraction costs, the curvature of the net tax function is
ambiguous.
T
q
K
Figure 2.6: Implementation of a concave net tax function by a menu of linear contracts.
As illustrated in figure 2.6, the concave net tax function can be replaced by the family of its
tangents.'? The partnership's choice of extraction-tax bundle is the same whether it is offered
1? This is an analogous application of Laffont and Tirole [1993]. section 1.4.
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a concave net tax schedule (bold curve) or its set of tangents (depicted by light linear lines).
The optimal regulatory policy, therefore, can be implemented by a menu of contracts that are
linear in the realised extraction level:
(2.105)
where q * (O) and R* (O) are, respectively, the extraction level and the net government take
determined by the optimal mechanism (equations (2.46) and (2.36), respectively). To verify
that (2.105) induces revelation (O = 8) and the appropriate extraction level (q = q * (8)), I will
analyse the partnership's optimisation program when facing this menu of linear contracts:
(2.106) Max{pq(8) - C(q(8), 8) - R* (O) - (p - dC(~(~),8»)(q - q*(O))}.
9.q q
The first-order conditions are
(2.107) ( _ dC(q(8),8))_( _ dC(q·(8),8))=0p dq Pdq· ,
(2.108)
.AA." ."'.'"
_( _ dC(q (8),8)) dq ~8)+ ( _ (}C(q (8),8)) dq ~8)
p dq* d8 P dq* d8
2 * A • A
+d C(q (8),8)dq ~8)( _ *(8))=0.
dq*2 de q q
The first term in condition (2.108), -dR· (8) / d8, is calculated from equation (2.36).
Equation (2.107) gives q= q.(8), and (2.108) implies that 8= 8.
Implementation by a menu of linear contracts is more easily compared with existing systems
for petroleum taxation. Each of the linear contracts described above is composed of a fixed
amount and a proportional tax, or in the language of petroleum taxation, a mixture of a
license fee and a royalty. The most striking difference between the optimal contracts
106
generated from the model of this chapter and those commonly observed in real petroleum tax
systems, is that the petroleum companies in the model are not offered a single contract, but a
set of contracts. The purpose is screening of the firms' technology. Through its choice of
tax-extraction bundle, the partnership reveals its true efficiency parameter (self selection).
This is illustrated in figure 2.6: Due to lower extraction costs, an efficient producer group
will select a higher extraction level than an inefficient producer, and thereby pay a higher
license fee and a lower royalty.
Contrary to most petroleum tax schemes, it is also worth noting that the suggested menu of
contracts does not involve a profits tax. The explanation is evident; since there is assumed to
be asymmetric information as to costs, MIE is not able to observe true profits. The net tax is
instead made contingent on an observable variable, namely the extraction level chosen by the
partnership.
2.11 COMPETITION
Up to now I have assumed that the production right is awarded by discretionary licensing.
The production license gives the selected partnership group a monopoly in extraction from
the petroleum field. The regulatory problem is to tax the monopoly under asymmetric
information, by design of an optimal incentive contract. As shown in section 2.10, the
optimal regulation is a menu of linear contracts, composed of a license fee and a royalty.
If there exist several companies with adequate resources and competence to exploit the
reservoir, the regulatory agency may be able to improve the outcome by utilising competition
ex ante or ex post, i.e., before or after awarding the production license. Conventional ex post
competition would be the threat of entry, or threatening to award the production right to
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another partnership group. Models for ex post competition, by means of repeated auctions,
are provided in chapter 4.
Ex ante competition, by the auctioning of production rights, may improve rent extraction,
provided it is possible to avoid collusion. This follows analogously from Laffont and Tirole
[1993], chapter 7. A number of m producer groups, drawn independently from a distribution
F (O), with support [~, 8], bid simultaneously by announcing efficiency parameters. The
optimal auction awards the production license to the partnership with the lowest efficiency
parameter, and the winner is given an incentive contract similar to the monopoly case. The
only difference induced by the auction is a truncation of the interval [~,9] to [~, Oi],
where (Ji is the second-lowest bid. The negotiating power of MIE is increased, as it can
threaten to replace the winner with the second-lowest bidder. The information rent, the rent
necessary to induce truthful report, is now reduced to
(2.109)
i.e., the rent of the most efficient partnership if it instead were to mimic the second-lowest
bidder.
The optimal contract exhibits a separation property; the optimal extraction level is the same
as if there had been no bidding competition. This is clear as the hazard rate is invariant to an
upward truncation of the distribution: For O s Oi, [f(O) / F(Oi)] / [F(O) / F(Oi)]
= f(O) / F(O). The optimal production schedule, therefore, is still determined by equation
(2.46). As before, the optimal regulatory policy can be implemented by a menu of contracts
that are linear in the realised extraction level. The effect of competitive bidding is to increase
the license fee, whereas the level of the royalty is left unchanged.
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APPENDIXES
Appendix 2.1
In proving that the policies q( 8) and (JE [fl,8] are differentiable, I will follow the approach
in Laffont and Tirole [1993], section 1.4. The profit of the partnership is given by
A(2.1)
,... A A ,..
II( (J,(J)= pq( (J) - C(q( (J), (J) - R( (J).
The truth-telling requirement implies that for any pair of values fJ and (J in [fl,8],
A(2.2) pq«(J) - C(q«(J),(J) - R«(J) ~ pq(fJ) - C(q(8 ),(J) - R(8),
A(2.3) pq( fJ ) - C(q( fJ ), fJ ) - R( 8)~pq( (J) - C(q( (J),8 )- R( (J).
Adding up A(2.2) and A(2.3) gives
A(2.4) -C(q«(J), (J)+ C(q«(J),8) ~ -C(q(8 ),(J) + C(q(8), fJ),
or
A(2.5)
B'q(B') 2J J d C~q( (J), (J)dq( (J)d8 sO.
B q(B) d(Jdq( (J)
Therefore, if fJ> (J, then q(8) < q«(J), i.e., incentive compatibility implies that q«(J) is a
non- increasing function. Hence q( (J) is differentiable almost everywhere.
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I will now prove that at a point of differentiability for q(8), A(2.2) and A(2.3) imply that
R( 8) is also differentiable. Let 8 be a point of differentiability of q( 8). From A(2.2) and
A(2.3), and for (J> 8,
A(2.6) (C(q«(J ),(J) - C(q(8),(J » > R«(J) - R(8) > (C(q«(J), 8) - C(q(8),8»
(J -8 - (J -8 - (J -8
Since (J ~ 8, the left-hand and right-hand sides converge to _ ac~q(8),8) dq(8) , i.e.,
q(8) d8
A(2.7) dR( 8)1 = dC(q( 8),8) dq( 8)
d8 + dq( 8) d8
Similarly, taking (J < 8, I get
A(2.8) dR(8)1 =_ dC(q(8),8) dq(8) .
d8 _ dq( 8) d8
Therefore, at any point where q( 8) is differentiable, R( 8) is differentiable.
•
Appendix 2.2
I will check the sufficient condition for the regulatory problem. The sufficient condition is
that the Lagrangian (2.41) shall be concave in (q(8),II(8» for all 8, or expressed with the
principal minors of the Hessian matrix:
A(2.9)
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A(2.1O)
As the Lagrangian is linear in Il ,A(2.1O) is trivially satisfied. A(2.9) can be written as
A(2.11)
and is satisfied by the assumptions A3 and A4.
•
Appendix 2.3
By applying the implicit f~nction theorem, I will now show that the solution to the regulatory
problem satisfies the monotonicity condition
(2.24) dq(O) sO.
dO
For fl. $ O $ 0* the resource constraint is binding (q( O) = K); the monotonicity condition is
therefore trivially satisfied for these types. In case of an interior solution, i.e., for 0* < O$ "'8
( y( O)= 0), equation (2.46) defines q( O) as an implicit function of O:
A(2.12) F(O (O» = _ aC(q(O),O) _ A + J.l F(O) a
2C(q(0),0) = O
,q p aq(O) 1+ A f(O) aq(o)ao '
since we from assumptions A3 and A4 have
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A(2.13) F = ;PC(q(O),O) _ A + J.l F(O) ;ic(q(o),O) "# O
q aq(0)2 1+ A f(O) aq(0)2 ao .
Hence, the derivative is given by
A(2.14)
a2C(q(0), O) + A + J.l!!:_(F(O») a2c(q(0), O) + A + J.l F(O) a3c(q(0), O)
aq(o)ao 1+ A dO f(O) aq(o)ao 1+ A f(O) aq(0)a02
a2C(q(0),0) A + J.l F(O) a3C(q(0),0)_ ___;;,,__c~_+ __
aq(0)2 1+ A f(O) aq(0)2 ao
which is strictly negative due to assumptions A2, A3, A4, and AS.
•
Appendix 2.4
Iwill examine under what conditions y(O) is decreasing in O for fl ~O~ 0*. The Lagrange
multiplier for the resource constraint is given by
(2.56)
y(O) = (p - aC(q(O), 0»(1 + A)f(O) - (A +J.l)F(O) a
2
c(q(0), O) ~ O fls Os 0*.
aq(o) aq(o)ao '
I want to show that
A(2.1S) dy(O)--=
dO
a
2
C(q(0),0)(1+A)f(0)+( _ aC(q(O),O»)(l+A)df(O)
aq( o)ao p aq( O) dO
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In the derivation of r(8) I have made use of the fact that in the optimal mechanism we have
bunching (i.e., dq(8)/d8=0) for ~S8S8·. By inserting for (p-dC(q(8),8»/aq(8)
from equation (2.46), and solving with respect to df( 8) / d8, yields
A(2.l6)
a
2
C(q(8),8) (1+ 2A. + j1)f(8)2 + (A. + j1)F(8)f(8) a
3
C(q(8),8)
_~_(8_)<__a~q(~8~)a_8 ~~~=- a~q~(8~)a_8_2_
d8 (A. + j1)F(8) a
2
C(q(8), 8) + r(8)
aq(8)a8
For a quadratic cost function C(q, 8) = 8q + (b / 2)q2, b ~ O, this condition is equal to
A(2.l7) df(8) (1+ 2A. +J1)f(8)2 + (A. +J1)F(8)f(8)---< .
d8 (A. +j1)F(8)+ r(8)
It is therefore clear that to secure that the shadow price for petroleum is decreasing in 8 (i.e.,
is increasing in the efficiency parameter of the partnership), one has to introduce a restriction
on the distribution of possible types. The restrictions on the slope of the density function, for
a general cost function in A(2.l6) and for a quadratic cost function in A(2.17), however, may
already be contained in the assumption of a monotone hazard rate:
A5: '!!:_(F(8») ~ O.
d8 f(8)
Taking the derivative in A5, and solving for df( O)/ dO, yields
A(2.l8) df(8) < f(8)2
dO - F(8)
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For certain values of A,Jl and r(8), the conditions A(2.16) and A(2.17) may be contained in
condition A(2.18). In this case the requirement of r(8) to be decreasing in 8 will not imply
additional restrictions on the density function.
•
Appendix 2.5
I will examine under what conditions the net tax function T(q), for the types 8* ~ 8 ~ "6, is a
strictly concave function. From (2.104), we get
A(2.19) d
2T(q) _ a2C(q,8(q»
dq' - al
a2C(q,8(q» 1
---;,--
aqa8(q) dq
d8(q)
By rearranging A(2.19) we get that the net tax function is strictly concave if
A(2.20)
a2C(q,8(q»
_.!!!L_ < _ aqa8(q)
d8(q) a2C(q,8(q»
aq2
Since the right hand side of condition A(2.20) is strictly negative, due to assumptions A2 and
A3, condition A(2.20) is stronger than the monotonicity condition (dq / d8(q) ~ O). Inserting
for A(2.14), i.e., the expression for dq / d8(q) developed in appendix 2.3, condition A(2.20)
can be written as
A(2.21)
114
iPC(q, 8(q» + A + J1 !!:_(F(8)J ;PC(q,8(q» + A + J1 F(8) d3C(q,8(q» d2C(q,8(q»
dqd8(q). 1+ A d8 f(8) dqd8(q) 1+ A f(8) dqd8(q)2 > dqd8(q)
d2C(q,8(q» A + J1 F(8) d3C(q,8(q» d2C(q,8(q»
--'-=-::-;"::__ + -------=-""-~
dl l+A f(8) dq2d8(q) dl
The quadratic cost function used by Gaudet et al. [1991], is one example of a cost function
that satisfies the conditions for concavity of T(q), provided the hazard rate is strictly
monotone. This is simply shown by inserting for C(q,8) = 8q+ (b / 2)q2, b e O,in condition
A(2.21) :
A(2.22)
1 A + J1 d (F(8)J
+ 1+A d8 f(8) 1
-----'---~ > -.
b b
For general cost functions I will show that T(q) is more likely to be a strictly concave
function (d2T(q) / dq' <O), either if the cost function exhibits a strong degree of convexity
(a2C(q, 8(q» / dl is high), or if the marginal extraction costs do not differ much among
different producer types (d2C(q, 8(q» / dqa8(q) is low). These comparative statics results
are obtained by differentiating equation A(2.19), taking into account the expression for
dq / d8(q) in equation A(2.14):
A(2.23)
d2C(q,8(q»
-1 + dqd8(q) < O
a2C(q,8(q» + A + J1 !!:_(F(8)J d2C(q,8(q» + A + J1 F(8) a3C(q,8(q»
dqd8(q) l+A ae f(8) aqd8(q) l+A f(8) dqd8(q)2
A(2.24)
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iJ2C(q,0(q» + A +J1 _!!_(F(0»)iJ2C(q,0(q»
-----.-1_ 1- iJqiJO(q) 1+ A dO f(O) iJqiJO(q)
dq iJ2C(q,0(q» + A + J1 _!!_(F(O») iJ2C(q,0(q» + A + J1 F(O) iJ3C(q,0(q»
dO(q) iJqiJO(q) 1+ A dO f(O) iJqiJO(q) 1+ A f(O) iJqiJO(q)2
>0
•
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Chapter 3
Petroleum taxation with adverse selection.
Interactions of dynamics in costs and Information'
3.1 A DYNAMIC ADVERSE SELECTION MODEL OF PETROLEUM REGULATION
This chapter examines how real economic intertemporal dependence in extraction costs
interacts with informational dynamics, in design of optimal intertemporal taxation of the
petroleum companies. It is a well known result that optimal dynamic regulation under full
commitment is to repeat the optimal static scheme in each period. Due to the non-stationarity
imposed by inter-period link in extraction costs, the optimal contracts for the petroleum
industry will differ between periods. Assuming symmetric information, tax theory has
prescribed a neutral petroleum taxation, e.g. the resource rent tax. Asymmetric information
brings us in a second best situation, calling for a non-neutral petroleum tax system. The
• I would like to thank Kåre P. Hagen and Diderik Lund for useful comments. This chapter has also benefited
from comments at Nordic Workshop on Applied Game Theory and Industrial Organisation, May 1994, and the
1994 EARlE conference.
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implementation mechanism of chapter 2 is generalised; the optimal allocation can be
implemented by menus of tangent planes.
Dynamics are important in the petroleum industry, due to a long planning horizon in
petroleum investments. Exploration is time consuming and it takes several years to develop a
field, which thereafter may produce in thirty years. In the static model the focus was on the
extent of extraction. In a dynamic resource-constrained context, the regulator will also have
to make decisions about the rate of extraction, i.e., select a depletion path.
Generally, going from a static to a dynamic regulatory problem adds well-known
complexities of renegotiation and lack of credible commitment.' The regulatory agency, the
Ministry of Industry and Energy (MIE), will in this chapter be assumed to be able to credibly
commit to a regulatory contract for the entire period of exploration, development and
extraction. This assumption considerably simplifies the model: Under full commitment all
decisions are taken in period one, and a binding contract is drawn for the entire horizon. The
parties commit not to bilaterally renegotiate or unilaterally revise this long term contract.
From a decision making point of view, therefore, this is a static problem, and parallel to the
static model in chapter 2, the relevant equilibrium concept is static Bayesian equilibrium.
Due to the long planning horizon in petroleum extraction, however, the assumption of full
commitment is far from innocuous. As I argued in section 1.7, two additional characteristics
of petroleum regulation make credible commitments especially hard to achieve in the
relationship between petroleum companies and the government: l) Irreversible investments;
it is tempting for the government to increase the net take from the petroleum sector once large
investments are sunk, as this causes no (static) deadweight loss, and 2) Institutional
restrictions; the present government cannot commit future governments. It can be argued,
however, that a confiscatory tax policy after sinking of irreversible investments, can not be
expected until there are only a few petroleum fields left for extraction. Before that time,
1 See section 1.7 for a discussion of dynamic petroleum regulation.
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since the government realises that it depends on private participation in petroleum extraction,
taxation will probably be reasonable so as to encourage private companies to apply for blocks
in future licensing rounds. Put differently, to keep down the dynamic deadweight loss, the
government will not opt for ex post confiscatory taxation.? Although MIE is generally
believed not to choose the drastic means of nationalisation, and therefore has more credibility
than politically unstable and less internationally integrated countries, it will still have to build
reputation for not choosing less dramatic means like heavy ex post taxation of irreversible
investments. The present discretionary tax regime is probably not effective for building such
a reputation.
As for the inability to commit future governments, this problem is somewhat modified by the
fact that for many years there has been a consensus among the largest Norwegian political
parties about the major questions of petroleum regulation. The arguments of political
consensus and dynamic deadweight loss, can to some extent give the government credibility
for not unilaterally deviating from long term contracts. It is difficult, however, to find
arguments of why MIE and the partnership should not amend (renegotiate) the initial contract
if both parties agree to do so. On the basis of this discussion, clearly the assumption of full
commitment, made in this chapter, is not reasonable. The full commitment model,
nevenheless, is useful as a reference case.
In the specific adverse selection model of this chapter, a two-period version of the model in
chapter 2, the investment decision is suppressed. The action taken by the partnership is to
report an efficiency parameter 8, or, equivalently, select an extraction path. Full
commitment in this context implies that the government, at the initial time of contracting, can
credibly commit to how to use information about the true 8 revealed in future periods. If
there is a separating equilibrium in period 1, there will be symmetric information at the
beginning of period 2. Reoptimising the contract, taking into account the new information
2 The Norwegian government is not expected to impose confiscatory taxation. It may, however, be suspected
to impose less dramatic tax increases. In the case of an unexpected high return for the petroleum companies, the
government may ex post choose to capture more of the resource rent than prescribed by the initial contract.
Some examples of such practise are mentioned in chapter 1.
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available, will typically yield a revision of the ex ante optimal contract. Full commitment
means that the government is credible when it asserts that it will not choose the revised ex
post contract, but will stick to the committed ex ante contract; i.e., the government is credible
in its claim of not making use of the new information available. When possible, it will
always be optimal for the principal at the initial contracting date to commit to a policy for the
entire horizon.'
Dynamic analyses of the petroleum industry are interesting from the perspective of regulation
theory. Two-period models of manufacturing industry have dynamics in information; the
asymmetric information may be resolved over time, and the principal updates his
expectations. In addition, being an exhaustible resource, petroleum also has an intertemporal
dependence in production. The higher is the present extraction level, the less is left for future
production. Equivalently, the more petroleum is extracted in this period, the more costly is
future production. The main objective of chapter 3 is to examine how the real economic
interternporal dependence in extraction costs interacts with the informational dynamics, in
design of optimal intertemporal taxation of the petroleum companies.
This chapter is inspired by an article on regulation of the mining industry by Gaudet, Lasserre
and Long [1991]; "Optimal resource royalties under asymmetric information't.f The structure
of their two-period model is similar to that of Baron and Besanko [1984], with an added
resource constraint. I make the same changes in the model of Gaudet et al. [1991] as in
chapter 2.5 Additional changes made in this chapter are introducing an asymptotic cost
function, redefining the resource stock, and allowing for the private information (given by a
parameter (J in the cost function) to be correlated over rime," Whereas Gaudet et al. assume
that (J is temporally independent, I choose the other polar case, assuming (J to be perfectly
3 Byentering into a binding long-term contract, the parties can always duplicate a sequence of short tenn
contracts, and generally they will be able to improve the outcome of short tenn contracting.
4 I also benefit from Baron and Besanko [1984], Baron [1989], and Laffont and Tirole [1993], chapters 8 and
10.
S The changes are a) The introduction of a general cost function, b) The elimination of one constraint, and c)
Some minor changes in the government's objective function.
6 The asymtotic cost function (assumption A6) and the resource base will be explained in section 3.2.
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correlated over time, i.e., 8) = 82 = 8. I will analyse the perfect correlation case because I
find this more descriptive of the information structure over time, and because this case yields
more interesting economic interpretations.
The assumption of a time invariant 8 is best explained by remembering the interpretation of
8 as an intrinsic cost parameter. As discussed in chapter 2, in this context the private
information underlying the intrinsic cost parameter 8, is either the partnership's efficiency
level or the quality of the reservoir (the geological structure). It is reasonable to assume that
the private information about efficiency or reservoir characteristics affects costs in a related
manner in the two periods, i.e., 8) and 82 are likely to be correlated. (The case of
independent cost parameters would be descriptive of a regulatory situation where the private
information is factor prices, and where these prices are statistically independent over time.)
By choosing the polar case of perfect correlation, I implicitly assume that the efficiency level
or the reservoir characteristics persist through time. Hence, the partnership has the same
advantage of private information in both periods. It may be that the partnership in observing
8) obtains only imperfect information about 82, i.e., 8) and 82 are imperfectly correlated:
Observing the intrinsic cost parameter in period one gives some indication of the extraction
costs in period two, but not exact knowledge as reservoir characteristics and efficiency may
change over time. I make the assumption of perfect correlation for tractability reasons."
If 8) and 82 were assumed to be independent, it implies that the partnership at the contracting
date knows its first period costs, but has no private information about its intrinsic cost
parameter in the second period. In other words, at the time of contracting there is symmetric
information about costs in period two. In this case, assuming full intertemporal commitment,
there is no informational dynamics. The optimal dynamic regulation, therefore, is straight
forward, and can be deduced from the static model in chapter two: Due to symmetric
information, the first best static contract of section 2.4 is chosen for the second period: For a
7 When O) = °2, MIE needs to ask for a report of intrinsic cost parameter in period one only. Hence, there is
only one incentive constraint to consider.
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non-binding resource constraint the price is set equal to marginal extraction costs, and MIE
sets net takes so as to capture all of the resource rent. In the first period the information
advantage of the partnership is the same as in the static model in section 2.5: Price is set
equal to marginal extraction costs plus marginal information costs, and the partnership
obtains an information rent. Introducing informational dynamics by allowing for a correlated
cost parameter, gives a more complex model, but yields interesting economic interpretations.f
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS
There are two basic approaches for modelling the inter-period link arising from the resource
constraint: 1) Imposing a resource constraint that may bind for some parameter values, or 2)
Reserve-based cost functions.? By introducing a general cost function C(q,,8,S,), where S,
is the remaining petroleum stock at the beginning of period t, I choose the latter approach in
this chapter. In a two-period model we have
(3.1) Sl = K
where the initial petroleum deposit, K, taken as exogenously given, is defined as the total
amount of petroleum in the reservoir (the resource base). As in chapter 2, the initial
petroleum deposit is assumed to have a deterministic size that is known to both parties. In
Gaudet et al. [1991], and in the static model in chapter 2 of this monograph, the first approach
is chosen. K is still exogenous, but is now defined as the amount of recoverable reserves. io
8 By making the simplifying assumption of independent cost parametes, however, Gaudet et al. [1991] are able
to analyse the non-commitment situation.
9 For a review of strategies for modeling exhaustible resources, see Epple and Londregan [1993] and Sweeney
[1993].
10 Gaudet et al. do not give a precise definition of the resource stock, but by allowing the resource constraint to
be binding, they implicitly treat the resource stock as recoverable reserves.
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I will argue that this definition of K, although common, may be questionable in the present
context. The size of recoverable reserves depends on economics and technology. It is,
therefore, endogenously determined in the model, and should not be treated as exogenously
given.
For the single period cost function C(ql(O),O,S,) and the distribution of efficiency types,
F(O), I make the following assumptions (t = 1,2):
Al: dC(q"O,S,) > O
dO
A2: d
2C(q"O,S,) > O
dOdq,
A3: d
2C(qt'O,S,) > O
dq,z
Monotonicity
Static single crossing
Convexity
A4: lim I,C(q"O,SJ= 00
I:q --> K
, I
Asymptote
A5: dC(q2,O,S2) < O
dS2
Stock effect
A6: Decreasing return in remaining stock
A7: d
2C(q2(O),O,S2) < O
dS2dO
Dynamic single crossing
A8:
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A9: _!}_(F(O») ~ o
dO /(0)
Monotone hazard rate
We recognise assumptions Al and A2 from chapter 2. They merely state that the intrinsic
cost parameter is defined so as the total and the marginal extraction costs are increasing in O.
As explained in section 2.3, convex extraction costs, are explained by reservoir physics:
Petroleum production is dependent on a certain level of driving pressure in the reservoir to
pump up oil and gas. As production proceeds the reservoir pressure, therefore, must be
maintained, e.g., by pumping water or associated gas into the reservoir. These activities are
costly. The injection level needed to compensate for the loss of reservoir pressure from one
unit of petroleum production, is increasing with the extraction level. Another reason for
convexity is that it typically will be optimal to start extracting the high-quality (low-cost)
portions of the deposit. The smaller the remaining stock, the lower is the quality of the
remaining reserves, and the more expensive is additional extraction. These are arguments
for the extraction costs to be convex in cumulative extraction level. Assumption A4 goes one
step further, claiming that the cumulative extraction costs approach infinity when the
remaining resource base approaches zero. The asymptotic costs assumption implies an
interior solution, i.e., a non-binding resource constraint. This is in accordance with
geological observations; the amount of petroleum extracted from a reservoir is usually in the
range of 20 to 60 per cent of the resource base. It is technically feasible to increase the
extraction further, but only at prohibitive costs.
The convexity of the single period costs C(qt(O),O,St)' assumption A3, makes it profitable
to spread production over both periods. This assumption coincides with geological
experience of a more rapid decline of the driving reservoir pressure the more rapid is the pace
of extraction.
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Assumption A5 takes care of the inter-period link arising from the non-renewability
constraint: The costs are lower the larger is the remaining reservoir (stock effect). The
geological explanation is the same as for convexity; reservoir pressure. This assumption
implies dynamics in extraction costs: The extraction level chosen in the first period will
affect the size of the resource base remaining at the beginning of period two,. and,
consequently, the second period extraction costs.
Assumption A6 says that the rate of cost reductions, caused by a larger residual deposit, is
declining (decreasing return in stock). The dynamic single crossing property, assumption A7,
says that the rate of reduction in extraction costs caused by an increase in remaining
reservoir, is higher for inefficient than for efficient partnerships. The interpretation in terms
of production technology is straight forward: Inefficient producers, by having a larger stock
of petroleum available, are to some extent able to compensate for their intrinsic cost
disadvantage, i.e., stock is relatively more important for inefficient producers (intrinsic
efficiency level and remaining stock are subsututes).!'
As in the static model, I need restrictions on the third derivatives of the cost function
(assumption A8, having no clear economic interpretations), to secure the sufficient conditions
for the principal's regulation problem. An interpretation of the monotone hazard rate,
assumption A9, is provided in section 2.3.
Summing up, as is common for regulation theory, a number of assumptions are needed to
secure concavity of the problem, etc. In the case of petroleum regulation most of these
assumptions are reasonable, as they have economic and reservoir physical justifications.
11 Single crossing property in the two-period model is explained in more detail in section 3.4 below.
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3.3 SYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Under symmetric information, MIE knows the cost parameter 8. The regulatory problem is
to maximise an intertemporal welfare function'?
(3.3)
subject to a set of intertemporal participation constraints and a resource constraint:
(3.4) II( 8) '?: O, V 8 E [fl, O]
(3.5) ql + q2 s K,
where II( 8) == III (8) + 8II2 (8). Due to assumption A4 of asymptotic cumulative costs, it
will never be optimal to empty the reservoir. The model is thus simplified, since I can
abstract from the resource constraint in the mathematical analysis.
Under symmetric information MIE is able to capture all of the resource rent, i.e., the rent, in
net present value terms, of the partnership is equal to zero (the intertemporal participation
constraint will be binding for all types in optimum). By inserting for II(8) = O in (3.3), we
see that the regulator's problem is reduced to maximising the net present value of the resource
rent:
12 This is a two-period version of the function in equation (2.2), where o is the discount factor. In the analysis
to follow, o is assumed to be the same for MIE and the partnership. This might be justified by referring to
Diamond and Mirrlees' [1971] result that social prices should be based on market prices. In deriving this
conclusion, however, Diamond and Mirrlees assume lump sum taxation and constant returns to scale. Clearly,
these assumptions are violated in my model. Still, from reasons of tractability, the assumptions of a common o
will be maintained.
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(3.6)
The first order conditions are
(3.7)
(3.8)
In calculating (3.7), I have made use of (3.2). The second order conditions are given in
appendix 3.1.
Optimal regulation of a manufacturing industry would imply repetition of the static contract.
Due to exhaustibility of the resource, this is not the case for petroleum extraction. We
recognise the expression for the second period extraction level, equation (3.8), as the solution
to the static problem.P In the first period, optimum is still given by price equal to marginal
extraction costs. The marginal costs, however, have an additional component,
8dC(qz (O), O,Sz) / asz; the present value of incremental costs in period two, caused by
extracting an additional unit in period one. This is an opportunity cost, accounting for the
inter-period link: in extraction costs (the stock effect).
Parallel to the static model, the optimum of this primal regulatory problem can be
implemented by instructing the partnership to choose the extraction levels determined by
equations (3.7) and (3.8), and to pay a lump sum tax equal to the resulting resource rent.I+
Net present value of the net tax is equal to the resource rent, but its distribution is arbitrary.
The license fees may be set so as the participation constraint is binding in each period, i.e.,
R, = plq,(O) - C(ql(O),O,S,), t = 1,2.
13 For a non-binding resource constraint, it is equivalent to equation (2.9).
14 This lump sum tax is equal to R(O) = Pt% (O) - C(% (O), O,St) + o[pzqz (O) - C(qz(O), O,Sz)]'
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Alternatively, from the dual problem, the regulatory agency can delegate the decision of
extraction path to the partnership, and levy a neutral tax of 100 per cent of the rent. The tax
can be levied on reported profits or cash flow. The latter could be a tax on non-fmancial cash
flow, proposed by Brown [1948], or, as proposed by Garnaut and Ross [1975], a resource
rent tax. The regulatory agency is able to reach the first best outcome, since it under
symmetric information is equipped with a wide range of tax measures. In reallife, however,
a rent tax of 100 per cent is not considered feasible, or, put differently, the assumption of
symmetric information is unrealistic.
Note that under symmetric information, royalties are not among the optimal tax instruments.
This is because a tax on gross income, with extraction costs not being deductible, implies a
disincentive for extraction.
3.4 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITH FULL COMMITMENT
Under full commitment, we assume that the government has the ability to credibly commit to
a two-period contract specifying how the regulatory instruments available (extraction path
and net taxes) will be set in each of the two periods.
The partnership is assumed to know its own type, 8, whereas the regulator only knows the
distribution, given by the probability density function f( 8), 8 E [!l,8]. In this case, the
regulator will recognise that if he tried to implement the first best solution of section 3.3, the
companies would have incentives to overstate their costs to obtain higher profits. The
analysis to follow is facilitated by the revelation principle, stating that the principal can
restrict his attention to the class of mechanisms in response to which the firms report their
types truthfully. The revelation principle is valid for static games. As argued in section 3.1,
under full intertemporal commitment, all decisions are taken in period one. The relevant
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equilibrium concept, therefore, is a static Bayesian equilibrium. Hence, the revelation
principle applies.
The regulatory agency, the Ministry of Industry and Energy (MIE), offers the self-selection
mechanism M= {[(ql(O),Rl(O)],[(q2(O),~(O)],O E [~,9]},i.e., a menu of type-revealing two-
period contracts in q and R that the partnership can choose among.
The regulatory problem is now to maximise the expected intertemporal welfare
-(A + /J)ll(O)}f(O)dO,
subject to
(3.4) ll(O) == ll(O,O);;::: O, 'VO E [~,9]
(3.10)
We recognise the set of intertemporal participation constraints (3.4) and the resource
constraint (3.5) from the symmetric information case. As in the static model, asymmetric
information generates an additional set of constraints; incentive constraints, given by
equation (3.10).
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In solving this program, I proceed in the same manner as in chapter 2. Net present value of
A
the partnership's rent, as a function of reported efficiency O and true efficiency O, is given
by
(3.11) Il(O, O) == III(O, 0)+ 8Ilz(0,0) = Plql (O) - Ctq, (O),O,SI) - RI (O)
+8[pzqz(0) - C(qz(O), O,Sz) - Rz(O)].
From the envelope theorem, i.e., by using the first order condition for incentive compatibility,
we get
(3.12) dIl(O) = drr~O) =_ dC(%(O),O,Sl) _8dC(qz(0),0,Sz).
dO dO 8=8 dO dO
We see that the rent, due to assumption AI, is decreasing in O, i.e., to be willing to reveal
their true type, efficient partnerships must be rewarded with a higher rent than inefficient
partnerships. The economic interpretation is parallel to the static model; instead of revealing
its true efficiency O and produce accordingly, the partnership may choose to camouflage as a
marginally less efficient producer group O+ dO. The mimicking is done by selecting the
combination of production levels and net taxes intended for this type;
{rql(O+ dO), RI (O + dO)],[qz(O+ dO),Rz(O+dO)]}. From the monotonicity condition (3.19)
below, this implies a lower level of extraction, i.e., installation of a smaller capacity (smaller
or fewer platforms) or a less extensive use of extraction enhancing techniques in the
production phase (e.g., injections). An interpretation of the rent expression, equation (3.16)
below, therefore, is that to get incentive compatibility, the partnership group, when they
reveal their true type, is rewarded with the rent they would get if they instead were to mimic a
marginally less efficient type. It therefore follows that for the two types O and O+ dO, the
difference in rent is equal to the cost advantage (in net present value terms) of type O relative
to type O+ dO. Type O can masquerade as type O+ dO by producing q, (O + dO) at cost
C(q,(O+ dO),O),t = 1,2. By inserting into the profit function (3.11), we see that relative to
type O+ dO, this strategy yields a rent equal to
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(3.13) n(o) - n(o+ dO) = [C(qt (O + dO),O + dO,St ) - C(qt (O + dO), O,St)]+
8[C(q2(O + dO), O+ dO,S2) - C(q2(O + dO),O,S2)]'
Taking the limit of (3.13), letting dO approach zero, we get the incentive constraint (3.12).
As this local incentive constraint is binding, i.e. type O is indifferent between announcing O
and O+ dO, the same rent difference will appear when the partnership announces its true type
(a separating equilibrium). From this it follows that the total rent of a producer of type O
must be given by a cumulation of cost differences, as is clear from equation (3.16) below.
Integrating both sides of equation (3.12), yields
(3.14)
or
(3.15)
By assumption AI, C(q"O,S,) is increasing in O. If the participation constraint, equation
(3.4), is satisfied for type O =8, it is therefore satisfied for all O E [!l, 8]. Since MIE wants
to extract rent, the participation constraint will be binding for type O =8. Hence, the set of
participation constraints in equation (3.4) is reduced to the single constraint n(8) = O. By
combining the first order condition for incentive compatibility, equation (3.15), and the
participation constraint, we get
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(3.16)
Defining R( 8) == RI (8) + 8~ (8), we have
(3.17)
By combining (3.16) and (3.17), I get
(3.18)
Following the same procedure as in section 2.5 for the static case, we find that the second-
order condition for incentive compatibility implies a dynamic monotonicity constraint:
(3.19)
I have shown that the class of mechanisms satisfying the incentive and the participation
constraints, is composed of those policies in which the quantities of extraction are non-
increasing in type, and where the fixed government charge R(8) satisfies (3.18).
As shown, the rent function (3.16) combines the participation constraint and the first order
condition for incentive compatibility. Inserting for this rent expression in the objective
function (3.9), the expected welfare is given by
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(3.20)
"6
EW = f {(1+ Å)[Plql (8) - Ctq, (8),8,SI)+ ~(P2q2(8) - C(q2(8),8,S2»]
~ .
By integrating by parts in the last term, (3.20) can be rewritten as
8
(3.21) EW = f {(1+ Å)[Plql(8) - Ctq. (8),8,SI) + ~(P2q2(8) - C(q2(8),8,S2»]
~
_ (Å + )[i)C(ql (8), 8,SI) + s dC(q2(8), 8,S2)J F(8)}f(8)d8
Il d8 d8 f(8)
The regulatory problem is now reduced to maximising the expected welfare, equation (3.21),
subject to the dynamic monotonicity constraint (3.19) and the resource constraint (3.5). As in
the symmetric information case, the resource constraint will be non-binding for all producer
types, due to assumption A4 of asymptotic costs. I will ignore the dynamic monotonicity
constraint at first, and later, in appendix 3.2, show that the solution to the less constrained
problem satisfies this condition. I am now left with an unconstrained optimisation problem.
An implicit expression for the optimal exploration path {q; (8), q;(8)}, is found by pointwise
differentiation of the expected welfare, equation (3.21), with respect to ql (8) and q2(8):
(3.22)
P _ dC(ql(8),8,SI) + ~ i)C(q2(8),8,S2) = Å + Il F(8) (d2C(ql (8),8,SI) _ ~ d2C(q2(8),8,S2)]
1 dql (8) dS2 1+ Å f(8) d8dql (8) d8dS2
(3.23) dC(q2(8),8,S2) Å + Il F(8) d
2C(q2(8),8,S2)
P2 - dq2(8) = 1+ Å f(8) d8dq2(8)
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Second order conditions are given in appendix 3.3.
We recognise condition (3.23) from the static model of chapter 2. For a non-binding resource
constraint, condition (3.23) is equal to condition (2.46). There is a wedge between price and
marginal extraction costs, equal to the marginal information costs. As a means of enhanced
rent extraction, for all types 8 > fl. extraction is reduced relative to the first best (symmetric
information case),15 The extraction level is distorted to the point where the expected value-
weighted marginal deadweight loss in production equals the expected marginal reduction in
deadweight loss in other sectors of the economy, made possible by the increase in
government take from the petroleum sector. This is more thoroughly discussed in section
2.5.
Proposition 3.1
It is not optimal to repeat the static contract. Optimal petroleum regulation will involve
distortions of both the extent and the pace of depletion.
The first order condition determining ql (8) has a structure similar to (3.23), but contains two
additional terms. Optimal dynamic regulation of the manufacturing industry under full
commitment, is to repeat the optimal static scheme in each period; see Baron and Besanko
[1984] and Laffont and Tirole [1993], section 1.10. Due to the inter-period link in extraction
costs derived from changes in the reservoir pressure, the optimal contracts for the petroleum
industry will differ in the two periods. This is clear from comparison of conditions (3.22) and
(3.23). As a special case, by ignoring the intertemporal cost dependency from the model of
. this chapter, we get results analogously to Baron and Besanko [1984] and Laffont and Tirole
[1993]. This is done by eliminating the stock effect, i.e., by letting aC(qz(8),8,Sz)/ asz
= aZC(qz (8),8, Sz) / a8aSz = O. Condition (3.22), the first period optimum, will now be
reduced to the static contract, parallel to equation (3.23).
15 This is clear by comparing conditions (3.8) and (3.23).
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To give a more detailed interpretation. of the first order conditions of the regulatory problem,
I need to define the single crossing property for a dynamic model. In a two-period model, for
the net present cost C(q, (J,S) == Ctq, «(J), (J,Sl) + 8C(q2«(J), (J,S2)' the single crossing property
can be stated as
(3.24) a dC(q, (J,S) > o t = 1,2.16
d(J dq, '
The distortion of the second period extraction level is due to the fact that the partnership's
rent is increasing in q2«(J), as is clear from the rent expression (3.16):
(3.25)
We recognise the integrand in (3.25) from the marginal information cost (the right hand side
of condition (3.23». In the same manner as in the static model, the sign is determined by the
single crossing property (3.24), which for t = 2 reduces to
(3.26) d2C(q2(~),8:S2) > O,
dq2( (J)d(J
see assumption A2.
For the first period, we get
(3.27)
16 This is a sufficient condition for the iso-NPV curves for different partnership types to cross only once.
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The sign is again determined by (3.24), the single crossing property, which in this case (t = 1)
contains two terms:
(3.28) dZC(%(O),O,SI) _8dZC(qz(0),0,Sz) >0
dql (O)dO dSzdO
Assuming the static condition, dZC(ql (O),O,SI) I dql (O)dO > O, is satisfied (assumption A2),
a sufficient (but not necessary) additional condition for the dynamic single crossing property
(3.28) to hold, is dZC(qz(O),O,Sz) I dSzdO< O (assumption A7). As explained in section 3.2,
assumptions A2 and A7 have plausible economic explanations. Again, the integrand,
equation (3.27), is part of the marginal information cost at the right hand side of condition
(3.22). Comparing with the symmetric information case (condition (3.7», ql (O) is reduced
to enhance rent extraction. As for qz(O), the economic explanation for this distortion in
q, (O) is that it makes it less favourable for efficient companies to mimic inefficient
companies, made clear by equation (3.27). The economic interpretation is that the dynamic
single crossing property, condition (3.24), implies that the marginal extraction costs (direct
costs and indirect costs caused by the stock effect) are increasing in O. Hence, a producer of
type O has lower marginal costs than a type O+ dO. Therefore, the relative cost advantage
of type O (in net present value),
(3.29)
[C(ql (O + dO), 0+ dO) + 8C(qz(O+ dO),O+ dO)] -[C(ql(O + dO),O) + 8C(qz(O + dO), O)],
i.e., the difference in information rent, is increasing in ql (O).
Comparing with the symmetric information case of section three, we see that asymmetric
information causes the production levels to be reduced in both periods. Due to assumption
A7 that marginal indirect costs caused by the stock effect are increasing in O, however, first
period production is likely to suffer the biggest reduction. Asymmetric information,
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therefore, not only reduces the extrent of extraction, but also slows down the pace of
depletion.
3.5 IMPLEMENTATION
In developing an optimal contract for petroleum regulation, I have used the revelation
approach, i.e., the Ministry of Industry and Energy is assumed to offer the petroleum
companies a revelation mechanism M= {[(q! (8),R! (8)],[(q2(8),R2(8)],8 E [fl, 'O]}. Since the
optimal mechanism satisfies incentive compatibility, the partnership will report their true cost
parameter 8, in response to which they will be instructed to follow an extraction path
determined by equations (3.22) and (3.23), and pay net taxes according to equation (3.18).
Comparing this contract with present systems for petroleum taxation is difficult, since direct
revelation mechanisms are rarely used. The optimal contract, however, can be given an
alternative implementation that is similar to present petroleum tax schemes; net taxes as a
function of the selected production levels. The implementation of this dual regulatory
problem is termed the delegation approach, since the pace of extraction is left for the
partnership to decide. As shown in appendix 3.2, q! (8) and q2(8) are strictly decreasing for
all types (monotonicity), and can thus be inverted; 8(q!) and 8(q2)' I substitute for these
functions in (3.18):
(3.30)
T(ql'q2) == R(8(q!),8(q2» = p!q! - C(ql' 8(q!),S!)
+ D[P2q2- C(q2,8(q2),S2)] - ll(8(q!),8(q2»
The optimal net tax is now a function of the extraction levels; Ttq, ,q2)' The second best
allocation of this chapter, given by conditions (3.22) and (3.23), therefore, can be
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implemented by designing a tax system that generates the functional form for intertemporal
net taxes given byequation (3.30).
Dasgupta, Heal and Stiglitz [1980] show that petroleum taxation can be used to realise all
types of extraction paths. The only tax instruments required is a tax on profits and a
depletion allowance. In formulating their model, however, they make the restrictive
assumption that costs are independent of the rate of extraction. Their results, therefore, do not
directly apply to my model, as it contains a stock effect. By adding some instruments, I find
it reasonable to assume that the optimal contract derived in this chapter can be implemented
by means of taxation policy, i.e., the government should be able to replicate the net tax
function (3.30).
In the static model of chapter 2, by an analogous application of Laffont and Tirole [1993],
section 1.4, I showed that the optimal regulatory outcome can be implemented by a simple
menu of linear contracts, composed of royalties and license fees. In a two-period model of
procurement under asymmetric information, Laffont and Tirole [1993], appendix 8.2, it is
shown that the optimal allocation can be implemented by two separate menus of linear
incentive schemes, one for each period. In the dynamic model of petroleum taxation, this
implementation is not possible, due to the non-stationarity imposed by the intertemporallink
in extraction costs (stock effect). I will show, however, that optimal tax policy may still
consist of royalties and license fees. By a generalisation of Laffont and Tirole [1993],
appendix 8.2, I obtain the following result:
Proposition 3.2
The optimal contract can be implemented by a menu of tangent planes, generated by license
fees and royalties in each period. To account for the dynamics in extraction costs, the
partnership must be presented the tax scheme for the entire horizon at the beginning of period
one. It cannot sequentially be offered separate single period contracts.
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As shown in appendix 3.4, the net tax function T(ql,q2) is strictly concave if either the single
period cost functions are strongly convex or if there is a rapidly decreasing return in
remaining stock. These are the same type of requirements securing sufficient conditions for
the primal regulatory problem, see appendix 3.3. As argued in section 3.2, the convexity of
the single period costs C(ql(8),8,S,), assumption A3, coincides with geological experience
of a more rapid decline of the driving reservoir pressure the more rapid is the pace of
extraction. In the following, therefore, I will assume that T(qpq2) is a strictly concave
function.
As illustrated in figure 3.1 below, the net tax function can in this case be replaced by the
family of its tangent planes.l? The partnerships choose the tax-production bundles where
their iso-NPV curves are tangent to the net tax plane (self selection). The partnerships'
selection is the same whether it is offered the concave net tax function or its set of tangent
planes.
The optimal regulatory policy, therefore, can be implemented by a menu of tangent planes,
written in vector notation:
(3.31)
where q * and R* (in are the extraction levels and the net total government take, determined
by the optimal mechanism (equations (3.22), (3.23) and (3.18), respectively). Inserting for
the gradient
(3.32)
17 I am thankful to Lars Håkonsen for diagram design.
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o 1
Figure 3.1: Implementation of a concave net tax function by a menu of tangent planes.
the menu of tangent planes can be written out as
(3.33)
In the language of petroleum taxation, we have
(3.34) Net tax = License Fee + Royalty! x q! + Royalty; x q2'
where
(3.35)
(3.36)
(3.37)
From (3.36) we see that Royalty! depends on the optimal extraction level in period two, i.e.,
the optimal depletion path cannot be implemented by a sequence of static contracts. To
account for the intertemporal link in extraction costs, extraction levels for both periods must
be set simultaneously at the beginning of period one. Equation (3.35) specifies a license fee
at the beginning of the first period. Alternatively, we may have a license fee in each period,
where their discounted sum satisfies (3.35).
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Using the conditions for the optimal allocation, equations (3.22) and (3.23), the royalties can
be rewritten as
(3.38) Royalty!
(3.39) Royalty;
In the symmetric information case, as shown in section 3.3, first best optimal regulation
implies neutral taxation. As made clear in section 3.4, the optimal regulatory response to
asymmetric cost information is to distort (reduce) the production levels for all types (J > fl., in
order to enhance rent extraction. This second best allocation is implemented by levying
royalties for all types but the most efficient. The most efficient producer is only faced with a
license fee, and will therefore choose the first best extraction level (no distortion on the top).
The regulatory agency is not able to reach the first best for the types (J > fl., since it has no
taxes that are both neutral and revenue effective at its disposal. The explanation is evident;
with asymmetric information about costs, the regulatory agency is not able to observe true
profits or the true cash flow. By strategic reporting of costs the partnership is able to
manipulate the tax base, i.e., these taxes are non-neutral.lf The net tax of the asymmetric
information model is instead made contingent on observable variables, namely the extraction
levels chosen by the partnership.
As is clear from (3.38) and (3.39), the royalties are equal to the marginal information costs in
optimum. In this sence they are similar to Pigouvian taxes. Comparing Royalty! and
Royalty.; we see that they differ. This is due to the assumption that the intertemporai link in
extraction costs is systematically type-dependent, see assumption A7 and the discussion of
dynamic single crossing in section 3.4. Hence, it is optimal to distort both the extent and the
18 In the discussion of the resource rent tax proposed by Garnaut and Ross [1975], it has been pointed out that
the neutrality rests on the government being able to observe the company's cost of capital. Clearly, symmetric
information about operating costs is also required.
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pace of extraction. The first is achieved by imposing royalties, and the latter is secured by
letting the royalties differ among the periods. Comparing (3.38) and (3.39) we see that the
first period royalty is likely to be higher than the royalty in the second period, i.e. the rate of
depletion is reduced. The economic explanation was given in section 3.4: The rent of an
efficient producer group is derived from its cost advantage, in net present value terms. From
the single crossing assumptions, this cost advantage is increasing in the extraction levels. To
capture more of the rent, therefore, it is optimal (by means of distortive royalties) to reduce
extraction. It is relatively more important to reduce the first period extraction level
(implemented by setting Royalty,» Royalty2)' since it through the stock effect affects
extraction costs in both periods.
To verify that (3.33) induces revelation (9= O) and the appropriate extraction path {q;,qa,
I will analyse the partnership's optimisation program when facing this menu of hyperplanes:
(3.40)
The first-order conditions are
(3.41)
[ _ aC(qt(O),O,St) +oaC(q2(0),0,S2)1_[ _ aC(q;(9),0,St) +oaC(q;(9),0,S;)1=0
Pt aqt aS2 Pt aq; as;
(3.42)
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(3.43)
The first term in condition (3.43), can be calculated from equation (3.18):
(3.44)
After inserting equation (3.44) into condition (3.43), it is easy to check by substitution that
{q;,q;,8} solves the equation system (3.41)-(3.43).
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APPENDIXES
Appendix 3.1
The second-order conditions of the symmetric information case are:
A(3.1) aZC(q! (8),8,S!) > -o aZC(qz(8),8,Sz)
dq!(8)z dS/
A(3.2) i)2C(qz(8),8,Sz) > O
dQz(8)z
Condition A(3.2) is satisfied by assumption A3 of convex extraction costs. Condition A(3.1)
requires the additional assumption that extraction costs, in present value terms, is more
convex in first period extraction level than in the consequent declining stock (or, put
differently, net present costs are more convex in the direct than in the indirect effect).
•
Appendix 3.2
By applying the implicit function theorem, I will show that the solution to the regulatory
problem under full commitment satisfies the dynamic monotonicity condition
A(3.3)
A sufficient condition for this constraint to be satisfied is
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A(3.4)
As explained, the second period decision problem is equivalent to the static problem. Hence,
we already know that dq2(0) I dO::;;O is satisfied, see appendix 2.3.
By applying the implicit function theorem Iwill now show that the solution to the regulatory
problem also satisfies the first period monotonicity condition, dq. (O) I dO ::;;O. Equation
(3.22) defines q, as an implicit function of O:
A(3.5)
since we from assumptions A3 and A8 have
A(3.6) G = d
2C(qt(0),0,SI) A+/lF(0)d3C(qt(0),0,SI) O
ql dqt (0)2 1+ A f(O) dOdql (0)2 <.
Hence, the derivative is given by
A(3.7) dql(O) =_ Gø =_{d
2C(%(0),0,St) _8d2C(q2(0),0,S2)
dO Gq1 dOdql (O) dOdS2
+ A + /l _!}_(F(0))[d2C(ql (O), O,St ) _ 8 d2C(q2(0),0,S2)]
1+A dO f(O) dOdqt(O) dS2dO
+ A + /l F(0)[d3C(qt (O),O,St) _ 8 d3C(q2(0),0,S2)]}I
1+A f(O) d02dqt(0) dS2d02
{
d2C(qt(0),0,St) + A +/l F(O) d3C(ql(0),0,SI)}
dql(0)2 1+A f(O) dOdQI(0)2 '
which is strictly negative due to assumptions A2, A3, A7, A8 and A9.
•
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Appendix 3.3
I will check the sufficient conditions for a unique solution to the regulatory problem. The
sufficient condition is that the welfare function (3.21) is strictly concave in
(ql(8),q2(8» forall 8, or, expressed with the principal minors of the Hessian matrix:
A(3.8)
A(3.9)
A(3.1O)
Derivating the first order conditions, (3.22) and (3.23), yields
A(3.11)
A(3.12)
A(3.13)
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A(3.11) is satisfied by assumptions A3, A6 and A8, and A(3.12) is satisfied by assumptions
A3 and A8. Condition A(3.13), however, is not so obvious. Written in its complete form, it
requires
From the left hand side of A(3.14) we see that the condition is likely to be satisfied if either
the single period cost functions are strongly convex or if there is a rapidly decreasing return
in stock. As argued in section 3.2, the convexity of the single period costs C(q,(9),9,S,),
assumption A3, coincides with geological experience of a more rapid decline of the driving
reservoir pressure the more rapid is the pace of extraction.
•
Appendix 3.4
Iwill check the sufficient conditions for strict concavity of the net tax function T(Ql'q2)'
expressed with the principal minors of the Hessian matrix:
A(3.1S)
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A(3.16)
A(3.1?) > o,
In calculating T
M1
and Tq2Q2, I make use of equation (3.30). A(3.1S) is satisfied by
assumptions A3 and A6, and A(3.16) is satisfied by assumption A3. Condition A(3.1?) is
more complex. Written in its complete form, it requires
A(3.18)
Condition A(3.18) resembles one of the conditions for a unique solution to the regulatory
problem; condition A(3.14). From the left hand side of A(3.18) we see that the condition is
likely to be satisfied if either the single period cost functions are strongly convex or if there is
a rapidly decreasing return in stock. These are the same requirements securing sufficient
conditions for the primal regulatory problem, see appendix 3.3.
•
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Chapter 4
Adverse selection and moral hazard in the petroleum industry,
repeated auctions of incentive contracts*
4.1 INTRODUCfION
In section 2.11 I discuss how the government can improve the regulatory outcome in the
petroleum sector by utilising competition ex ante or ex post, i.e., before or after awarding the
production license. In this chapter of repeated auctions, I provide models of ex post
competition.
Laffont and Tirole [1993], chapter 8, analyse repeated auctions in procurement; a regulated
monopolist may be replaced if performance is poor. The Chicago school (e.g., Demsetz
[1968]) suggests repeated bidding, and at any point in time awarding the monopoly franchise
* I am thankful to Kåre P. Hagen and Diderik Lund for useful comments.
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to the bidder with the best terms (bidding parity). Inspired by Williamson [1976], Laffont
and Tirole [1993] show that in case of transferable and unobservable investment, bidding
parity does not apply; the second-sourcing auction should to some extent be biased in favour
of the incumbent. By raising the incumbent's probability of keeping the franchise in the
second period, the problem of underinvestment is mitigated.
The topic of this chapter is interactions between incentive schemes and optimal policy of
replacing license groups with low efficiency or low production. By introducing non-
verifiable investment (moral hazard) in a repeated game version of the dynamic model of
petroleum regulation in chapter 3, I show that the biased auction result of Laffont and Tirole
[1993] carries over to petroleum regulation. In addition, the model of Laffont and Tirole
[1993] is generalised, from a fixed size to a variable size project, and with a slightly more
general cost function. Thereafter, in an adverse selection model with asymmetric information
about extraction levels, I show that it may be optimal to deviate from bidding parity even in
the absence of moral hazard. If a producer group has some positive probability of being
replaced in the second period, it will not fully internalise the stock effect. Again, it will be
optimal to mitigate this effect by introducing a bias in the second period auction.
Once a petroleum license is awarded, the license group has an exclusive right to exploit the
tract. Petroleum regulation, therefore, has some resemblance with regulation of natural
monopolists in manufacturing. The monopoly position, along with a predictable and
reasonable tax system, guarantees the partnership to reap some of the possible future profits.
This is vital as to provide incentives for the partnership to sink large irreversible investments
in extraction and transport facilities. If the performance is not adequate, however, the
monopoly position will represent an obstacle for the regulatory agency, since the license
cannot be transferred to a more efficient company. A problem of the monopoly position,
particularly relevant to the petroleum industry, is that potential entrants may implement
technological progress. Mismanagement can to some extent be avoided by contract design,
e.g., letting the petroleum license contain clauses regulating the number of exploration wells.
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As previously discussed in this monograph, however, due to asymmetric information, several
vital factors contributing to the costs and the volume of petroleum production are non-
contractible.! Examples are the inherent efficiency level, effort, non-monetary investments,
and monetary investments that can be manipulated.
The problem of inadequate performance may be reduced by holding repeated auctions. The
winner of the first auction is awarded the license for a limited number of years, after which a
new auction is held. Thus, a poor performing license group may be replaced. A complicating
element, pointed out by Williamson [1976], is that capital may be hard to transfer and
measure. Physical capital, platforms and transport systems, are likely to be transferable, but
human capital may not be so easy to transfer from one license group to another.
Measurability is difficult for non-monetary investments, e.g. the quality of capital
investments. As discussed in the previous chapters, by strategic reporting of costs, the
petroleum companies are also able to conceal the true amount of monetary investments. This
problem is particularly severe in the petroleum industry, due to its multinational nature (use
of inputs from many countries makes it hard to check true costs) and due to the high degree
of vertical integration (giving opportunities for transfer pricing).
In designing an optimal system for repeated auctions, therefore, the Ministry of Industry and
Energy (MIE) must take into account that changing the license group may cause a loss of
non-transferableinvestments. Furthermore, due to measurement problems, capital cannot be
transferred at correct price. This will affect the willingness to invest.
1 I.e., they are non-observable to one of the contracting parties or non-verifiable by the courts.
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4.2 TIIE MODEL
The model has two periods. In the first period an incentive contract is offered to a single
license group; the incumbent. A possible justification is that initially only one license group
possesses the adequate technology, competence, or resources to exploit the reservoir.? In the
second period an auction is held, where the incumbent and another license group (the
potential entrant) participates. The partnerships bid simultaneously by announcing efficiency
parameters 8 and 8' , and the selected partnership is given an incentive contract similar to the
monopoly case. MIE designs a breakout rule 0* (O), where the potential entrant is awarded
the license if O' < 0°. It is assumed that the government can avoid collusion. Investments
are only made in the first period. The cost function is assumed to be additively separable in
capital and extraction costs. The fust and second period costs of the incumbent and the costs
of the entrant, respectively, are given by
(4.3) C' = C(q' (O), O,Sz) - ki,
where d(i) (d'> O,d"> O) is first-period investment costs that reduces the incumbent's
second period costs by i, and the entrant's costs by ki (k E [0,1], with k =O being a non-
transferable (specific) and k = 1 being a fully transferable (general) capital). The extraction
costs for the incumbent and the entrant have the same functional forrnC(q,O,S), but differ
2 Alternatively, the model can be generalised to allow for several companies competing in period one, where
they are defeated due to inferior technology. In the second period, the competitors may have improved their
technology.
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with respect to the efficiency parameters; 8 and 8' respectively. The investment level is not
observable for the regulatory agency. The inherent efficiency parameters are private
information for the incumbent and the entrant, and they are independently drawn from the
same distribution 1(8). The assumptions of section 3.2 and the objective function of chapter
3 are maintained. MIE is assumed to be able to credibly commit to a regulatory contract for
the entire horizon of exploration, development and extraction.
4.3 SYMMETRIC INFORMATION
The regulatory problem is to maximise an intertemporal welfare function 3
(4.4)
Max {(1+A)[Plql(8) -C(ql (8),8,Sl) -d(i)] - (A + Jl)ll(8)
91(9),92(9),9 '(B'),i,B-
+ 8(1- F(8*))(1 +A)[pzqz(8) - C(qz(8), 8,Sz) + il
+ 8[ (1 +Å)[p,q' (8' )-C(q' (8' ),8' ,S,)+ki]-(Å +p.)[[(8' »)[(8' )d8'}'
subject to a resource constraint and two sets of participation constraints:
(4.6) tue: == rue.e, '2:: 0, 'V8 E [fl,8]
3 The probability that the incumbent wins the second period auction is (I - F( 0*».
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(4.7) II(8') = II(8',8') ~ O, 'V8' E [~,8]
In the case of symmetric information, the instruments available to MIE are the extraction
levels, the level of investment, and the breakout rule. Analogous to chapter 3, the
participation constraints will bind, whereas the resource constraint is non-binding. Inserting
for II(8) = II(8') =Oin the objective function, and differentiating, the first order conditions
are given by
(4.8)
PI - dC(ql (8),8,SI) + 8(1- F(8·» dC(q2(8), 8,S2) + 8f dC(q '(8'),8' ,S2)f(8' )d8' =O
dql (e) dS2!! dS2
(4.9)
(4.10) _ dC(q' (8' ),8' ,S2) _ OP2 dq , (8 ' ) -
(4.11) d'(i) = 8(1- F(e·» + 8kF(e·)
(4.12)
Condition (4.8) is analogous to conditions (3.7) and (4.9) and (4.10) are analogous to (3.8);
price is equal to marginal extraction costs. The only difference is that that the opportunity
cost (stock effect) in condition (4.8) now is given as an expected value. From condition
(4.11) we see that the optimal investment level is where the marginal cost is equal to the
expected benefit. From (4.12) we see that the critical breakout level e· is where the period
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two net total government take (i.e., the resource rent) is equalised for the two license groups,
or, generally, the breakout level (l is determined by equality ofnet social value from the two
bidders. This is a variable quantity generalisation of bidding parity. In the fixed size project
model of Laffont and Tirole [1993], bidding parity is defined as a regulatory policy where the
government selects the entrant if and only if the entrant's second-period efficiency exceeds
the incumbent's. For general investments (k = 1), this definition of bidding parity implies
8- = 8. We would get the same result in this model, by setting q2 = q ,= q. In a variable
size model of petroleum regulation, however, condition (4.12) may be satisfied for
constellations of cost parameters and extraction levels where 8-:¢: 8 and q- :¢:q .
As one may expect, non-transferability of investments works in favour of the incumbent.
This can be shown by implicit derivation of condition (4.12):
(4.13)
se: i- = ----.",..------:----:~-
dq' «(r) OC(q' «(}*),(t ,S2) ,
P2 d(r s«dk
which is positive due to the monotonicity constraint (see appendix 3.2) and assumption AI.
4.4 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ABOUT COSTS
The regulatory problem is now to maximise the expected intertemporal welfare
'6
EW = J{(l+A)[P1ql(8) - ceq, (8),8,Sl) - d(i)] - (A + /-l)ll(8)
~
(4.14)
B'
+J{(I + A)[P2q' (8') - C(q' (8' ),8' ,S2) +ki]
~
-(A + /-l)ll(8' )}j(8' )d8 '}j(8)d8,
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subject to
(4.6) ll(8)=ll(8,8)'2::0, \i8e[!l,8]
(4.7) ll(8')=ll(8',8')'2::0, 'if8'e[!l,8]
(4.15) tt;8) '2:: ll(0,8), 'if0,8 e [fl,8]
(4.16) II (8 ' ) '2:: II (8' ,8 ' ), \i O ' , 8 ' e [!l,8]
(4.5)
(4.17) -d'U) + 8(1- F(8*» = O
Asymmetric information concerning the intrinsic cost parameter generates an additional set of
constraints; incentive constraints, given by equations (4.15) and (4.16). Non-observable
investment imposes the moral hazard constraint (4.17). This constraint is the first order
condition of the incumbent's investment problem:
(4.18) Max{ -d(i) + 8(1- F(8·»i}
I
In solving this program, I proceed in the same manner as in chapters 2 and 3. By combining
the first order conditions for incentive compatibility and the participation constraints, for the
incumbent and the entrant, respectively, we get the information rents:
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(4.19)
(4.20)
Inserting for these rent expressions in the objective function (4.14), and integrating by parts,
the expected welfare is given by
'8
EW = J {(1+A)[p!q!(O) - C(q!(O),O,S!) - d(i)]
!!.
-(A + )[ac(q! (0), O,S!) + 0(1- F(O·» aC(q2(0), 0,S2)] F(O)
j1 ao ao f(O)
+0(1- F(O·»(l + A)[P2Q2(0) - C(Q2(0), 0,S2) + i]
(4.21)
B·
+0J{(l+ A)[P2q' (O') - C(q' (O'), O' ,S2) + kil
!!.
-(A +j1) ac(q' (O'), O' ,S2) F(O' )}f(O' )dO'}f(O)dO
ao' f(O')
The regulatory problem is now reduced to maximising the expected welfare, equation (4.21),
subject to the resource constraint (4.5), and the moral hazard constraint (4.17). As in the
symmetric information case, the resource constraint will be non-binding for all producer
types, due to the assumption of asymptotic costs. Optimal regulatory policy is found by
maximising the Lagrangian
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L = {(l +A)[p!q! (B) - C(q!(B),B,S!)- deO]
. -(A+ )[ac(q!(B),B,S!) +8(1_F(B·»dC(q2(B),B,S2)]F(B)
J.l dB dB f(B)
+8(1- F(B·»(l + A)[P2q2(B) - C(q2(B), B,S2)+ i]
(4.22)
8"
+8 J{(1+A)[P2q , (B ' ) - C(q , (B ' ), B' ,S2)+ kil
fl.
-(A + ) dC(q' (B'), B' ,S2) F(B' )}f(B' )dB '}f(B)
J.l dB' f(B')
-v(B)[d'(i) - 8(1- F(B·»]
with respect to q! (B), q2(B), q , (B '), i, and B· :
PI - dC(ql (B), B,SI) + 8(1- F(B·» dC(q2(B),B,S2) + 8JdC(q' (B'), B' ,S2)f(B' )dB'
dq! (B) dS2 fl. dS2
(4.23) = A + J.l F(B)(d
2
C(ql (B), B,S!) _ 8(1- F(B"» d
2
C(q2(B), B,S2»)
l+A f(B) dBdq!(B) dBdS2
-8 A+ J.l8J"(d
2
C(q, (B' ),B' ,S2) F(B' )Y(B' )dB'
1+ A fl. dB ' dS2 f (B ' )
(4.24) dC(q2(B), B,S2) _ A +J.l F(B) d
2C(q2(B), B,S2)
P2 - dq2(B) - 1+ A f(B) dBdq2(B)
(4.25) dC(q'(B'),B' ,S2)_A+J.lF(B')d
2C(q'(B'),B',S2)
P2- dq , (B ' ) - 1+ A f (B ' ) dB' dq , (B ' )
(4.26) v( B) = (1+ A)f(B)[ -d'(i) + 8(1- F(B"» + 8kF(B·)]
d"(i)
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(4.27)
Equations (4.24) and (4.25) are directly analogous to equation (3.23). Condition (4.23)
follows the same pattern as condition (3.22), except that the stock effect and the dynamic
single crossing are now in expected value terms. Abstracting from the moral hazard
constraint (i.e., setting v(O) =O), condition (4.27) says that the breakout level 0* is
determined by equality of net social value from the two bidders; bidding parity," Compared
with the symmetric information case, condition (4.27) corrects for the fact that the
partnerships are to keep some of the resource rent, due to private information about intrinsic
efficiency. The additional term, v( O) / f (O), indicates that the moral hazard constraint, if it
is binding ( v( O) > O), will affect the breakout rule.
Proposition 4.1
The qualitative results of Laffont and Tirole [1993], chapter 8, carry over to a variable size
model of petroleum regulation
Lemma v( O) = O iff k = Oor O= fl., v( O) > O otherwise.
Proof
yielding
This is shown by substituting the moral hazard constraint (4.17) into (4.26),
4 The net social value is the value of the license if MIE were able to capture all the resource rent,
(1+ A.) [P2Q2(0) - C(Q2,0,S2) + i], corrected for the loss of welfare caused by the partnership's information
(
1 aC(Q2(0),0,S2) F(O)
rent, I\. +p) .
so /(0)
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(4.28) v( O)= (1+A )f( 0)8kF( 0*) .
d"(i)
•
If the moral hazard constraint is binding ( v( O) > 0), there will be a discrimination in favour
of the incumbent. This can be seen directly from condition (4.27); 0* will be negatively
correlated with v( O) under the assumption that the net social value of a petroleum deposit is
higher the more efficient is the partnership.> This seems to be a reasonable assumption; a
more favourable intrinsic cost parameter implies a higher resource rent. Due to asymmetric
information, the increase in rent is likely to be split between the partnership and the
government, and social welfare is increased. The assumed relationship between 0* and
v(O) can be verified by implicit derivation of (4.27):
(4.29)
A sufficient but not necessary condition for this expression to be negative is that the problem
of private information, at the margin, is not too severe, i.e., aZC(q' Ul),o*,Sz)j ao*z is not
too high.
The economic interpretation of the biased auction result is that the incumbent, not knowing
whether he will be allowed to produce in period two, will not internalise all the benefits of his
investments. More specifically, he will not take into account the positive (investment-
5 Å + Il ac(q(e),e,S) F(e)
I.e., pq( O) - C( q( e), o, S) - is decreasing in O.
l+ Å ao f(O)
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induced) externality on the entrant's costs. This was not a problem in the symmetric
information case, as full internalisation could be secured by the contract. With unobservable
investments, however, there will be a welfare loss from underinvestment. Optimal regulatory
response for the types 8 E (!l.,9] is to discriminate against the potential entrant in the second
period auction (i.e., reduce 8*); the underinvestment problem is then mitigated, as it raises
the incumbent's probability of a prolonged license period. An incumbent of type !l. does not
run the risk of being replaced.f Accordingly, the investments will be socially optimal, and
there is no need for discrimination. Nor is it necessary to bias the selection rule when the
investments are non-transferable (k =O), as there in this case is no externality.
By reducing 8* the underinvestment problem is mitigated, or, put differently, the moral
hazard constraint (condition (4.17)) is relaxed. This is achieved by sacrificing optimal
selection; the incumbent may get a prolonged license period even if the potential entrant is
more efficient. The optimal breakout rule 8*(8), therefore, is a trade-off between optimal
selection and reduction of moral hazard. This is illustrated by rearranging equation (4.27):
v(8)d8=
(4.30) [(1+Å.)[P,q' (9') - C(q' (9'),9' ,S,) + ki]- (Å.+ Il) iJC(q' ~/9' ,S,)~i::~Y(9)d9
- [(1+Å.)[p,q,(9) - C(q,(9),9,S,) + i]- (Å.+ Il) iJC(q,~~,9,S,) ~i:;]/(9)d9
The critical intrinsic cost parameter 8* is determined by equality of the welfare gain of the
relaxation of moral hazard, the left hand side of (4.27) 7, and the expected welfare loss of
inefficient selection; the right hand side.
6 Technically, from equation (4.27) we get (J* (fD =E. i.e., the probability of prolonged license for the
incumbent is (l - F(!!.))= 1.
7 The welfare gain of a marginal relaxation of the moral hazard constraint is expressed by the Lagrange
multiplier v«(J).
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4.5 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION ABOUT EXTRACTION LEVELS
The results of the analysis above are similar to Laffont and Tirole [1993]. The specific cost
structure in petroleum production (i.e., stock effect) does not qualitatively affect the results.
From a practical point of view, however, one might suspect that an incumbent facing a
positive probability of losing the production license in period two, will, compared to a
situation without repeated bidding, change his period one behaviour. Due to the stock effect,
present production will increase the costs of future extraction. With some probability of
losing the period two auction, the incumbent may not fully internalise this stock effect. This
problem was easily solved in the model above. Since extraction levels were assumed to be
observable to both parties, MIE could secure full internalisation through the incentive
contracts offered. In a repeated auction model with asymmetric information about extraction
levels, I will now show that it may be optimal to deviate from bidding parity even in absence
of moral hazard (I assume that the principal and the agents are symmetrically informed about
investments).
Due to private information about internal resources and reservoir characteristics, each agent is
assumed to possess private information concerning the amount of petroleum it can extract
from a given tract. In some cases the regulatory agency will be able to control the extraction
level ex post, by inspection of sales contracts. Due to the high degree of vertical integration
in the petroleum industry, however, oil and gas are often sold on an internal market, e.g.,
petroleum is shipped to a petrochemical plant owned by the same corporation. In addition,
the shipment is often carried out by subsidiaries, and the internal purchasers are often located
in other countries. This distribution structure may give some leeway for strategic reporting of
extraction levels.
The problem of asymmetric information about extraction capacities, as for other types of
private information, can be met by three basic approaches by the regulatory agency: 1)
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Offering the petroleum companies incentive contracts to induce truthful reports, 2) Imposing
control measures, and 3) A combination of 1) and 2). For petroleum production there exist
instruments, installed at the well head, that can give fairly accurate measurement of
production levels. These control measures, however, are costly. High precision
measurement devices may have an investment cost close to ten million US dollars, and, in
addition, these high tech instruments are costly to operate. For large wells, investments in
advanced measurement technology may be justified. For smaller wells, however, the optimal
regulatory response may be incentive contracts, or a combination of incentive contracts and a
less expensive measurement device.f Less sophisticated measurement technology has lower
precision; it will reduce but not eliminate the uncertainty concerning extraction capacity.
Examples of small wells are the on shore tracts in the United States. There is also a trend
toward smaller wells on the Norwegian continental shelf.
Specifically, the partnerships' types are in this adverse selection model given by extraction
levels q and q' , with support q E [~,q], independently drawn from a common knowledge
distribution F(q). The extraction capacities q and q' are private information for the
partnerships, but from experience and comparisons with other tracts, the regulatory agency
knows the support and the distribution. Alternatively, the support and the distribution are
generated by an inexpensive and inaccurate measurement technology.?
It is unconventional in economic models to treat production as an exogenous variable. The
parallel variable in the previous models was the intrinsic cost parameter 8. In reality, both
q and 8 are subject to optimisation; the assumptions of exogenity are made to facilitate the
analyses.
Furthermore, the adverse selection parameter will be assumed to be perfect correlated over
time, i.e., ql = q2= q. Since the model also contains a stock effect, ac(q,~,S2) / aS2< 0,
8 For other types of exhaustible resources the available measurement technology may not be so effective as in
the petroleum industry. In this case incentive contracts may be the optimal regulatory response even for large
deposits.
9 To keep the model tractable, the choice of measurement technology is not endogenised.
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this assumption may seem restrictive. To maintain the reservoir pressure, petroleum
extraction usually starts off at a moderate pace, gradually increasing to the plateau level. A
possible generalisation would be to apply the framework of Baron and Besanko [1984],
assuming the extraction levels to be imperfectly correlated over time. This would, however,
not change the qualitative conclusions. As it would also add complexity, I will stick to the
assumption of perfect correlation. I will argue that the stock effect can be accounted for in
the present model, by allowing the period lengths to vary.
Costs and extraction levels are unobservable to the regulatory agency. Investments are
assumed to be observable and verifiable. Total costs are given by the sum of extraction costs
and investments:
(4.31) C = C(q,i"S,) + i,
The total costs of the incumbent and the entrant have the same functional form, but differ
with respect to the extraction capacity parameters; q and q I ,respectively. Investment, or
effort, lowers the extraction costs; aC(q,i,S) I ai < O. Investments are assumed fully
transferable. MIE, assumed to be able to credibly commit for the entire regulatory horizon,
offers in period one the incumbent a self-selection mechanism
{[i1(q),R1(q)],[i2(q),R2(q),q*(q)]}, i.e., a menu of type-revealing two-period contracts in
investment i and tax R. In period two, the potential entrant is offered the contract
{i I (q I ),R I (q I ),q*(q ')}. An auction is held in period two, where the entrant takes over the
license if it announces q I > q". The critical extraction level q* is determined by a breakout
rule.
The expected rent, in net present value, of an incumbent of type q announcing q, is given by
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For an entrant of type q' announcing q' , the rent is given by
(4.33) Il' (q' ,q') = P2q' -C(q' ,i' (q' ),S2) - i' (q') - R2(q')
By combining the participation constraints and the first order incentive constraints (the
derivative of equations (4.32) and (4.33) with respect to q and q'), and by integrating, we
obtain the expected information rents for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively:
(4.35) [J' (q') =1{p, - dC(q' ,~~q' ),S,) r'
q
By construction, I will now give an economic explanation of the information rent of the
entrant; equation (4.35). Instead of revealing its true extraction capacity q', the partnership
may choose to masquerade as a marginally lower producer q' -dq , , where dq' is a small
and positive number. The mimicking is done by selecting the bundle
{i' (q' -dq' ),R' (q' -dq')} intended for type q' -dq'. By inserting in the profit function
(4.33), we see that relative to type q' -dq' this strategy yields a rent equal to
(4.36)
Tl' (q , ) - Tl' (q , -dq , )
= P2q' -C(q' ,i' (q' -dq' ),S2) - [P2(q' -dq') - C(q' -dq' ,i' (q' -dq' ),S2)]
It is clear from equation (4.36) that the payoff to this strategy is equal to the difference in
resource rent for the two producer types. Taking the limit of (4.36), letting dq' approach
zero, we get the incentive constraint
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(4.37) dn' (q') ac(q' ,i' (q' ),S2)dq' = P2 - dq'
Hence, an interpretation of (4.37) is that to get incentive compatibility, the partnership group,
when they reveal their true type, is rewarded with the rent they would get if they instead were
to mimic a marginally lower producer. From this it follows that the total rent of a partnership
of type q is given by a cumulation of differences in resource rent. This rent, equation (4.35),
is obtained by integrating (4.37) and applying the participation constraint.
Similarly, the rent of the incumbent, equation (4.34), can be derived from equation (4.32).
To be willing to reveal its true extraction capacity, the incumbent must be given a rent equal
to the net present value of cumulated resource rent differences over two periods. Due to an
intertemporal dependence in extraction costs, the first period marginal extraction costs
includes ad additional term; the stock effect.
The regulatory agency seeks to maximise the expected value of the intertemporal welfare
function
(4.38)
with respect to the investment levels il' i2, i' , and the breakout level q", Inserting for the
rent functions (4.34) and (4.35), i.e., incorporating the incentive and the participation
constraints, the expected welfare is given by
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-q
EW = f {(l +A)[Plq - C(q,~ (q),SI) - ~(q)]
s
-(A+ )[ _dC(q,~(q),SI)+8F( .)dC(q,i2(q),S2)]I-F(q)
Il PI dq q dS2 f(q)
+8F(q·{ (1+ Å. )[p,q - C(q,i,(q),S,) - i,(q)]_ (Å. +p)(p, _ iIC(q,~q),S,» 1~~;q) ]
-q
+8 f {(l + A)[P2q' -C(q' ,i' (q' ),S2) - i' (q')]
(4.39) q.
-(A +1l)(P2 - dC(q',i' (q' ),S2» 1-F(q' )}f(q')dq '}f(q)dq
dq' f(q')
•
Maximisation with respect to il' i' , ~, and q.,yields the first order conditions
(4.40) dC(q,ipSI) -1= _ A + Il d
2C(q,ipSI ) 1-F(q)
dil 1+A dqd~ f(q)
(4.41) _ dC( q , ,i ' ,SI) _ 1= A + Il d
2C( q , ,i ' ,SI) 1- F (q , )
di' 1+A dq , di ' f(q , )
(4.42) _ dC(q,~,S2) -1= A + Il [d
2C(q,4,S2) _ d2C(q,i2,S2)] 1-F(q)
d~ 1+A dS2di2 dqdi2 f(q)
(4.43)
-Cc i( )S)-"( )_A+Il( _dC(q,i2(q),S2»I-F(q)
P2q q>2 q '2 ~ q 1+ A P2 dq f (q)
_ A + Il dC(q,i2(q),S2) 1-F(q)
I+A dS2 f(q)
= ·-C(· i'( ·)S)-i'( .)_A+Il( _dC(q·,i'(q·),S2»I-F(q·)
P2q q, q, 2 q 1+A P2 dq· f (q*)
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Proposition 4.2
In a repeated auctions model of the petroleum industry, with private information about
extraction levels, deviation from bidding parity is obtained without the introduction of moral
hazard.
Analogous to section 3.2, I have made the following assumptions
(A2') iPC(q,i"S,) < O Static single crossing
dqdi,
(A7 ') d
2C(q,i2,S2) > O Dynamic single crossing
dS2diz
(A3') d
2C(q,i
"
S,) > O Convexity
di2
These assumptions have plausible economic explanations. Assumption (A2 '), static single
crossing, states that the rate of cost reductions from investments is higher for high volume
than for low volume producers, i.e., investments are more effective at a high than a low
extraction level. The dynamic single crossing property, assumption (A7 '), states that the rate
of reduction in extraction costs caused by investments, is decreasing in the remaining
petroleum stock, i.e., investments and remaining petroleum reserves are assumed to be
substitutes. The convexity assumption, (A3 '), implies diminishing returns of investments.
Parallel to the previous models, I also assume a monotone hazard rate:
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(A9') !!:_( f(q) ) > O
dq l-F(q) -
The first best investment level is where the marginal investment-induced cost reduction is
equal to the marginal investment cost:
(4.44) aC(q,i"S,) -1 =O
di,
This solution will be obtained in a situation of symmetric information about extraction levels.
Under asymmetric information, optimal regulation will imply a wedge between marginal
costs and benefits of investment. As is clear from the conditions (4.40), (4.41), and (4.42),
the wedge is equal to the marginal information cost.l'' Due to the convexity assumption (A7
') we get the conventional underinvestment result; to enhance rent extraction, investments are
reduced from their first best levels. Underinvestment applies for all types q < q, i.e., we have
no distortion at the top.
Abstracting from the stock effect, i.e., setting aC(q,i2,S2) / aS2=O, condition (4.43) states
that the breakout level q. is determined by equality of the period two net social value
generated from the two bidders; i.e., we have bidding parity. In the absence of moral hazard,
this would be the optimal breakout rule in a manufacturing industry. In the petroleum
industry, having an intertemporai dependence in extraction costs due to the resource
constraint, the optimal breakout rule has an additional term. If the net social value of a given
petroleum deposit is increasing in the producer type 11, which is a plausible assumption, it is
clear from condition (4.43) that, for the partnership types q < q, the stock effect will imply a
bias in favour of the incumbent: To be awarded the license, the potential entrant must bid a
higher q than the extraction level -securing equality of net social value of the two
10 See section 3.4 for a more detailed explanation.
11 . C(· S . A.. + Il ( ac(q,il(q),S,) F(q).. ..I.e., If Plq - q,z,(q), I) -z(q) - -- PI - )-- IS mcreasmg 10 q.
1+ A.. aq f(q)
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partnerships, i.e., q* is increased as a consequence of the stock effect. The discrimination
result can be verified by implicit derivation of (4.43):
(4.45)
A+1l1-F(q)
___ dq~*__ = ~_l_+_A __ ~f~(q~) ~ ~
d(de / dS) _ de _ di' + A+ Il dZC 1- F(q) _ A+ Il ( _ dC )!!_(1- F(q))
pz dq* dq' 1+)., dq*z f(q) l.f.A pz dq* dq f(q)
The derivative is positive, due to convexity (A3), monotone hazard rate (A9 '), and the
monotonicity constraint (appendix 3.2).
The economic interpretation is that discrimination of the potential entrant raises the
probability of prolonged license period for the incumbent, causing a larger part of the stock
effect to be internalised. The incumbent's intertemporal incentive constraint is thus relaxed,
and enhanced rent capture is the result.l? Rent capture is now improved both by careful
design of incentive contracts (with distortive investment taxes), and by the biased auction
rule. MIE is thus equipped with an additional means for rent extraction.
Improved rent extraction of the incumbent is obtained at the expense of optimal selection.
Rearranging equation (4.43), yields
-
12 For type q bidding parity is still obtained. Full internalisation is always secured for the most efficient
producer type since it does not run the risk of being replaced.
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(4.46)
-(,4, + f.1) aC(q,i2(q),S2) (1- F(q»dq =
aS2
[(l+Å)[p,q. - C(q·,i' (q·),S,) - i' (q'n- (Å + Il )(p, - ac(q· ,~)q·),S,» 1~~~~.) ]f(q)dq
-[(l +Å )[p,q - Ctq.i; (q),S,) - i,(q)]- (Å +Il )(p, - ac(q,~~q),S,» 1~~\q) ]f(q)dq
It follows from (4.46) that the critical extraction level q. is determined by equality of the
welfare gain of relaxation of the incumbent's incentive constraint (left hand side) and the
expected welfare loss of inefficient selection (right hand side).
The selection loss is equal to the difference in expected net social value from the two bidders.
The welfare gain of distorting q* can be seen by comparing equations (4.34) and (4.35). By
increasing q* an expected marginal resource rent is shifted from the potential entrant to the
incumbent. Assuming the two partnerships have the same welfare weight (1- f.1), i.e., the
same foreign equity share u , the shifting of rent does not have a direct welfare effect. Due to
the intertemporal dependence in extraction costs, the incumbent experiences an additional
effect. A higher q* means a higher probability of prolonging the license period, and,
therefore, a larger share of the stock effect will be internalised. As a consequence, expected
overall rents are reduced at the rate aC(q,i2 (q),S2) / as2. We recognise this term from the left
hand side of equation (4.46). The explanations of the other terms are as follows: The rent is
reduced for all incumbent types with higher extraction capacity, having probability
(1- F(q», and the value-weight of increased rent extraction is (,4, +,u); the value of
transferring one unit of income from the partnership to the government.
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Chapter 5
Petroleum taxation and regulation.
Policy implications from principal-agent theory,
and a comparison with the current Norwegian system*
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric information about costs is a generic problem for taxation. The international
nature of the petroleum industry, together with the high degree of vertical integration and the
technological complexity, implies that the problems of private information are bound to be
more pervasive in this sector. The specific cost structure in the petroleum industry, with
interternporal dependence in extraction costs (stock effect), leads to a special regulatory
response to asymmetric information.
* I am thankful to Kåre P. Hagen, Diderik Lund, Ulf Pedersen, and Guttorm Schjelderup for useful comments.
174
When designing the petroleum tax system, the special features of the industry should be taken
into account Still, the Norwegian system of petroleum taxation is directly based on the
onshore corporate tax system. The petroleum tax system is adjusted to take into account one
of the special features of the industry; the presence of resource rents. The present system
seems to be more of a complicated patchwork than the result of careful and conscious design.
Instead of creating a new tax system that is specially designed to capture the resource rent,
taking into account special features of the petroleum industry, the government simply added a
few extra taxes on top of the existing on shore corporate tax system. There may be some
benefits of having similar tax systems on and off shore; in particular to prevent tax arbitrage
between the two sectors.' A major implication of this monograph, however, is that the
theoretical underpinnings of the on shore tax system, which presupposes symmetric
information, are not adequate for the petroleum industry where private information is
prevalent.
The recent petroleum tax reform was, parallel to the reform in on shore corporate taxation,
based on principles of neutrality and uniformity. If the economic decisions of the petroleum
companies are socially optimal in the absence of taxation, a neutral (non-distorting)
petroleum tax system is optimal. In the presence of market imperfections, however, a second
best optimum may call for distortive taxation. The introduction of a carbon dioxide emission
tax, correcting for environmental externalities, indicates that this is recognised by the
government. The market imperfection represented by asymmetric information, however, is
not accounted for in the tax system. Uniform taxation (level playing field) secures an optimal
allocation of capital among sectors; again under the assumption of no market imperfections.
Attempts have been made to level the playing field among the various licenses, but there is a
large deviation between the marginal tax rates on and off shore, thus causing an inoptimal
allocation of capital among the two sectors. If the extent of private information differs
among petroleum fields, moreover, second best optimum does not imply uniform taxation.
1 Tax arbitrage, however, relies more on differences in marginal tax rates than on differences in tax systems.
With marginal tax rates of 28 and 78 per cent on and off shore, respectively, the problem of tax arbitrage is not
accounted for in the present tax system.
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The adverse selection and moral hazard models of the previous chapters have endogenously
determined optimal mechanisms for regulation and taxation of the petroleum industry under
asymmetric information. In this chapter I compare these normative recommendations with
the current Norwegian system.
Norwegian petroleum taxation and regulation are set to serve many objectives and it is
subject to political constraints. The principal-agent models of petroleum regulation, in
comparison, focus on the single objective of rent extraction. The models abstract from
political constraints and the multitude of objectives. With the emphasis on asymmetric
information, however, principal-agent theory introduces incentive constraints. It appears that
such constraints have been neglected in design of the current Norwegian system.
Principal-agent theory (adverse selection and moral hazard models) generates the following
normative recommendations: Licenses should be awarded by auctioning of incentive
contracts, and the tax system should consist of simple menus of linear contracts. The
recommended tax system is neither neutral nor uniform. The petroleum companies should
bear a considerable part of the risk. Recommended response to the problem of private
information is a combination of incentive schemes and monitoring.
Present Norwegian petroleum regulation is based on discretionary licensing. The petroleum
tax system is complex, with a stated intention of neutrality and uniformity. The government
bears most of the risk. Problems of asymmetric information are mitigated by control
measures.
This was a brief comparison, indicating that current Norwegian petroleum taxation and
regulation have little in common with the regulatory framework endogenously determined by
regulation theory. Byelaborating on this comparison, I will in this chapter show that the
deviation between theory and regulatory practice is not so fundamental as it may appear at
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first sight. Furthermore, I will discuss whether some of the differences can be justified by the
following political explanations: a) The government's objective function is more complex
than is assumed in the theoretical analyses, and b) The electorate disapproves of repatriations
of funds made by foreign petroleum companies. The complexity of the current system might
be explained by a), and b) might be the reason for the high level of risk borne by the
government.
5.2 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS
The problems of asymmetric information are more severe for petroleum companies than for
on shore companies. The reasons for this are two-fold: 1) Due to presence of large rents,
the incentive for exaggerating true costs is higher on the continental shelf, and 2) The
vertically integrated multinational petroleum companies have more opportunities to
camouflage its costs.
The petroleum industry is extracting a scarce and exhaustible natural resource, yielding a
considerable resource rent. Consequently, there is much to gain from strategic reporting of
costs. Furthermore, certain characteristics of this industry make it difficult for the tax
authorities to monitor costs. First of all, the tax subjects are vertically integrated
multinationals. A special monitoring problem pertaining to multinational companies, due to
imperfect international harmonisation of the national tax systems, is the problem of
international tax arbitrage by the use of tax-minimising transfer pricing, e.g., borrowing at a
high interest rate or purchasing expensive insurance from an affiliated company located in a
tax haven. An incentive for transfer pricing exists when the effective tax rates, taking into
account procedures for credit of taxes paid to foreign governments, vary between countries.?
2 In the present Norwegian petroleum tax system, having marginal tax of 78 per cent, the incentives for tax
arbitrage are enormous. Not only is it profitable, by means of transfer pricing, to shift profits from the
Norwegian continental shelf to tax havens, but it is also lucrative for Norwegian companies to shift resource
rents from off shore to on shore activities, with marginal tax rates of 78 and 28 per cent, respectively.
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A distinguishing feature of multinational corporations is that the interfirm transactions are
not valued in an open market. Instead, within the limits established by the monitoring
opportunities and efforts of the national tax authorities, these firms choose an optimal transfer
price. The problem of transfer pricing is particularly severe in the petroleum sector due to a
high degree of vertical integration, giving many interfirm transactions. Another part of the
problem is the fact that many of the inputs in the offshore industryare not standard
commodities with an established market price, making it hard to monitor costs or impose
norm prices.' Some costs can be controlled by auditing, but this is not the case for calculated
costs, e.g., capital costs. Due to the high investments in the petroleum industry, the
companies' capital costs are important.
As pointed out, there are several obstacles to a direct ex post auditing of costs in the
petroleum industry. Alternatively, the regulatory agency might attempt to deduce true costs
from observable variables, e.g., the extraction levels chosen. If the regulator knows the cost
function, i.e., the total costs for a given extraction level and a given intrinsic efficiency
parameter, and if extraction levels and efficiency are observable, there is symmetric
information about costs. Through their operating activities, however, the petroleum
companies obtain field-specific information that is not available to the government.
Examples of such private information are knowledge about the estimated size and quality of a
particular petroleum reservoir, and knowledge of how adequate the company's internal
resources are in developing a given deposit. Consequently, a petroleum company has private
information about its intrinsic efficiency parameter, causing asymmetric information about
costs. A necessary condition for the persistence of this private information, is a complex
production technology that has not been standardised. This condition pertains to deep water
operations on the Norwegian continental shelf, but more rarely to industries on shore.
Moreover, being residual claimant for only 22 per cent of its cost savings, the petroleum companies are not
given incentives to cost consciousness in the present tax system. An obvious remedy is to reduce the marginal
tax rate and, at the same time, maintain the revenues by imposing fixed payments, either in form of discretionary
license fees or up front payments determined by auctions.
3 Examples are tailor-made parts or modules to production platforms, and specialised consulting services.
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On the basis of experience from a number of petroleum deposits, the government can be
assumed to know the general cost function. It has, however, only imperfect information
about reservoir characteristics and the internal efficiency of a partnership at a particular
petroleum reservoir, i.e., there is private information about an intrinsic cost parameter. In this
situation it is in the interest of the partnership to misrepresent its own type; it can obtain an
information rent by imitating a partnership with lower efficiency and a smaller deposit. To
effectively masquerade as a partnership with high extraction costs, it will choose the
extraction level that is optimal for this type, i.e., it produces a suboptimal quantity of
petroleum. The information rent obtained, relative to the marginally less efficient company,
is equal to the cost advantage. Hence, the manifestation of private information about costs, is
that petroleum companies report a lower efficiency than their true level,"
5.3 THE REVELATION PRINCIPLE
As argued, monitoring of costs is especially difficult in the petroleum industry. The control
measures are not only bound to be imperfect, they will also require many resources. This
may give scope for revelation mechanisms, i.e., incentive systems securing a voluntary
revelation of information.
Adverse selection models, i.e., models of regulatory settings where the agent (petroleum
company) obtains private information before entering into a contract with the principal (the
Ministry of Industry and Energy; Mill), make use of the revelation principle. During the
negotiating process the private companies will, in return for an information rent, reveal their
private information to Mm. In the primal formulation of these models, the agents, subject to
4 This is not to say that the companies commit crime or fraud. In measuring efficiency parameters, and even
more in estimating the size of a petroleum deposit, there is not always an unquestionable truth to be found. To
calculate these measures one has to choose which data to use and which measurement methods to apply. The
companies, seeking to maximise the payoff to the shareholders, may act strategically by not reporting their best
estimate, but rather using a selective choice of methods and a selective presentation of data in order to obtain
highest possible profits.
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an incentive constraint, announce their true intrinsic cost parameter to the principal, The dual
approach is closer to present tax systems; revelation is achieved by self selection, i.e., by
offering the partnership a carefully designed net tax schedule (e.g., the one depicted in figure
3.1), the private information is revealed by the choice of extraction levels. With the high
number of tax instruments in the present complex tax regime, it should be possible, by
simulation, to generate a concave net tax schedule of the type illustrated in figure 3.1. As
shown in chapter 3, however, the concave schedule can be implemented by a menu of hyper
planes. To generate these hyper planes, we need only two tax instruments; royalties and
license fees.
The present Norwegian petroleum regulation has features that may serve the function as
revelation mechanisms, e.g., the licence applications and the offering of work programmes
may convey some information about the company's assessment of profitability of the various
licenses.
5.4 MORE ON IMPLEMENTATION
To compare the present Norwegian petroleum tax regime with the recommendations from the
normative theory of the previous chapters, one should note some fundamental features of
implementation of optimal auctions and incentive contracts. The taxation regime generated
by the static model of chapter 2 implied a relatively simple tax scheme: A menu of linear
contracts, composed of a license fee and a proportional royalty. In section 3.5 I showed that
the optimal regulatory outcome in a dynamic model is also implementable by proportional
royalties and license fees. Chapter 4 analyses repeated auctions of incentive contracts. These
contracts follow the pattern of the previous chapters; the incumbent is offered a two-period
contract along the lines of chapter 3, whereas the potential entrant bids for static contracts
analogous to the linear schemes in chapter 2. In the model with private information about
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extraction levels (section 4.4), the linear contract is generated by licence fees and an
investment tax.>
In the auction models, the partnerships bid by announcing efficiency parameters (section 4.3)
or extraction levels (section 4.4). The regulatory contracts can be given an alternative
implementation that is closer to reallife auctions.f The optimal allocation is implemented in
two stages; first the partnerships are asked how much they are willing to pay for the license,
and thereafter they select among a menu of contracts generated by license fees and royalties.
5.5 COMPLEX TAX SYSTEM
The present Norwegian petroleum taxation system, in comparison, is complex. It is a hybrid
scheme, composed of an income tax, a state tax, a special tax, a capital tax, a withholding tax,
and a carbon dioxide emission tax. The complexity is not primarily caused by the number of
taxes, but the fact that the various taxes have different tax bases. The tax package also
contains license fees, but these are negligible. Royalties are abolished for new licenses.
An interesting question is whether the optimal schemes from chapters 2-4 can be combined
with other forms of taxation, i.e., if royalties can correct for private information, carbon
dioxide emission tax secure internalisation of environmental effects, income taxes capture
resource rent, etc. Under symmetric information there is usually no problem, as long as the
various objectives do not outnumber the means. Since the means are numerous in petroleum
regulation (licensing conditions, equity shares, various tax instruments, etc.), MIE should be
in a fortunate position. When there is asymmetric information, however, serving many
objectives is not straightforward. Based on a motive of rent extraction subject to asymmetric
information, royalties and license fees are endogenously determined by regulation theory as
S Since extraction levels in this model are assumed to be non-observable to the regulator, the regulatory
contract is made contingent on the observable investment levels. To enhance rent extraction, the investment
decision is distorted, by the introduction ohm investment tax.
6 See Laffont and Tirole [1993], section 7.5.2.
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the optimal tax instruments. To reach this conclusion the revelation principle is applied, with
binding incentive constraints in optimum. Let us, on top of the endogenous royalties and
license fees, introduce an income tax, a state tax, a carbon dioxide emission tax, or a special
tax. A relevant question now is whether a menu of license fees and royalties can be applied
to obtain self selection, and, at the same time, other objectives can be achieved by applying
these other tax instruments. The answer to this question is negative. Whereas the tax
schemes proposed in chapters 2-4 are contingent only on observable variables (extraction
levels chosen, price levels etc.), the added taxes are contingent on reported costs, that MIE is
assumed unable to observe. The incentive constraints will be strengthened since the
partnership now has two motives for exaggerating its costs: 1) To obtain a more favourable
(license fee, royalty) bundle, and 2) To reduce other taxes. Due to the additional motive, the
revelation of the basic tax scheme will no longer hold when supplemented with the other tax
forms." Consequently, the complexity of the petroleum tax system reduces its capability of
rent extraction. Conversely, enhanced rent extraction by the use of incentive contracts,
cannot be achieved by simply introducing a system of royalties and license fees on top of the
existing tax structure; a more radical system revision is required.
One might think that the complexity of the Norwegian tax system for the petroleum sector is
caused by a complex objective function. In addition to the objective of rent extraction, from
which the theoretical results are derived, Norwegian petroleum regulation is also supposed to
serve regional, industrial, and macroeconomic policies. The complexities of the tax system,
however, do not seem suited to achieve these objectives. If securing of stable demand and
employment in specific regions and industries is to be achieved by means of petroleum
regulation (which is questionable), it is more effectively done by the discretionary licensing
conditions than by the tax system. In the case of an auctioning system, employment is best
regulated by the selection and timing of licenses to be auctioned. The complexity of the
present petroleum tax system is perhaps better explained by its origin; it is based on the
7 An exception is the carbon dioxide emission tax, provided the cost function is additively separable in
abatement and extraction costs.
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onshore corporate tax system, and augmented with special features to extract resource rent,
e.g., the special tax.
5.6 UNIFORMITY AND NEUTRALITY
In the recent petroleum tax reform, there was a stated objective of a neutral tax system that
should not discriminate between licenses (level the playing field).8 The argument in favour
of uniform taxation is that maximal payoff from a given level of investment is obtained when
the allocation of capital remains undistorted. Following this argument, one might argue,
however, that the perspective has been too limited. With marginal tax rates of 28 and 78 per
cent off shore and on shore, respectively, there is not uniformity between these two sectors of
the economy. As pointed out, the differences in marginal tax rates creates incentives for
transfer pricing.
In the petroleum industry, however, where asymmetric information is prevalent, the objective
of uniform taxation is questionable. The theoretical underpinnings of uniform taxation
presupposes symmetric information, and are not adequate for cases of private information.
One of the most important implications of regulation theory, is the recommendation of
individualised contracts for each license. It will be optimal for MIE to tailor the incentive
scheme to the information structure in each separate case. As the extent of private
information most likely will differ among licences, this calls for discrimination. Optimal
discrimination can be implemented by field-specific royalties and licence fees. Norway had
a field-specific royalty system, but in the recent tax reform this was abolished for new
licenses. The purpose was to create a non-discriminatory tax system. According to O.t.prp.
12, 1991-92, benefits of uniform taxation are efficient trading of oil between the operators of
different oil fields, and realisation of welfare-improving inter-field projects. If the
8 See O.tprp. 12, 1991-92.
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discriminatory royalties are properly designed to correct for marginal information costs,
however, they will secure these benefits.
Despite the stated policy of non-discrimination, the Norwegian government has a record of
tailoring the tax system. Selective tax relieves have been given to supplementary projects,
and the choice of equity shares in the various licenses is an important differentiation device.
Abolishing royalties, along with other features of recent tax reforms, also had the intention of
creating neutrality.? Due to asymmetric information in the petroleum sector, however, the
policy objective of neutrality is neither implementable nor second best optimal. A system
based on net income taxes, where the companies due to private information can manipulate
their reports on costs or extraction levels, will not be neutral. In the adverse selection models
of chapters 2, 3, and 4, distortive royalties are a second best response to asymmetric
information. With the purpose of enhanced rent extraction, extraction levels are deliberately
distorted away from the first best levels. The economic explanation is the following: The
partnership's information rent is derived from its bargaining position; instead of revealing its
true costs it may choose to camouflage as a producer group with marginally higher costs.
The imitation is done by selecting the extraction level meant for the marginally less efficient
partnership, and the information rent, relative to this partnership, is equal to the difference in
extraction costs. It is second best optimal for MIE to distort (reduce) the extraction level for
the marginally less efficient partnership, since it will reduce the cost difference, and therefore
also the information rent. Following the same argument, it will be optimal to distort the
extraction levels for all types but the most efficient.U' The neutrality result, therefore,
although generally applicable under symmetric information, only applies as an asymptotic
result under asymmetric information.
9 The only tax with a stated distortive purpose is the carbon dioxide emission tax, correcting for environmental
externalities.
10 The production of the most efficient type remains undistorted, since no other producer has anything to gain
by imitating his type.
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5.7 DIVIDE AND RULE
Provided it can avoid collusion, I have shown that by holding an auction, MIE can improve
the regulatory outcome. By inducing competition among partnerships, rent extraction is
improved. For reasons of tractability, I have in the adverse selection models assumed that the
companies in a partnership form a stable cartel in negotiations with the government.U
Following the above reasoning one step further, however, MIE might increase its negotiation
power by exploiting conflicts of interest among the companies working together in a license
group. Such conflicts of interest, some of which have been exposed in the media, often result
from difference in portfolios (if one or several of the partners participate in adjacent licenses)
and different investments in infrastructure (competing transport and refining facilities).
Conflicts are likely to reduce the bargaining power of the partnership, making it possible for
MIE to achieve revelation at a lower cost. As a possible strategy for further improvement of
its bargaining position, MIE could introduce discriminatory policies with the intent to
increase the conflicts of interest among the partners.
5.8 CONTINGENT LICENSING
Norwegian petroleum policy has, as one of its objectives, the task of securing a stable
employment in the engineering and construction industry. Hence, in periods of idle capacity
in the mechanic industry, the government is eager to develop new petroleum fields. The
petroleum companies, realising MIEs position, thereby gain more negotiating power and are
likely to enjoy higher rents. This illustrates the fact that introducing additional objectives in
petroleum regulation, may reduce MIEs ability of serving its primary objective of rent
extraction.
11 The methodological advantage is that the cartel assumption makes regulation a problem of optimisation.
whereas with heterogeneous companies we must resort to less developed equilibrium models; see section 1.10.
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This discussion is related to the screening models in the following way: MIE loses
negotiating power in periods of idle capacity because the partnerships know that the project
will be implemented no matter costs or reservoir sizes, i.e., MIE has no reservation point with
relation to the agents' types. In other words, a postponement strategy is not credible, and the
regulator loses the option of waiting. If MIE were to serve the single objective of rent
extraction, or, with the present objective function in periods of full employment in the
mechanic industry, it may benefit from making the implementation contingent on the
companies' types being in a certain range.l- For the strategy of contingent licensing to be
successful, the government is dependent on credibility in its claim that it will postpone
awarding of the license to a later licensing round if the reported cost parameter is above a
certain predetermined level.
5.9 AUCTIONS VERSUS DISCRETION
The potential benefit of auctions is increased rent extraction, by truncating the support of the
asymmetry of information.U MIE applies a discretionary licensing system instead of
auctions. The arguments against auctions are two-fold:
1) Collusion. The bids will be too lowas a consequence of imperfect competition.
According to Rowland and Hann [1987], the exposures to risk, the scale, and the heavy front-
end loading of costs, tend to restrict the offshore industry to an oligopolistic structure.
2) Political risk. Low bids may be the consequence of the fact that the government is not
able to commit not to tax the companies heavily after irreversible investments have been
sunk.
12 See the analysis of optimal cutoff type in section 2.8.
13 See section 2.11.
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In addition, there are problems of underinvestment (due to moral hazard) and overproduction
(derived from the stock effect). As shown in chapter 4, however, these problems can be
mitigated by introducing a biased auction procedure.
Laffont [1994] argues that the assumption of noncooperative behaviour in auction theory is
somewhat naive; realising that the purpose of auctions is to extract a maximal surplus, the
firms are likely to protect themselves by collusion. In the current Norwegian discretionary
licensing system, there is usually a high number of applicants in the licensing rounds. This
may give hope of competitive behaviour. On the other hand, due to specialisation of
competence and improved profitability of developing tracts close to a company's existing
extraction, accommodation, and transport facilities, the various companies are often not
interested in the same blocks. In addition, limited resources introduce an upper levelon the
number of licenses a company wishes to undertake. In this economic environment, one might
suspect the following form of tacit collusion: We will not actively seek licenses in your back
yard, if you keep out of our interest sphere. In the recent years, necessary conditions for
collusion have been reduced. As the Norwegian petroleum industry has become mature,
increased geological knowledge has made it easier to raise external capital. Together with
diffusion of technology, barriers to entry have been reduced. At the same time, the domestic
petroleum industry has become competitive.
Norway clearly applies a discretionary regulation of the petroleum industry, as the licensing
process (especially the distribution of equity shares in licences) and the tax system is
responsive to changes over time in prices, technology and estimates of recoverable reserves.
In this non-commitment environment, auctions are not likely to be a fruitful regulatory
instrument; petroleum companies will not be willing to pay much up front for a petroleum
license without a credible guarantee as to future taxation. With a change of policy, however,
the Norwegian government might improve its commitment credibility; see section 1.7.
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Summing up, there have been serious obstacles to applying auctions on the continental shelf.
The situation is changing. In a mature petroleum industry there might be scope for the
introduction of auctioning of licenses. This would be compatible with the increased
integration of Norway in the European Union.
5.10 ADVERSE SELECTION VERSUS MORAL HAZARD
I have considered two types of asymmetric information models, 1) Moral hazard (section 1.9
and 2) Adverse selection (chapters 2-4). Adverse selection models refer to the case where
agents have precontractual private information. Applying this framework to the petroleum
industry, I have analysed regulatory problems when a partnership has private information
about its intrinsic efficiency level and its production capability from a given tract. The focus
of adverse selection models is on screening and rent extraction. Moral hazard models,
focusing on the trade-off between provision of incentives and optimal risk sharing, refer to
situations of symmetric information at the contracting stage, but where the agents' actions or
the circumstances of the actions are non-observable to the regulator. I have discussed the
regulatory situation where the partnership has private information with respect to its effort to
increase production and reduce costs.
An important question is whether the results of the two types of models, applied to petroleum
regulation, are in conflict. Is there a trade-off between optimal risk-sharing and type-
revelation? It appears that the answer is no; the qualitative results of adverse selection and
moral hazard are compatible in the petroleum industry. It is also clear that the present
Norwegian risk sharing between the government and the petroleum companies, is not in line
with the normative recommendations from incentive theory.
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The total risk in petroleum projects is the sum of risk related to production and costs
(idiosyncratic risk) and income risk (systematic risk).14 Income risk (price and exchange rate
risk) is exogenous to the petroleum companies, i.e., there is no moral hazard attached to this
type of risk. Hence, the risk is to be shared among the government and the companies
according to their risk aversion.P Production and costs, on the other hand, are dependent on
the companies' effort, which is not observable to the regulatory agency (moral hazard).
Maximal incentives are given when the companies are residual claimants for all of their cost
savings. With this contract, however, all the idiosyncratic risk is borne by the agent. Since
the risk related to production and costs can be effectively diversified in their portfolio of
petroleum projects, however, the petroleum companies are not negatively affected by this
risk.16 Hence, we do not get the conventional trade-off between incentives and risk sharing.
Summing up the normative recommendations of the theory of moral hazard, the partnerships
are to bear all the idiosyncratic risk, whereas the systematic risk should be split among the
government and the companies. In other words, a considerable part of the total risk is to be
borne by the petroleum companies. The adverse selection models of previous chapters,
assuming both principal and agents to be risk neutral, are not suited for analysing risk-
sharing. Nevertheless, the implementation of the optimal adverse selection contracts includes
auction payments and license fees as essential elements. These are fixed payments made by
the partnership before the petroleum field is put on stream, i.e., before uncertainty resolves.
Hence, much risk is borne by the petroleum companies."? In qualitative terms, therefore,
there does not seem to be a conflict concerning petroleum risk sharing between the two main
theory branches of asymmetric information.
14 See section 1.8.
15 Optimal risk sharing under symmetric information is given by equality of the parties' marginal rates of
substitution of income between the different states of nature.
16 If a company has a portfolio of 10-15 imperfectly correlated projects of about the same size, most of the
idiosyncratic risk (i.e., risk with relation to production and costs) will be diversified; see section 1.8. Even
with a smaller portfolio of projects, a petroleum company should not be averse to idiosyncratic risk since the
shareholders can diversify this risk on their own behalf, by holding shares in several petroleum companies.
17 Since risk is not explicitly accounted for in the adverse selection models, they do not give answer to what
types of risk that are to be borne by the companies and the government.
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Comparing the theoretical recommendations with the present Norwegian petroleum
regulatory system, however, there seems to be a major conflict. The overall effect of the
Norwegian discretionary licensing system (with negligible license fees and a high direct state
participation) and a complex tax system, is that the government bears most of the risk,
regardless of whether it is idiosyncratic or systematic.P A major element of the tax system,
contributing to the shifting of risk from the companies to the government, is the high
marginal tax rate on net income (78 per cent). As discussed in chapter 1, a high marginal tax
rate also leads to problems of transfer pricing and low cost consciousness. A major policy
recommendation from incentive theory, therefore, is to select an alternative means of
extracting rent from the petroleum companies, by introducing a system of up front payments
(auction payments and license fees). These payments will give room for lower marginal tax
rates, and more of the risk will be borne by the private companies.
The deviation between actual practice and theoretical recommendations as to risk sharing,
may have political explanations. Ifmore of the risk is to be shifted to the private petroleum
companies, they will, of course, have to be compensated for this added risk. Furthermore, by
definition, this shifting of risk implies larger fluctuations in the companies' net after tax
income (and, correspondingly, smaller fluctuations in net total government take). Losses in
bad years will be compensated by large profits in good years. Herein is the political problem;
the electorate will, in some years, have to accept large profits in private petroleum companies.
Specifically, shareholders of domestic petroleum companies may receive large dividends, and
foreign companies may repatriate billions of Norwegian kroner. A political consensus that
the petroleum resources constitute a public property, may make such events hard to accept.
The current system with large fluctuations in net total government take and relatively stable
private profits, may be politically more acceptable since it gives the electorate an impression
of effective rent extraction.
18 See section 1.9.
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The government seems repeatedly to be taken by surprise each time there is a major change
in the oil price. With a history of large fluctuations in both oil price and the exchange rate of
US dollar, however, the oil price denominated in Norwegian kroner should not be expected to
remain stable. Following price changes, the Ministry of Finance makes public an updated
estimate of the consequence for the government net total take from the petroleum sector.
This estimate often varies radically during the fiscal year, thus clearly illustrating the fact that
most of the income risk is borne by the government. When the petroleum revenues fall
below a certain level, the government proposes budget cuts. With this budget policy,
inefficient risk sharing in the petroleum industry may also cause fiscal adjustment costs.
5.11 INCENTIVES VERSUS CONTROL
Focusing on asymmetric information and imperfect competition, this monograph contains
principal-agent models that endogenously determine second best regulatory mechanisms in
the petroleum industry. The optimal mechanisms are biased auctions and incentive contracts;
distortive and individualised tax schedules designed to reveal private information and to
capture as much resource rent as possible. The policy recommendations of this regulation
theory approach contrast with those of the Chicago school, which by ignoring market
imperfections, recommends that a petroleum license simply should be sold to the highest
bidder.
The actual Norwegian regulatory system represents a third approach: Rent extraction is
pursued by a uniform tax system, and the problem of asymmetric information is mitigated by
control measures. The tax system is not designed to reveal private information by use of
incentive contracts. Instead, resources are devoted to monitoring the private petroleum
companies, thus reducing information rents by creating obstacles to strategic reponing of
costs, extraction capabilities, etc. A special regulatory and controlling agency, Norwegian
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Petroleum Directorate (NPD), has control of economic and technical data as one of its main
objectives.
There are several specific factors reducing the effectiveness of monitoring as a means for
enhanced rent extraction in the petroleum industry. As argued in section 5.2, due to the
international nature of the petroleum industry, the high degree of vertical integration, the
presence of considerable resource rents, the complex and non-standardised technology, and
the uncertainty about the size and the quality of a given petroleum deposit, monitoring of
costs is especially difficult in this industry. Consequently, the control measures will be
imperfect; considerable noise in petroleum cost monitoring is inevitable. Moreover, in order
to effectively deter misrepresentation of information, the controlling agency will have to
impose high penalties if it detects deviations between reported and true costs. Limited
liability restricts the size of these penalties.!? Furthermore, monitoring and control activities
are costly. To impose penalties the controlling agency must present verifiable documentation
of misrepresentation, calling for detailed and costly investigations. Obviously, auditing the
consolidated accounts of a multinational company, checking for transfer pricing between a
large number of subsidiaries in many parts of the world, will be imperfect as well as resource
demanding. Many resources will also have to be spent in control of technical data, e.g., by
conducting independent geological and geophysical surveys. Finally, the present regime of
discretionary licensing and monitoring, as opposed to auctions and incentive mechanisms, is
based on discretion rather than rules, thus being more exposed to regulatory capture.
Taking into account the limitations and costs of control measures, optimal response to
asymmetric information prescribed by regulation theory is a combination of monitoring and
incentive mechanisms.t" Norwegian petroleum regulation is based solelyon control
19 A possible penalty in the present system of discretionary licensing, is to deny equity shares in future
licensing rounds. This penalty is not restricted by limited liability.
20 An example is Baron and Besanko [1984]. In a model of private information about costs, the regulator has
authority to ex post conduct an imperfect and costly audit and to impose penalties. Optimal regulatory policy
implies incentive contracts. In addition, the regulator follows the following optimal auditing strategy: The
company is audited if it reports sufficiently high costs, and the maximum allowable penalty is imposed if the
realised costs are lower than reported.
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measures. The focus on monitoring is not accidental; control measures are well founded in
Norwegian industrial policy. Maybe now time has come to benefit from insights of the new
regulatory economics.
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